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PREFACE 
The Tenth Inter-American Conference, held in Caracas during March 
1954 adopted resolution LXVI which convened a meeting of Ministers 
of Finance.or Economy of the member countries of the Organisation of 
American States, and provided, inter alia, that "the Inter-American Eco-
nomic and Social Council shall request of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, through the proper channels, the collaboration of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in the prepara-
tion and holding of the meeting". 
Following this request, the Executive Secretary of the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America, on the instruction of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations and at the invitation of the Chairman of the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council, Sr. Jorge Hazera, consulted in 
May 1954 in Washington, D. C. with Dr. Octavio Paranagua, Chairman 
of the ad hoc Committee of the Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council which is entrusted with the preparation of the meeting. In the 
course of this consultation it was agreed that the ECLA secretariat would 
prepare a report on practical measures for economic development, the 
financing of development and problems of international trade in relation 
to the economic development of Latin America, as well as on any item 
on the agenda which it might deem expedient to analyse or expound; the 
ECLA secretariat would designate a small number of distinguished Latin 
Americans to constitute a Preparatory Group, who would be requested 
to formulate recommendations and economic projects related to the 
study prepared by the secretariat; and the ECLA secretariat would for-
ward the corresponding documents to the ad hoc Committee of the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council for their consideration and 
distribution, to Member Governments, together with the rest of the 
documentation for the conference. 
• These arrangements were submitted for consideration of the Commit-
tee of the Whole of the Economic Commission for Latin America which, 
at its meeting on 30 July 1954, resolved inter alia: 
"To take note with satisfaction 
"(a) Of the invitation extended to the secretariat of the Commission to 
collaborate with thé Inter-American Economic and Social Council regarding this 
matter, and of the measures taken by the secretariat of the Commission to col-
laborate in the Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy; 
"(b) Of the appointment of a Preparatory Committee, consisting of six out-
standing Latin Americans, which will formulate recommendations and projects 
on the basis of the study prepared by the secretariat;" 
and 
"To indicate its pleasure at this collaboration between the Commission and 
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council as a new stage in the co-
ordination of work and closer collaboration between these two agencies." 
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The Preliminary Report of the Secretariat of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Explanatory State-
ment and Recommenddtions of the Preparatory Group appointed by the 
Commission's Secretariat have been prepared in pursuance of the above 
arrangements. The report of the Preparatory Group represents the 
unanimous views of its authors, who acted in their personal capacities and 
whose recommendations are put forward entirely on their own respon-
sibility. The members of the group were: Ing. Evaristo Araiza, President 
of the Council, Banco de Mexico, Director-Manager of Compañía de 
Fierro y Acero dé Monterrey, S.A.; Dr. Rodrigo Fació, Rector, Uni-
versity of Costa Rica, former Assistant Director, International Mone-
tary Fund; Mr. Eduardo Frei Montalva, Senator, former Minister of 
Public Works, Chile; Ing. Francisco Garcia Olano, Director, Research 
Centre of the Advanced School of Economics, Buenos Aires, formerly 
member of the Committee of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations to study commodity trade and economic develop-
ment; Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, former Minister of Finance, Colom-
bia; Mr. Cleantho de Paiva Leite, Director, National Bank of Economic 
Development, Brazil, Vice-President, National Technical Assistance 
Commission. At the invitation of the group, Mr. Frei Montalva acted as 
the Chairman of the Group^and Dr. Lleras Restrepo as its rapporteur. 
Discussion of various problems and suggestions included in this report 
which by necessity involve certain aspects of activities of the existing 
international organizations within and outside the United Nations family, 
have been undertaken from the point of view of establishing necessary 
conditions for a dynamic development policy for Latin America. The 
organizations in question have not been consulted and are in no way 
responsible for the contents of this report. 
Raúl PREBISCH 
Executive Secretary 
Economic Commission for Latin America 
Santiago, Chile, -
25 August 1954. 
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PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION 
FOR LATIN AMERICA 

INTRODUCTION 
The economic development of Latin America cannot be the object 
of outdated formulae, either at the domestic level or in the sphere of ex-
ternal affairs. Recognition of this fact is clearly evident both in the dis-
cussions and resolutions of the United Nations and in the field of inter-
national financial co-operation and technical assistance. 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that this new attitude towards the 
problems of economic development has not yet had a decisive influence 
upon the growth of Latin America. Although the merits of certain forms 
of practical action are not unrecognized, and at times have been consider-
able, it cannot be denied that such measures still have not reached sufficient 
dimensions for their effects upon the rate of Latin America's development 
to be perceptible. 
This situation is a source of serious concern to the Governments of the 
Americas. Thus, the agenda for the Rio Meeting proposed at the Tenth 
Inter-American Conference, as well as the debates at that Conference, 
are a vivid expression of the desire to study recent experiences and to 
extract valid conclusions as a means of achieving maximum efficiency in 
international economic co-operation. A process is being sought to in-
vigorate existing methods and formulae, to suggest other new measures, 
and. to find individual domestic solutions which, duly combined with 
those offered by international action, would result in better advantage 
being taken of such collaboration. 
This recent experience and the evident intention to strengthen the 
inter-American system show that it is indispensable to formulate a well-
defined and continuing policy for international co-operation in Latin 
America's economic development. This policy must arise from the efforts 
of the individual countries and from a suitable and considered regional 
development policy, within the framework of the economic policies de-
veloped by the United Nations. The period of spontaneous growth, pre-
dominantly caused by external factors, is at an end. But economic and 
technical co-operation f rom outside the region will continue to be indis-
pensable to accelerate the rate of growth. The United States has on many 
occasions reiterated its intention to further such aims. Moreover, various 
reports of United States experts make recommendations to the Govern-
ment of the United States on the best means to accomplish this purpose. 
There is no doubt that a clear and objective presentation of the main prob-
lems of Latin American growth, as well as a discussion of the means re-
quired to encourage it, can contribute on the occasion of the Rio Meeting 
to the implementation of such international co-operátion. 
The secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America, in accordance with resolutions of the Commission, has given 
particular attention to this problem. Recognizing this fact, the tenth 
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Inter-American Conference requested ECLA's collaboration in the prep-
aration for and holding of the Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Econ-
omy which will take place at Rio de Janeiro in November 1954. The ECLA 
secretariat welcomes and appreciates this opportunity, which constitutes 
an example of effective co-operation between two independent bodies hav-
ing similar aims, the one within the inter-American system and the other 
being part of the United Nations. 
This last characteristic of ECLA gives particular significance to the 
collaboration with the Inter-American Economic and Social Council re-
quested by the tenth Inter-American Conference. The external aspects 
of a development policy are not limited to the countries comprising the 
inter-American system. The secretariat of ECLA must therefore con-
sider the problem from a broader perspective, without ignoring either the 
disposition and the requirements of the inter-American system or the 
compatibility of the solutions which it may adopt with the corresponding-
policies required at a global level. 
The co-operation requested from ECLA is extensive as regards both 
the possibility of covering all the points on the agenda and the objective 
of formulating specific proposals for the governments which are to meet 
at Rio de Janeiro. In this last connexion, mindful of the restrictions 
inherent in its character, the secretariat considered it appropriate to 
prepare this basic report on'the measures for international co-operation 
which should be adopted, in concord with domestic measures, to solve 
these problems and to accelerate the rate of growth. Therefore, in order 
to meet the request of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council 
for concrete proposals which could be presented for consideration of the 
governments, the secretariat appointed a Preparatory Working Group. 
This Group, composed of distinguished Latin Americans, was given the 
task of drawing up proposals according to its knowledge and understand-
ing of the problems. 
The Meeting at Rio de Janeiro will meet with a sense of deep concern 
regarding the present situation in Latin America which has been referred 
to above. Its agenda may be summarized under four basic headings: the 
policy for foreign investment; the policy for technical assistance; trade 
policy and economic development; and finally the measures required to 
reduce the external economic vulnerability of Latin America. These sub-
jects are discussed in this report. In this connexion/ it was considered 
useful to begin with a general analysis of development policy and of the 




INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN A DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY BASED ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
1. T H E NEED FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL IN A DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
In the final analysis, economic development is an urgent social need. 
The desire for new consumption patterns and for the higher standards 
of material existence which more advanced countries could only attain 
through a steady rise in productivity and per capita income, is spreading 
rapidly among under-developed countries. But it is well known that 
productivity develops inadequately in these countries because their adop-
tion of modern production techniques tends to be slow and laborious. 
Indeed there is a marked contrast between the gradual process of adop-
tion of modern production techniques and the rapidity with which con-
temporary methods of diffusion of information and knowledge produce 
their effects. From this contrast, tensions, on occasions very acute, often 
arise and can only be resolved through accelerating the rate of growth. 
Here one must beware of facile illusions. Latin America has under-
gone a very high rate of development in recent years. Average per 
capita income rose by 3.3 per cent annually during the period 1945-52 
as compared with a rate of 1.9 per cent recorded in the historical growth 
of the United States.1 If a similar rate could be steadily maintained, the 
Latin American countries could double their present standard of 
living in twenty-one years. But unfortunately the factors which stimu-
lated this growth were exceptional and show no signs of repetition. The 
principal factor was the improvement in the terms of trade, which had a 
favourable effect upon income, both directly and indirectly, by stimulat-
ing investment. But the outlook has been changing for the worse and 
the slight effect which may still persist is being absorbed by the obstinate 
tendency of consumption to take advantage of any available margin of 
product for its own benefit. 
The anxiety aroused by these events in responsible Latin Americans is 
clear to see. A firm conviction has gradually been forming of a need whose 
satisfaction cannot be postponed. Latin America lacks a vigorous eco-
nomic development policy in which the fundamental role belongs to its 
countries' own efforts. Only thus can international co-operation in such 
a policy be justified. A basic element in this policy is the investment of 
foreign capital, to break the traditional and vicious circle of a low income 
level which does not allow investment to increase, and an investment rate 
1 See ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1953 (E/CN. 12/358. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. 1954.11.G.l), statistical appendix to chapter 1. 
See also Solomon Fabricant, Economic Progress and Economic Changes, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., May 1954. 
5 
which is insufficient to raise the precarious level of income. A wise invest-
ment programme, supported by domestic measures to facilitate its full 
success would, with the passage of time, enable the countries of Latin 
America to increase their per capita income to such an extent that the 
entire future investment effort, necessary to achieve the continued growth 
of income at a satisfactory rate, could be accomplished from their own 
resources, since the attainment of a high coefficient of saving would 
eliminate the need for new and substantial supplies of foreign capital.2 
It is undeniable, however, that some increase in investment would be 
possible even with the low average income which prevails in most of the 
countries. The upper income groups do not as a general rule save and 
invest what might be expected of them if they did not so readily adopt the 
consumption patterns of the higher income groups in the industrial coun-
tries, or rather, if such patterns were not superimposed on already very 
high standards of living, sometimes much higher than those in the more 
advanced countries. Measures are indispensable to raise and orientate 
investment at the expense of these groups, and here primarily the tax 
system is required to play a role which in the past has not been important 
in Latin America. But such measures alone would be far from adequate 
to accelerate economic growth sufficiently without the participation of 
foreign capital. Failing such participation, the consumption of the work-
ing-class masses—already in itself precarious—would also have to be 
reduced, in contradiction to the very justifiable endeavours which are 
being made to increase it. 
Whether this could be achieved by persuasion, or whether persuasion 
would need to be strengthened by the authority of the state, is a contro-
versial question. However that may be, the dilemma is obvious. To accel-
erate the rate of growth, either consumption would have to be curtailed 
or supplementary foreign capital would be required. Belief in the virtues 
of inflation has been greatly weakened, and to increase investment and 
simultaneously improve consumption among the mass of the people has 
in the past proved to be an inaccessible goal unless it was due to a tem-
porary conjunction of favourable external factors; 
2. ENCOURAGEMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA'S PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
There is one essential point of departure in an economic development 
policy and, if it is not clearly recognized, deterrent factors may intervene 
to compromise the efficacy of such policy. The industrialization of Latin 
America is not an economic error nor is it the consequence of nationalistic 
designs, however much it may be accompanied on some occasions by 
manifestations of national pride and on others by deplorable mistakes. 
Industrialization is an ineluctable requisite of economic development 
and constitutes an essential complement to technical progress in agricul-
ture as well as in a wide range of pre-capitalistic activities having very 
low productivity. It is recognized that, in Latin America*, the effort 
towards industrialization is being mainly carried out by the entrepreneur, 
who is either a Latin American or a person from abroad who has assimi-
3 It should nevertheless be recognized that, even after the attainment of a satis-
factory rate of growth, it may be useful to continue obtaining new supplies of 
foreign capital which would make possible an even faster rate of growth and the 
introduction of new techniques. 
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lated his techniques and initiative to the countries of the region. The 
Latin American entrepreneur is therefore an indisputable reality and the 
evidence of his drive and constructive ability would suggest what may be 
expected from his future activities if he is granted the incentives and 
favourable conditions which he does not adequately enjoy at present. 
The entrepreneur is also emerging and establishing himself in agricul-
ture, although the survival of anachronisms in the land system constitutes 
the obstacle which most hampers the productivity of private enterprise 
in this domain. 
Economic development in Latin America depends to a great extent 
upon the actions of the private entrepreneur; even in countries of the 
region which have been characterized by certain forms of State inter-
vention which interfere with private enterprise, this concept is generally 
acknowledged. State intervention has not usually been the consequence 
of an ideological position but the result of a succession of special circum-
stances, first the great depression, then the Second World War and then 
inflation. This type of intervention almost always aims at controlling in 
one way or another the behaviour of the individual entrepreneur; and, 
although some positive results may be apparent, the adverse consequences, 
deriving from such regulations often outweigh their possible advantages, 
apart from the opposition which they may arouse on account of excessive 
red tape. Such is the opinion which is becoming widespread in Latin 
America, although the abolition of a system of such measures is not easy 
as long as the evils which it aims at correcting continue to exist, as is the 
case with the effects of inflation. This by no means indicates that eco-
nomic development will result from the spontaneous action of economic 
forces alone. Private enterprise must be combined with a firm State 
policy, with a type of intervention calculated to encourage development, 
creating conditions to guide and stimulate in one way or another the 
activities of the entrepreneur without regulating his individual decisions. 
For this purpose the State has recourse to the media of monetary and 
fiscal policy, tariff policy and its own basic investments. 
Basic public investment has led to an expansion of the sphere of State 
influence, which in some cases has unnecessarily entered the realm of 
private enterprise. This is an aspect which will be discussed later. In 
this chapter only a few conclusions will be mentioned. This problem must 
be viewed in its perspective. There- is no essential disparity of criteria 
between the countries of the region as to the role which private enterprise 
fulfils and should continue to fulfil in economic development. But this in 
no way excludes certain forms of State participation in economic life 
which have historically developed in Latin America in contrast with the 
part played by private enterprise in the United States. 
In the first stage of economic development which preceded the world 
depression of the 'thirties, although the Latin American countries were 
firmly attracted to the idea that the State should not interfere in economic 
matters, governments were in the habit of contracting large foreign loans 
for purposes of basic social investment. Following such investment—. 
if not simultaneously with it—came private enterprise, and a Latin 
American tradition was thus created in which the present forms of State 
enterprise are deeply rooted. 
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Herein lies a problem of securing the balance in the respective partici-
pation of free enterprise and the State in economic life which will ensure 
the maximum possible rate of economic growth. It may be asked whether 
the present methods of international financing are supplying Latin Ameri-
can private enterprise with the resources that it requires to maintain this 
balance with State enterprise. The International Bank requires a State 
guarantee, and most of its operations have been directed to public in-
vestment. Such a policy is not inexpedient; on the contrary, important 
reasons.are given later for providing a greater impetus to this policy. 
The balance cannot be achieved by curtailing State investment, but by 
giving the greatest possible encouragement to investment by private 
enterprise, and for this purpose it is precisely the basic social investment. 
by the State which is essential. 
In this connexion, the countries interested in Latin American develop-
ment think first of the initiative of private foreign enterprise, and occa-
sionally of its possible combination with private domestic capital. There 
are evident advantages, especially when such private enterprise includes 
new production and organization techniques, in an atmosphere of free 
competition, devoid of monopolistic combines and exclusive practices. 
But the development problem is too vast and urgent for it to be possible 
to expect decisive action from such a policy. Furthermore, as already 
stated, there is the Latin American entrepreneur who — given his fun-
damental role in tHe development of these countries—should be placed 
in a position enabling him to perform a similar role to that performed 
by entrepreneurs in the United States, allowing for such differences as 
environment and size. 
In this respect the historical position of the United States is unique. 
When Great Britain and other European countries invested large 
amounts of capital in Latin America, the yield thereon came to constitute 
—especially in the case of Great Britain—a not insignificant fraction 
of the national income and an important item in the balance of payments. 
This is not the case in the United States. Its Government supports a 
United States company, which places investment abroad, and attends to 
its interests. But it may be asked whether, in so doing, the United States 
is aiming principally at increasing its national income, which is already 
growing rapidly as a result of powerful internal forces, or whether it has 
the more general motive of contributing to the evolution and consolida-
tion of the system of private enterprise, upon the desirability of which 
the countries of the continent are agreed, without prejudice to the adapta-
tions imposed by fundamental differences. If this is so, nothing will con-
tribute more effectively to such a design than the encouragement of Latin 
American enterprise itself. 
Governments may adopt measures to encourage domestic enterprise. 
But in Latin America such domestic measures, however wise they may be, 
will be insufficient. It is indispensable to guarantee the Latin American 
entrepreneur easy access to sources of international capital and tech-
niques, thus offering him opportunities comparable with those enjoyed 
by the foreign entrepreneur. The lack of access to international public 
resources, which have been offered almost exclusively to governments 
for basic investments, represents one of the most serious defects of the 
8 
present financing of development. And if the capacity for absorbing these 
resources is found to be lower than had been thought of some years 
ago, one of the chief reasons is to be found precisely in the inaccessibility 
of such resources to the Latin American entrepreneur. The potential 
demand of these entrepreneurs for capital is undoubtedly very great, as 
well as their demand for technical services. This is one problem on which 
the Meeting at Rio de Janeiro might reach decisions of great future 
importance. 
m 
3. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND STATE INTERVENTION 
The importance of the incentive to private enterprise, as already stated, 
does not imply that the State should abstain from economic activities. In 
addition to basic investment, State policy can play a decisive part in 
economic development. The fundamental difference must be emphasized 
here between State intervention which regulates the individual conduct of 
entrepreneurs—a policy to which there is growing resistance in Latin 
America—and the other type of intervention by which the State creates, 
or helps to create, certain conditions and factors which, while they influ-
ence entrepreneurs indirectly, do not curtail their liberty of action. The 
classic example of this type of intervention is that of a monetary nature. 
The appropriate authorities—within the limits imposed by external fac-
tors—decisively influence price levels, without depriving the entrepreneur 
of his ability to use the market as best suits his interests and in accordance 
with his own sense of responsibility, which constitutes the essence of a 
free enterprise system. 
An economic development policy, however, besides requiring monetary 
instruments, calls for other measures, notably of a fiscal nature. In Latin 
America's present situation one of the basic conditions of such policy is 
the needs to raise the domestic savings coefficient so that, after some years, 
new contributions of foreign capital, although still valuable, may no 
longer be necessary to maintain a satisfactory rate of income growth. 
Raising of the savings coefficient does not generally result from the normal 
interplay of economic forces. This must, therefore, be one of the objec-
tives of a development programme, to the success of which the State 
can make an outstanding contribution, inter alia through fiscal measures 
encouraging investment and discouraging an increase in consumption 
beyond certain income levels. This is another example where State 
intervention does not interfere with the individual entrepreneur's free-
dom of action, although it creates conditions which induce action in the 
desired direction. 
This is a most efficacious and at the same time most delicate aspect of 
development policy; it is also one in which Latin America has not as yet 
had enough experience, notwithstanding all that may be anticipated from 
its use. In any event, this need for influencing the savings coefficient shows 
that if, on the one hand, the efficacy of a development policy depends upon 
the private entrepreneur, on the other hand, State intervention through 
the measures referred to above, is also inevitable. Consequently, the ac-
cent placed in Latin America on private enterprise does not mean that 
it is thought that the acceleration of economic development will be 
secured by the free interplay of economic forces, as occurred in the Latin 
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American countries at an earlier stage in their development when almost 
exclusive emphasis was given to satisfying the needs of the international 
market. 
4 . PRINCIPAL AIMS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The acceleration of economic development thus cannot be a spontane-
ous phenomenon resulting exclusively from the operation of the above 
forces, but must spring from the combination of private enterprise with 
vigorous State action. It is the type of action that is under discussion here, 
and not the need for it; there are fundamental motives for State inter-
vention in economic development. 
Firstly, for reasons to be expounded elsewhere,3 a considerable pro-
portion of the international financial resources will have to be canalized 
by means of loans of a public nature. The State needs to have an invest-
ment policy for the use both of these loans and of the resources of domes-
tic origin at its disposal. This policy, moreover, cannot be drawn up in-
dependently of the requirements of private activity. Hence there is need 
for an overall investment programme in which investments in the public 
sector are combined with those which it is estimated will probably be 
made by private enterprise, taking into account the incentives and meas-
ures by which it is encouraged. 
Secondly, the State will have to try to raise the domestic savings co-
efficient, for the reasons already given. 
Thirdly, the economic development of a country demands, as a general 
rule, a continuous substitution of imports by domestic production, in so 
far as foreign markets cannot, without a perceptible deterioration in the 
country's terms of trade, absorb enough of the country's exports to satisfy 
its entire demand for imports. This process of substitution normally re-
quires measures ofrprotection and development to stimulate private enter-
prise and place it in a position to compete with foreign activities having 
a greater productivity achieved during earlier stages of development and 
maintained through their higher capital density and their easier access 
to modern techniques. It must be determined what activities are to be 
encouraged and how far such encouragement may justifiably go. This is 
a type of intervention which no Latin American country has been able to 
avoid, any more than any other country in history could do in the initial 
stage of its industrialization, except for those which, being the first, had 
no more-advanced competitors. It appears, however—save in exceptional 
cases—that no country in Latin America developed a policy of protec-
tion which, besides being based on logical criteria of economic sound-
ness, took account of the import substitution necessary for economic 
development, so as tó give investments their indispensable order of 
priority. 
Fourthly, State intervention is necessary if it is desired to make the 
domestic economy less vulnerable to external fluctuations and contin-
gencies. This adds another reason to that mentioned above and makes it 
advisable to introduce structural changes with a view not only to the 
substitution of imports but also to the general strengthening and diversi-
1 See chapter II. 
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fication of the national economy. National measures are not enough to 
mitigate the consequences of instability abroad, and it is considered 
necessary to complement them with international measures for the con-
trol of such instability.4 
Fifthly, State intervention in the extension of credit to supplement 
the needs of private enterprise—especially medium and long-term credit 
—or to provide the banking system with adequate resources, could have 
a considerable influence on economic development. In this case, the State 
facilitates private investments while in others it goes so far as to replace 
them or to associate itself with them when they are insufficient by them-
selves, as has occurred in the iron and steel industry in some Latin 
American countries. 
Sixthly and lastly, to refer only to the fundamental driving forces 
of an economic development policy, such a policy demands deep and 
sustained State action in the technological field. The absorption and as-
similation of the vast wealth of technical knowledge of the more advanced 
countries is not a task that can be left in its entirety to private enterprise. 
Here a situation arises similar to that which has characterized the 
technical evolution of United States agriculture. In a country of private 
initiative and free enterprise, the admirable progress of agricultural tech-
nique—parallel with that of industrial technique—has been due more to 
the action of the State, the universities and the special institutes than to 
individual action on the part of agriculturalists or private research 
workers. The knowledge obtained by scientific research and experiment 
has not therefore been confined to a particular firm or individual, but 
liberally disseminated among them all. The same thing is occurring in 
Latin American agriculture, and the technical co-operation of the United 
States especially has. had most efficacious results. But what is being done 
is still not enough in relation to the urgent needs of economic develop-
ment. State technical action in the industrial sphere has not yet been 
systematically developed and organized, except in very few, though 
praiseworthy instances. The relatively small or medium size of Latin 
American industrial undertakings, combined with other causes, does 
not allow the industrialist to avail himself of the forms of private 
technical co-operation which are accessible to the large companies; and 
this is one of the obstacles in the way of an increase in productivity. It 
is the State, therefore, in collaboration with the universities and techni-
cal institutes on the one hand, and with the trade organizations on the 
other, that must deal with this task. This offers fruitful possibilities of 
international co-operation. 
5. SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
This need for State intervention in economic development is due in 
Latin America to institutional, economic, political and social circum-
stances very different from those prevailing in some other countries 
when they passed through a similar stage of their evolution. Of course 
there are some common denominators, and the most important of these is 
the entrepreneur and his free enterprise. But this does not mean that, at 
4 See chapter V. 
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the present stage of Latin American development, free enterprise will 
function in a similar institutional environment as it once had in some 
more advanced countries. Latin America appears to be seeking its own 
path, its own ways of combining private enterprise and State action. 
Many things indicate that this may be so. Latin American economic de-
velopment is likely to reproduce neither the same historic process nor 
the same patterns of growth as did the more advanced countries in the 
periods of their early stages of development. Moreover, the economic 
organization of these advanced countries—imbued with a marked social 
sense—is not what it was in the nineteenth century. The particular cir-
cumstances in which the phenomenon of development is taking place in 
Latin America require solutions which had no place in the evolution 
of the great industrial countries. The interest aroused by development 
policy in recent years, the concern of several governments in defining 
this policy and in establishing development programmes, the insistence 
on obtaining new forms of international co-operation, are precisely due 
to the conviction that it is indispensable to find new solutions and to give 
. to the economies of their countries a dynamism which they lack today in 
sufficient degree vis-á-vis the social demands of development. Those of 
previous generations who took an interest in the problems of economics 
and their social consequences, habitually stressed the heed for measures 
of a redistributive character to improve the precarious situation of the 
masses. Nowadays there is an ever-growing tendency to concentrate 
attention upon the ability of the economic system—and on the institu-
tional environment in which it functions—to increase without delay the 
income per capita and ensure its fairer distribution. In fact, the validity 
of a system tends to be judged by its capacity for economic growth. 
Now that the pace of this growth has slackened in Latin America, gov-
ernment responsibility is considered of increased importance. The gov-
ernments have vast possibilities before them. If they know how to take 
advantage of them through the combination of national and international 
efforts, new generations will have the most powerful incentives to par-
ticipate with conviction and enthusiasm in the process of growth. Instead 
of a barren and disintegrating struggle to share a national income which 
hardly increases at all, there will have been an expansion of the horizon 
of life for all those of drive and creative spirit who emerge in every gen-
eration. A high rate of economic growth and the structural changes which 
accompany it give fresh opportunities to young people in the technical 
and economic fields. All this has perspectives which reach beyond 
the limits of economic development. In short, not only the satisfactory 
rate of economic growth and its contribution to the well-being of the 
masses are at stake, but also the whole value of the economic system pre* 
vailing in Latin American countries in its aptitude for growth and its 
flexibility in adapting itself to the new demands of social reality. 
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Chapter II 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY 
I. Desirability of establishing a target for foreign investment 
1. LIMITED VOLUME OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND 
INAPPROPRIATE COMPOSITION 
It'is a matter of concern that so little foreign capital is being invested 
in Latin America. The object of this chapter is firstly to examine the 
factors influencing this situation and secondly to consider the possibilities 
for a greater absorption of such capital. 
Some figures will be presented to substantiate the above statement. 
During the four years 1950-53, net investments in Latin America of 
United States capital—including, in this context, operations of the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development—reached an annual 
average of some 421.7 million dollars.6 In addition to these resources 
devoted directly to economic development, the United States Export-
Import Bank granted special loans to some countries for overcoming bal-
ance of payments difficulties; if such loans are included, the aggregate 
resources invested in Latin America amounted to an annual average of 
527 million dollars. 
This annual average of investments of only 421.7 million dollars in-
dicates the inadequacy of international effort in the economic development 
TABLE 1 
United States net capital investment in Latin America? 
(Millions of dollars) 
Private International credit 
Year capital institutions Total 
195 0 116 43 159 
195 1 447 55 502 
195 2 585 119 704 
195 3 222 100 322 
TOTAL 1,370 317 1,687 
Annual average 342.5 79.2 421.7 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
a Excluding the loans granted by the Export-Import Bank to overcome balance 
of payments difficulties, which averaged 105.2 million dollars annually. 
5 Figures for European capital are not included due to lack of reliable data. It is 
estimated that over 100 million dollars have been invested annually, especially in 
short- and medium-term loans connected principally with trade operations. In this 
report reference is made exclusively to United States investments, including, in 
this context, those of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
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of Latin America. In addition, the composition of investment reveals that 
the two above-mentioned institutions granting public loans, have provided 
only an annual average of 79.2 million dollars, or barely 18 per cent of the 
total. The remaining amount, i.e., 342.5 millions, corresponds to United 
States private capital investments, as shown in table 1. 
The limited amount of international public loans raises problems of 
extreme importance. Due to the nature of such loans, they are devoted 
principally to investments of social capital in transport, power and^other 
services that constitute a predominant part of public investments. Public 
investments reached an annual average of 2,240 million dollars for 
Latin America as a whole during the four years under consideration. 
Thus the 79.2 million dollars provided by the International Bank and 
the Export-Import Bank represent barely 3 per cent of aggregate public 
investments. Figures corresponding to loans granted by these two insti-
tutions may be seen in table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Investment of international public resourcesa 
(Millions of dollars) 
International Bank Export-Import Bank Total 
New Amorti- Net New Amorti- Net New Amorti- Net 
Year loans zation balance loans zation balance loans zation balance 
1950 . , , 39 _ 39 50 46 4 89 46 43 
1951 57 - 57 37 . 39 - 2 94 39 55 
1952. 66 1 65 97 43 54 163 44 119 
1953 50 ' 2 48 98 46 52 148 48 100 
TOTAL 212 3 209 282 174 108 494 177 317 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
ft Excluding loans granted by the Export-Import Bank to overcome balance of 
payments difficulties, which averaged 105.2 million dollars annually. 
During the nineteenth century and from the beginning of the present 
century until the First World War, the financing of economic develop-
ment was entirely dependent on private capital, and-consequently the 
foreign contribution to Latin American public investments was very high 
in relation to the scanty 3 per cent mentioned above. 
This is the principal explanation for the lack of social capital that at 
present characterizes most of Latin America. In fact, it has not been 
possible, as in the past, to resort to the private bond market in order to 
finance these requirements, and, as will be explained below, private direct 
investments would have been too costly. It is evident that social capital 
investment is essential in creating the proper environment for private 
investment, and the fact that this has not been carried out to a sufficient 
extent constitutes one of the major obstacles hindering the economic 
development of Latin America. 
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Moreover, most of the resources devoted to investments of social capi-
tal during those times originated from bond issues on the financial 
markets, principally in London. In fact, over two-thirds of the aggregate 
investments in social capital and for other purposes, were the product of 
bond issues. As is well-known, the international bond market did not again 
become accessible to Latin American countries, and the international 
credit institutions have tried to overcome this deficiency by loans of public 
resources. However, as previously indicated, these loans constituted only 
18 per cent of total foreign capital investments in recent years. 
This contrast between the relatively small share of public resources in 
foreign investments and the considerable proportion which was previously 
derived from bond issues needs to be stressed. The interest paid on bonds 
is far below the yield on direct investments of foreign private capital. 
Since direct investments constituted less than one-third of total foreign 
investments in Latin America prior to the First World War, the cost of 
foreign investment at that time was lower for debtor countries than that 
typical of recent years, when a high proportion of foreign direct invest-
ments has prevailed. 
As will be discussed later, foreign capital investments should be imme-
diately encouraged in order to accelerate the rate of Latin America's 
economic development. It is clear that to maintain a high proportion of 
private capital would involve a substantial increase in the burden of 
financial services on the balance of payments. This does not mean that the 
absolute amount of private investments will have to be reduced. On the 
contrary, as will be explained later, their expansion is desirable for Latin 
America. But an even more intensive increase must take place in loans of 
• public resources with a relatively low rate of interest. This follows from 
the two reasons already mentioned: firstly, the need to reduce the cost of 
foreign investments for Latin America; and, secondly, the need to in-
crease the participation of international public resources in financing the 
social capital investment necessary to provide an ample opportunity for 
private national and foreign investment. 
Increased loans with public resources mean that the role of interna-
tional credit institutions should be strongly emphasized, at least until the 
private bond market is reopened. Should this occur, the Latin-American 
countries would welcome the development. Besides providing an addi-
tional source of credit that could in certain cases advantageously serve in 
place of those institutions, United States and other countries' private 
savings would again become active in the economic development of these 
countries. 
From another point of view, an increased scale of international loans 
for basic investments on a larger scale would have favourable internal 
consequences in Latin American countries. It is well known that the 
financing of such investments from inadequate domestic savings has 
frequently caused governments to resort to the expansion of bank credit. 
Conversely in those cases where it was possible to use the genuine savings 
of the population for basic investments, this generally proved to be at the 
expense of private investment, which in turn was forced to utilize bank 
credit as a substitute. A larger contribution of foreign resources, covering 
at least 20 to 25 per cent of these basic capital investments, could therefore 
prove very useful in the application of an anti-inflationary policy. 
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With regard to investments of private foreign capital one further 
observation may be made. The greater part of such investments do not 
result from new capital inflows but are rather the re-investment of profits 
accruing from capital already invested. Out of the total United States 
private investment, excluding repatriations, of 1.531 million dollars, some 
56 per cent consists of re-investment. It is, of course, desirable for profits 
to be re-invested rather than remitted abroad. It should be noted, however, 
that if these re-investments are deducted, the annual average inflow of 
new capital in private foreign investment falls to barely 168 million dol-
lars (see data contained in table 3). 
TABLE 3 
Net investments of United States private capital in Latin America 
(Millions of dollars) 
Direct investments 
Repatriation Net 
Year NewB Re-investmentsb Total of investments0 investments 
1950.. 47 105 152 36 116 
1951 209 276 485 38 447 
1952. 324 305 629 44 585 
1953d,, 93 172 265 43 222 
TOTAL 673 ' 858 1,531 161 1,370 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, based on official United States 
data. 
•Including the non-distributed profits of branches. Excluding investments and 
disinvestments in petroleum shipping companies controlled by United States interests 
in Panama, except for 1953. 
b Re-investments of subsidiaries only. These figures include the investments in 
oil tankers referred to in 
0 Portfolio investments and compensation paid by Mexico for petroleum and 
agrarian expropriations. 
d Preliminary estimates. 
Another indication of the limited amount of foreign capital recently 
invested in Latin America is the relationship between the amount invested 
and the financial remittances required to service and amortize the existing 
capital. It is obvious that, in developing countries, the capital invested 
should exceed the remittances. Nevertheless, a time might come when this 
would no longer be necessary. As income increases, a higher savings 
coefficient could support the remittances without requiring new capital 
inflow to cover the amount of such remittances. 
Although Latin American countries in general are still far from reach-
ing this stage, the figures for remittances nevertheless exceed those for 
investments (see table 4). 
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TABLE 4 
Investment of United States capital in Latin America and remittances 
for repatriations, amortizations and financial services 
(Millions of dollars) 
Total Remittances Excess 
A/V%fl\Ó P r i M I t C * / l T nf TJlvtot'TrieTi'l'b OJ , — PJ 
public resources Repatriations remittances 
and private and Financial over 
Year capitala amortizations b services 0. Total investment 
1950 265 87 554 641 376 
1951 671 82 . 685 767 96 
1952 797 93 637 730 - 6 7 
1953 714 96 648 744 30 
TOTAL 2,446 358 2,524 * 2,882 436 
Average. . . 611.5 89.5 631 ' 720.5 109 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, based on official figures. 
a Includes the loans of the Export-Import Bank to cover the balance of payments 
deficit. 
b Includes the repatriation of portfolio investment, the compensations for the 
petroleum and agrarian expropriations in Mexico, amortizations of loans granted by 
the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank, and the lend-lease settlements 
with the Brazilian government. 
0 Includes the financial services of direct and indirect private investments and the 
interest on official loans. 
When considering this fact, it should be remembered that approxi-
mately 30 per cent of private capital investment has been devoted to 
developing export activities, principally mining and petroleum. As a 
result, a part of those remittances has been covered by increased exports. 
Nevertheless, this fact in itself clearly indicates the insufficiency of 
foreign investment. 
It is not, however, the only fact. Another involves the relation of for-
eign to total capital investments carried out by the Latin American coun-
tries. The annual average for the latter was 4 , 4 2 7 million dollars of net 
investments during 1 9 5 0 - 5 3 . As previously indicated, net investments of 
United States capital averaged 421.7 million dollars, or only 9.5 per cent 
of the total. Unquestionably this proportion is inadequate. And although 
the principle is recognized that the development of Latin American coun-
tries must depend basically on their own resources, an increase of this pro-
portion to at least double the figure for recent years would have a very 
favourable effect on the rate of development without weakening the 
validity of the principle. This would have to continue until such time as it 
would have been possible to effect a substantial increase in the national 
savings coefficient, for this alone would be sufficient to ensure a high rate 
of economic growth. 
2. FOREIGN CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
• The figures that have just been given indicate the very limited contri-
bution of foreign capital in recent years to the development of Latin 
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America. It is evident that the needs are much greater, and that a policy 
of stimulating these investments and improving the technical and eco-
nomic capacity of the Latin American countries to absorb them should 
result in considerably higher figures than those registered in the last few 
years. 
Unfortunately, an estimate of foreign capital needs must be made upon 
conjectural bases. Very few countries have made sufficient progress to 
provide an approximate idea of the amount of such needs and, until the 
application of an efficient method of analysis and projection of economic 
growth6 becomes widespread, no satisfactory basis for such estimates will 
be available. 
Moreover the estimates themselves depend upon the rate of growth 
which is considered to be both-possible and desirable. Consequently, every 
proposed figure must be considered only as a first approximation and not 
as a precise calculation. With such qualifications an attempt will now be 
made to provide some idea of the size of the problem. 
Between 1945 and 1952, Latin America developed at an extraordinarily 
rapid rate. Its per capita income in fact rose by an average of 3.3 per cent 
annually. The factors influencing this high rate of growth were excep-
tional, and it is highly improbable that they will be repeated in the years 
to come. For such a rate to continue it would be necessary for Latin 
America as a whole to make gross annual investments equivalent to 20 
per cent of its income. But, as noted earlier in this report, the coefficient 
of its savings, having once approached this figure, has slackened on 
account of both a deterioration in the terms of trade and of the continuous 
pressure of consumption. In 1953 it is estimated that the savings coeffi-
cient reached only 14 per cent, which would barely allow an annual per 
capita growth of 0.9 per cent. 
In order to attain an investment coefficient of 20 per cent and given a 
continuation of this relatively low savings coefficient, a foreign capital 
contribution amounting to 6 per cent of total income would be required. 
In 1953, income for the whole of Latin America stood at some 46,000 
million dollars so that the net capital contribution would have to be some 
2,800 million dollars. 
If this figure is compared with the 500 million dollars which, in round 
figures, have comprised United States annual investment during the last 
four years,7 the disproportion in size becomes obvious. 
Until research is intensified and made more widespread, it would be 
rash to establish the precise totals which foreign investment should reach 
if a given rate of growth is to be attained. It would not be surprising if 
these surveys led to a figure close to that of the rough estimate. But mean-
while, it would appear no exaggeration to fix, as a provisional reference 
point for an investment policy, the attainment, over a three-year transition 
8 This method has been recommended in a report of the ECLA secretariat. See 
Preliminary Study on Techniques of Programming Economic Development 
(E/CN. 12/292). 
1 Including Export-Import Bank loans to overcome balance of payments diffi-
culties. 
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period, 1955 through 1957, of a TOTARvolume of United States capital 
investment amounting annually to at least some 1,000 million dollars. In 
these three years a more accurate approximation could be made of the 
real requirements for foreign capital and at the same time a better under-
standing obtained of the possible contribution of European capital to 
Latin America's development. -
It should be understood that, until this knowledge is available, it would 
not be desirable to attribute to such a figure any other significance than 
that of a provisional target towards which the efforts of all those con-
cerned should be directed. 
3. T H E FOREIGN INVESTMENT TARGET 
The establishment of such a target appears advisable for an investment 
policy. Once this policy is mapped out, the activity of international credit 
institutions will be judged not only by the careful attention they give to 
examining suggested projects—a factor of vital importance—but also by 
the volume of their operations. If, within a reasonable time, a minimum 
figure, similar to that mentioned above, has not been attained, it will have 
to be concluded that the investment policy is not being satisfactorily 
implemented and the determining factors of the situation will have to be 
reconsidered. 
Conversely, to define an investment target might have very positive 
effects upon the Latin American countries themselves, creating an atmos-
phere favourable to programming economic development among the 
leaders of political and economic life, as well as in the spheres of business 
and labour. The doubts and uncertainties of obtaining an adequate and 
reasonable degree of foreign financial assistance have not exactly played 
an encouraging role in the formulation of development programmes. 
This requires expending a considerable effort and incurring heavy ex-
penditure, and it is very understandable that governments are reluctant 
to enter into these obligations without being certain of obtaining abroad 
the capital required to complement domestic savings. 
It would over-simplify the matter to assert that this is the explanation 
why several countries still show no interest in programming and why 
others have not yet put either the energy or the required sense of con-
tinuity into such a task. The existence of a policy aimed at raising invest-
ment can undoubtedly reinforce the authority of those who are endeav-
ouring to follow the path of development programming in the various 
countries. Such a process does not only signify the formulation of a 
programme but also the successful adoption of a series of measures to 
assist the placing of investments. 
The crux of this matter must not be ignored. The establishment of an 
investment target might have the virtue of centring the efforts of. credit 
organizations upon its success, but it would also have an effect upon 
the Latin American governments themselves. Interest in a development 
policy is as yet in its initial stages—in some cases very confused initial 
stages—and it may be indispensable to add this external stimulus to those 
of a domestic nature so that certain aspirations towards economic develop-
ment may be crystallized in a definite policy. 
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In what concrete form could an investment policy, with the fixing of 
the provisional target suggested, be inaugurated ? There are four elements 
to be considered: private capital, loans from the International Bank, credit 
from the Export-Import Bank and finally the system of loans to Latin 
American entrepreneurs. 
It is obvious that no precise objective can be formulated for invest-
ments of private, capital. The only possible method would be to estimate 
their possible development on the basis of the experience of recent 
years. It would be hazardous to suppose that, in the next three years, such 
investments could reach a net figure higher than 30 or 35 per cent of the 
1,000 million investment aggregate. Furthermore, there is no reason to 
consider the desirability of a very marked increase in this figure due to 
the heavy burden that its financial servicing would involve. 
Consequently the emphasis should be placed on investments from 
international public resources, which involve a much lower rate of in-
terest, although this aspect is not the only one to be considered. Gov-
ernments have a key role in determining the amount of this type of 
investment. This is evident in the case of the Export-Import Bank, the 
entire resources of which are supplied by the Government of the United 
States. In Latin America widespread praise and recognition is generally 
accorded to this Bank, since it is recognized that it has .understood de-
velopment needs and has shown vision and foresight. Among its most 
effective contributions to Latin American development are the loans 
granted for the establishment of the iron and steel industries in Brazil and 
Chile. 
One can thus appreciate the prevailing opinionxin Latin America re-
garding the important role which this Bank as well as the International 
Bank, could fulfil in the financing of economic development in Latin 
America. The Export-Import Bank, moreover, depending as it does on 
the decisions of the United States Government, is particularly well placed 
to act within the inter-American system, particularly if a vigorous policy 
of co-operation in economic development in Latin America is adopted at 
the Rio Meeting. 
The International Bank, in its capacity as a United Nations body, hate 
in turn clearly perceived the requirements of development, has insistently 
urged upon the Latin American countries the expediency of a develop-
ment programme, and on several occasions has actively co-operated with 
them in implementing such a programme. These factors and the experi-
ence which the International Bank has been gathering in the Latin Amer-
ican field, should enable it to provide very effective collaboration. 
If it is estimated that the system of industrial loans referred to 
later in this report might provide between 50 and 100 million dollars 
of the provisional target established at 1,000 millions, and if private 
investment were to total between 300 and 350 millions, the loans 
granted by the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank would 
be expected at a level of 600 to 650 million dollars annually. Bearing in 
mind the volume of operations carried out by the International Bank in 
Latin America, it is possible that this figure may prove exaggerated in 
terms of reality and that the Bank may not wish to undertake operations 
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of the necessary size. In such an event, further expansion of the opera-
tions of the Export-Import Bank would be indispensable, especially if, 
after the three initial years of the investment policy have elapsed, it 
appears that Latin America's absorptive capacity is above 1,000 million 
dollars and that loans should be expanded. 
4 . INDISPENSABLE CONTINUITY IN CREDIT POLICY 
In addition to establishing certain investment goals for Latin America, 
it is desirable to analyse the possible introduction of those specific methods 
which experience recommends. Hitherto, as a general rule, the policy 
followed has been one of gradually agreeing upon the loans to the extent 
that the respective projects were approved. A country drawing up an 
investment programme, partially based on foreign resources, could not 
anticipate whether or not it could count upon these resources during the 
years in which the programme was being implemented. Furthermore, in 
countries subject to great economic instability of external origin, the 
envisaged volume of domestic savings in the programme might percep-
tibly diminish, thus seriously affecting the programme unless credit insti-
tutions were to assume responsibility for a reasonable share of the invest-
ment which it was planned to make with these savings. If, however, the 
development policy is controlled, as is to be hoped, by wise and respon-
sible bodies, doubts may arise as to the desirability of involving their 
country in an investment programme which iii actual fact cannot be 
implemented; such doubts might suggest restricting the scope of the 
programme, or simply eliminating it, and following the more sensible 
path of approving the projects one by one, as and when the required 
resources become available. 
It is clear that international credit organizations could not uncondi-
tionally approve their own participation in an investment programme. 
However, this is not the question ; it is one of approving in principle the 
investments which must be financed in each year of the programme, while 
final approval must be dependeñt upon the separate submission of each 
satisfactory project and upon the fulfilment of those conditions held to 
be indispensable for the efficacy of each project. At the same time, such 
credit organizations might undertake to finance additional investments in 
the event that, for external reasons beyond the control of the country 
concerned, the country were unable to mobilize the domestic resources of 
the size envisaged in the programme. 
The adoption of such a practice would undoubtedly act as a powerful 
stimulus to development programming. However, it should be recognized 
if such operations amounted to a substantial sum, they might involve the 
international credit organizations in certain difficulties. In the case of the 
International Bank, its resources to a large extent originate from securi-
ties ; it might well occur that the market was unfavourable to their issue 
at the precise moment when the capital was required. But this problem 
should not be exaggerated and several formulae for its solution might be 
found. As for the Export-Import Bank, its resources are supplied by the 
United States Treasury, within the authorizations approved by Congress; 
the obligations which this Bank may acquire—however important they 
may be for Latin America—will not reach a volume which cannot be met 
at its normal level of operations. 
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5. TOWARDS AN INTER-AMERICAN INVESTMENT PROGRAMME 
The starting point and keynote of this discussion has been that Latin 
America requires a development policy with ample international collab-
oration. Some of the elements of this policy already exist, and if it can be 
developed, it will constitute the first step in a new experiment, the impor-
tance of which can hardly be stressed too strongly. This new experiment 
demands a search for new methods and instruments of action. These may 
properly be discussed in the preliminary document. Just as a national de-
velopment policy requires a programme, so an inter-American develop-
ment policy will also need a programme. Investment must naturally play a 
predominant role in this programme and for a long enough period of years 
to allow the Latin American countries to increase their own savings ca-
pacity. This inter-American programme, however, can only be based on 
national programmes, at any rate for the larger countries, arid in this 
sphere a considerable effort, which has only just begun, must be made. 
Meanwhile, the establishment of a provisional investment target might in 
itself be of great importance if the governments decided to adopt it as a 
first step towards such an inter-American programme. It would then be 
indispensable to continue and expand the analyses and projections of 
economic development which the secretariat of ECLA is carrying out in 
some countries with the encouragement and support of the governments. 
The governments of the inter-American system could have the results 
of this work at their disposal, together with the other opinions which they 
may require for the examination—at such periodic meetings as they may 
consider expedient—of the implementation of the development policy, the 
establishment of new targets and eventually for the formulation of an 
inter-American investment programme. 
This would not be a Marshall Plan for Latin America. That plan, con-
ceived to meet a very serious situation, had necessarily to be based on 
subsidies. The economic development of the Latin American countries 
can proceed with a high rate of growth without any recourse to subsidies, 
except for a few countries where per capita income is very low.8 Latin 
America's need is for productive loans on very long terms and at rates of 
interest as low as those permitted by money markets. But once again an 
indispensable distinction must be drawn. The Marshall Plan has led to a 
widespread concept of assistance which usually includes loans as well as 
grants. But in fact these are two entirely different operations. A loan pre-
supposes the regular payment of interest and amortization, while grants 
are purely and simply an act of donation. 
It is desirable to forestall the psychological and political consequences 
of this confusion, both in the United States and in the Latin American 
countries, particularly if the idea should spread that their economic de-
velopment depends upon such donations and that the primary aim of 
Inter-American conferences is to obtain resources upon that basis. Despite 
the extremely high per capita income, there are certain needs in the United 
States for which a satisfactory solution has not yet been achieved, an 
example being the inadequate working-class dwellings in the larger cities. 
Furthermore, the heavy taxes are not only a burden upon the high-income 
brackets—so much so that in some aspects their standard of living is lower 
8 Such cases are covered by the proposal for a Special United Nations Fund for 
Economic Development ( S U N F E D ) , at present under discussion in the United 
Nations General-Assembly. 
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than that of corresponding groups in Latin America—but also fall with 
considerable weight upon the earnings of the middle class and working-
class masses. It is worthwhile asking whether the prestige and con-
tinuity of an inter-American economic development policy should rely 
upon resources extracted by taxation from the taxpayer, or whether re-
course should rather be had to their savings in competition with produc-
tive domestic investment. 
6. COLLABORATION OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS IN A DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
There is a further aspect of the problem of public investment of inter-
national resources in Latin America which requires extremely cautious 
handling. A programme is the concrete expression of a development policy 
and does not consist solely of investments but of a series of measures 
designed to raise the savings coefficient and stimulate domestic invest-
ment, while simultaneously creating favourable conditions for such in-
vestment to fulfil the proposed objectives. The degree and form of 
foreign co-operation will depend upon the validity and common sense 
of this policy and it may easily be understood that credit institutions are 
not only ready to offer aid for certain aspects of this policy, but may wish 
to link their loans to the fulfilment of specific conditions. It is indeed 
inconceivable that one of the parties should guarantee to contribute re-
sources over a certain period of years, without the other party also 
accepting an obligation to maintain certain basic conditions, previously 
agreed upon by both parties. Without such a formula, it would be im-
possible to put into practice an effective policy for international col-
laboration. 
Every international negotiation of this character contains many delicate 
features, and the possibility of finding more satisfactory formulae should 
be explored. The formation of a programme—especially if important 
measures of an economic and financial nature are necessary for its 
implementation—usually requires the advice of experts who can provide 
authoritative and impartial opinions by virtue of their detached and 
neutral position in the matters at stake. It may be enquired whether the 
credit institutions, precisely because they are directly interested in the 
solution of the problem, are always best qualified to give this advice and, 
even more, to exert their efforts for or against the adoption of given 
measures. Their zeal might perhaps be interpreted as intervention in a 
country's domestic problems and not as the creditor's attempt to present 
his conditions to the debtor. 
Experience can here provide a guide to future action. If both a govern-
ment and the authorities of the credit bodies were jointly to express 
their confidence in certain independent experts, arid were to request their 
advice and recommendations, it would be less difficult to negotiate the 
contribution of foreign resources to a national development programme 
and there would be less likelihood of arousing understandable national 
susceptibilities. What is more, these experts—because of their impartial 
and neutral position—could advantageously mediate in the negotiations 
and obtain formulae which are sometimes more difficult to find when 
both parties are dealing directly with each other.9 
* The United Nations technical assistance programme provides a notable ex-
ample of such independent expert services. 
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II. Obstacles hindering the investment of international 
public resources 
The first section of this chapter has pointed out the desirability of 
establishing a minimum annual target for investment from abroad, and 
an annual average of 1,000 million dollars was suggested as an initial 
target to be attained over a transition period of three years. Within this 
period, measures would be adopted to mitigate—or in some cases elimi-
nate—the principal obstacles that have hindered the operations in Latin 
America of the two principal international credit institutions. 
Such obstacles are varied in nature and have been divided here into 
two large groups: those pertaining to the Latin American countries 
themselves and those deriving from the policies of the above-mentioned 
institutions. In order to become acquainted with the character and scope 
of these obstacles, the secretariat have not only had recourse to official 
publications but have also had the privilege of discussion of such matters 
with officials of the above institutions and of the Latin American govern-
ments. But the interpretation of these obstacles that follows should 
not be attributed to any of these sources; it is entirely the responsibility 
of the ECLA secretariat. 
1. OBSTACLES PERTAINING TO T H E L A T I N AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(a) Lack of investment programmes and duly presented projects 
The International Bank has emphasized the desirability of drawing 
up development programmes that encompass all the projects of the 
public sector and éstimate the investment requirements of private eco-
nomic activities. The task of programming was commenced some time 
ago in several countries and is now being undertaken in some others. 
Unquestionably the presentation of general programmes that have been 
carefully conceived will have very favourable effects on the policy of the 
credit institutions. Nevertheless, as stated m the previous section, the 
preparation of such programmes is a difficult and costly process; conse-
quently the willingness of these institutions to agree in principle to finance 
a programme for its entire duration would offer a strong stimulus to the 
task of programming. 
With regard to specific investment projects, their preparation also 
requires considerable technical and financial resources which governments 
are not always willing or able to expend, apart from the time required 
to formulate such projects. The risk that a plan may finally fail-to obtain 
approval, after these resources have been used, sometimes acts as an 
inhibiting factor. Nevertheless, experience has been indicating satisfac-
tory formulae. In several cases, the International Bank has sanctioned 
certain undertakings in principle and has encouraged the submission 
of plans which were afterwards approved. Furthermore, on occasions, 
it has even suggested the expansion of such projects with a view to 
achieving better economic solutions. From this aspect, extension of 
technical co-operation by the United Nations and its specialized agencies 
to governments could contribute to eliminating the obstacles. Such co-
operation in planning has been given in specific cases, but there is also 
a lack of training for those technicians in the different countries who 
would be able to formulate projects or judge the value of projects drawn 
up by other technicians. 
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(b) Defective administration of enterprises 
There are some badly administered public utilities, which the credit 
institutions have suggested should be reorganized before loans are 
granted. A case exists of a loan having been made for the import of equip-
ment which rapidly deteriorated because it was used inefficiently. The 
elimination of such difficulties naturally depends upon governments them-
selves, although a commitment to grant the loan, if given-conditions are 
fulfilled, would assist the adoption of corrective measures. 
(c) Obstacles imposed by inflation 
The inflation prevailing in certain Latin American countries is un-
doubtedly a substantial obstacle to the investment of international re-
sources, although in some of these cases a considerable amount of loans 
has been granted. Nevertheless, international resources aimed at a large 
investment programme are difficult to obtain, unless at least some meas-
ures are taken to curb inflation. Conversely, the fact cannot be ignored 
that the use. of such resources, in accordance with a well-conceived policy, 
is generally necessary for the success of an anti-inflationary programme. 
There are recent examples which offer very useful lessons. If the 
inflation was caused by private investment financed by bank credit, the 
immediate consequence of the withdrawal of such investment—to curb 
credit expansion—is unemployment in both the industries directly 
affected and in those which supplied consumer goods to persons employed 
in the former, accompanied by all the inevitable repercussions. A contrac-
tion of the economy then follows; the consequences of which generally 
lead to a renewed inflationary expansion of credit. The most effective way 
of avoiding this is to cover the inflationary excess of investment with 
foreign capital—whether from the same previous investment or other 
different ones—and to continue in this manner until such time as it is 
possible to cover it entirely from a higher domestic savings coefficient. 
In these cases, an inflow of foreign capital would make it possible to 
avoid the disturbances that would accompany simple deflation. Although 
such inflow alone would not correct the disequilibrium underlying the 
inflationary process, nonetheless it would be easier to correct the dis-
equilibrium if there were an increase in available goods or if an increase 
in imports could be financed by foreign resources. 
This leads to the conclusion that the best way of attacking this type of 
inflation is to adopt an investment programme while simultaneous and 
energetic anti-inflationary measures are carried out. 
If inflation is due to investment in the public sector, higher taxation 
is generally the most Convenient formula, in so far as the reduction of 
such investment is inadvisable. But this increase in taxation takes time 
and very often it is necessary to find solutions to technical, administrative 
and political problems, or, in other words, to establish a procedure of 
fiscal reform. Foreign capital can facilitate this transition, enabling it to 
be carried out in a shorter time or reducing its negative effects on 
the level of income. The temporary aid of international resources then 
becomes essential, in the same manner as when the effects of contracting 
such expenditures are to be prevented. 
The problem becomes much more difficult in the case of a wage or 
cost inflation. Here also a large investment programme is imperative, 
which, together with other measures, enables productivity and income 
to increase rapidly and without which inflationary pressure cannot be 
lifted. 
Some years ago, the thesis that inflation enabled investments to rise and 
encouraged economic development was not uncommon in Latin America. 
This has occurred in some cases, while in others inflation exists alongside 
an extremely low investment coefficient. But even in the former case, 
for investment to increase, there must be an expansion of the share of 
entrepreneurs and high-income groups in the national income. Apart 
from its unfavourable social consequences, this feature has ultimately 
discouraged private investment, and therefore economic development, 
because of the slow growth which this type of income distribution has 
caused in the effective demand of the working class. 
It is no exaggeration to say that inflation, owing to its economic, social 
and political effects, is the most acute problem facing Latin America. It 
must of course be attacked by domestic measures, taken with firmness 
and conviction. Nevertheless, if such action is to be taken, the contribu-
tion of international resources is indispensable. Otherwise, anti-inflation-
ary measures would be incompatible not only with development but even 
with the stability of the domestic economy at the level of employment 
reached in inflationary conditions. Once this combination of efforts is 
achieved, there can be no doubt that the capacity for absorption of inter-
national resources would substantially increase. 
(d) Obstacles imposed by the difficulty of meeting external payments 
Apart from inflation, the difficulty which a country may experience in 
the financial servicing of foreign loans is a major obstacle hindering the 
capacity for absorption of foreign capital. Latin American countries 
frequently experience periodic foreign exchange difficulties which could 
be appreciably reduced—or even perhaps avoided—if far-sighted meas-
ures were taken to encourage exports and to substitute imports through 
changes in their composition. It has already been stated that one of the 
most important aspects of a development programme is to obtain the 
investments necessary to introduce such structural changes into the domes-
tic economy. Consequently, a country's capacity to pay for financial serv-
ices—and therefore the limit of the foreign loans which could be raised— 
should not be judged in the light of such foreign exchange crises, but 
should take into account the possibilities of structural readjustment. Thus, 
it might often occur that these foreign exchange difficulties, instead of 
discouraging the investment of international resources, could become 
an incentive thereto, thus helping to expand the capacity for capital 
absorption. 
2 . OBSTACLES DERIVING FROM THE POLICY OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
(a) Limiting investment to imports of foreign equipment 
The practice followed by international credit institutions of limiting 
their financing to the amount heeded to pay for imports of capital goods, 
has a reasonable basis if each loan is considered separately on its own 
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merits. It appears logical that the recipient of a loan should call upon 
domestic savings to cover the share of his investment represented by 
local expenditures. An exception must be made, however. There are cases 
where a rise in production also causes an increase in the working capital 
represented by semi-finished goods imported from abroad. There would 
be no valid motives for restricting investment only to those goods which 
constitute fixed capital. 
However, if the economic process is considered as a whole, some 
doubts arise on which it is, expedient to comment. One example may be 
given. Supposing that at a given moment a country has net savings, 
equivalent to 10 per cent of its national income, which are entirely used 
in investment, and that additional investment is planned to raise the 
coefficient of all investment to 12 per cent of national income. Half of 
the additional investment constitutes capital goods which must be im-
ported and for which appropriate international resources are available, in 
accordance with the current practice being reviewed here. The other half, 
however, which is equivalent to 1 per cent of income, would represent 
domestic expenditures. If spontaneous savings stand at only 10 per cent, 
there would be no means of covering this additional sum, unless the 
State—if the State is involved—resorted to higher taxes for this purpose, 
which might be a reasonable solution in favourable circumstances. Con-
versely, the private entrepreneur has no option but recourse to the bank-
ing system, with ensuing inflationary effects both at home and in the 
balance of payments. 
A closer analysis of this example is justified by the lessons it offers. 
The persons employed by that half of the additional investment which 
must be covered locally, will mainly come from the increase in the active 
population plus the population displaced from primary production and 
from activities having a low productivity. Of the net income collected 
by these new employees from funds supplied by the banking system, part 
will be spent domestically and part, on imports. As a result, if a dis-
equilibrium in the balance of payments is to be avoided, it will be 
necessary to cover at least the latter part with resources from abroad. 
But as regards the share of domestic demand, an inflationary pressure 
on supply will occur, since the latter part will take some time to increase, 
while the increment of income tends to be rapidly spent. Hence, from 
this direction also imports will receive a stimulus, owing to the additional 
pressure of consumption expanded in an inflationary manner. 
If this were not a question of additional employment, but instead 
simply involved the transfer of persons already employed in the pro-
duction of consumer goods to the production of capital goods, the infla-
tionary pressure would be greater since the volume of income would 
remain the same while production for consumption would diminish. 
In this example, the only way in which the domestic expenditure of 
this increase in investment could have been covered without inflationary 
consequences, would be if an equivalent part hád remained unused from 
the 10 per cent domestic savings. 
It is thus apparent, if the economic process is viewed as a whole, that 
the practice followed in this example limits the productive absorption of 
international resources or leads to inflationary consequences. 
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But the lack of savings does not constitute the entire problem; there 
are also difficulties encountered in transferring savings abroad in order 
to purchase capital goods. It may happen that all the savings required are 
available and yet their transfer abroad may cause disequilibrium in the 
balance of payments. It is unlikely that such a situation would arise in 
countries that produce their own capital goods and have no need to 
import them. 
In this—as in other aspects of international investment—the policy 
of the London'financial market before the Rirst World War displayed 
very interesting features of adaptability to existing needs. The bonds 
which were launched on the market when a British railway was being built 
abroad, covered not only the materials and equipment required for export 
but also the sterling needed to cover wages and other local expenses, for 
transfer to the country receiving the investment. It might be inadvisable 
today to follow a similar method, but its lesson can be profitably applied 
in searching for a more satisfactory solution to this aspect of the problem. 
It must be acknowledged that such a solution might be difficult to find 
in individual cases. In contrast, if within a development programme it 
is calculated that the spontaneous domestic saving of a country cannot 
exceed a certain proportion of its income, and if an investment plan 
involving a larger amount is drawn up, the surplus must be covered from 
international resources, whatever projects are chosen to use this surplus. 
It is interesting to note that, for the economic development programme 
for Southern Italy, the International Bank has loaned resources to cover 
additional imports brought about by the increase in income. 
(b) Preference for private investment 
As noted previously, prevailing opinion in the Latin American coun-
tries is in favour of encouraging private enterprise and there could there-
fore be no fundamental objections to giving priority to the investment 
of private capital. Accordingly, the investment of international public 
resources is generally regarded as justifiable only if no private foreign 
capital is available for the purpose. But there are two aspects which must 
be considered in working towards a satisfactory and practical applica-
tion of such a policy. 
Attention has already been drawn to the traditional attitude of Latin 
American countries in favour of the carrying out by the State of certain 
types of public investment which in some other countries have been 
undertaken by private enterprise. This was compatible with substantial 
private investment in other public services, showing that such an attitude 
did not arise from any ideological considerations but simply because in 
this way a country's economic development was more satisfactorily served. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that there is a tendency, entirely apart from 
any ideological considerations, to place some undertakings, formerly left 
to private enterprise, in the hands of the State. One important example 
is sufficient to illustrate this tendency. For the State to exercise control 
over the rates of public utilities is an established practice. In the United 
States, rates which provide á yield of up to 6 per cent of the invested 
capital are considered reasonable. Although a somewhat higher limit may 
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be justified in Latin America, private capital would be difficult to attract 
into new public utilities with yields at that level. To achieve this goal, it 
would be necessary to raise the rate of yield substantially, which would 
not in fact be justifiable in view of the nature of such undertakings. It 
is no longer, as in the past, a matter of introducing new technologies, 
but rather of utilizing well-known existing ones. No reason thus exists 
for paying to foreign capital a considerable premium for technical knowl-
edge which has now become common property. 
It is therefore understandable that under such circumstances govern-
ments should prefer to effect such basic investments on their own and 
that they should have to resort to public international loans at a relatively 
low rate of interest until a private bond market has been re-established 
in the large financial centres. Nor, for the samé reason, namely the low 
profit yield, is the alternative always available of interesting private Latin 
American capital in such undertakings. 
The example of existing public utilities which are in the hands of 
private foreign capital is different. Their additional capital requirements 
can be satisfied at suitable rates of interest, either in the financial market 
or from international credit institutions. The usual problem in this case 
is of a different nature. The rates of such utilities have frequently not 
been adjusted to the rise in operating costs caused by inflation, so that 
in some cases they have reached the point where reasonable profits cannot 
be made or indeed where capital is actually being lost. 
This also frequently occurs in the case of public utilities which are 
the property of the State, where the situation derives more from 
the damaging results of inflation than a specific policy of opposition to 
foreign investment. When, as often occurs, the adjustment of wages 
and salaries to the rise in prices is delayed, the profits of entrepreneurs # 
generally increase, while rates for public utility services, in order to" 
prevent a further rise in the cost of living, are not increased. There is 
thus a transfer of real income to entrepreneurs, not only from the working 
classes but also from the public utilities, whether they are of public or 
private ownership. On the other hand, if it is difficult to increase 
the rates when public utilities are State property, it is much more so 
when they belong to private interests and when, in addition, they are 
of foreign ownership. 
In other cases, there has been reluctance to accept foreign capital when, 
for some reason or another, this takes the form of a monopoly or openly 
seeks to limit competition. It is sufficient merely to mention this fact here 
as it will be dealt with later in connexion with private capital. 
Finally, the large size of certain foreign enterprises and the consider-
able influence that they might attain in the internal life of a country, 
have at times given rise to feelings of mistrust. This situation, although 
proscribing private capital from access to certain fields of activity, 
nevertheless leaves investment opportunities in other activities for capital 
from private sources as well as from international credit institutions. 
In those activities where considerable mistrust has existed, it would 
be desirable for the government to limit and define the respective fields 
of action that it has reserved for itself and for private domestic enter-
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prise and to give sufficient security to private entrepreneurs in all other 
sectors of activity not affected by that policy in order to avoid any 
undue restriction of private initiative in these sectors. 
The fact that such a policy is possible is shown by the case of Mexico 
in recent years, where agrarian reform and the expropriation of petro-
leum and the railways have not prevented private national and foreign 
entrepreneurs from investing in manufacturing industry and other 
activities. 
From another point of view, in those cases which justify preference 
being given to private capital rather than to public investment, it is essen-
tial to provide the Latin American entrepreneur with ready access to inter-
national sources of capital and techniques in order that he may compete 
freely with the foreign entrepreneur. This is one of the weakest points 
of the system of international loans, and section III of this chapter 
contains an examination of important aspects of this problem*. 
(c) Differences of opinion as to the suitability of a plan 
At times, in spite of unquestioned technical reasons for a plan, doubts 
may arise as to whether it represents the best solution for furthering a 
country's economic development. It would not be difficult to solve 
the problem if the two parties concerned had the same criteria for judg-
ing an investment plan from this point of view. A case in point is the 
report of the Currie Mission on the Economic Development of Colombia. 
Although this Mission was sent by the International Bank, the report 
expresses opinions for which its authors are alone responsible. They 
showed themselves as opposed to the establishment of the iron and steel 
industry at Paz de Rio, basing their opinion (among other considera-
tions) upon the fact that domestic production costs were higher than, 
the price of imported iron and steel. If this criterion had prevailed 
throughout Latin America, industrialization would not yet have begun. 
Even if costs are higher than foreign prices, an industry can be eco-
nomical if the net increase in product derived from the factors employed 
therein is greater than that obtained in other occupations. The examina-
tion of foreign trade problems will clarify this point.10 Therefore, no 
judgment could be passed in this specific example without reviewing 
the other investment alternatives and without discussing the possibilities 
for import substitution which a country must effect by virtue of its own 
growth. The need for a development programme becomes more evident 
from examples of this kind. At meetings such as that to be held in Rio 
de Janeiro, agreements reached in regard to a development policy—and 
especially as concerns its international aspects-—can well provide a suit-
able framework for concrete solutions of such problems. 
(d) Reluctance to invest in certain public services 
Until the period of the world crisis, loans had been obtained by Latin 
American governments in London and other capitals of western Europe, 
and later in New York, for public services such as health, schools and 
public buildings; these did not always increase productivity directly but 
10 See chapter IV. 
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they did make a notable contribution to the overall increase in produc-
tivity. As a general rule, they were long-term loans which were serviced 
out of current public revenue and in some cases from special levies. At 
the present time, the private capital market abroad continues to be 
practically inaccessible to countries of the region and no other way of 
satisfying the need has yet appeared. There can be no doubt that the 
decision to grant loans for this purpose from international public re-
sources would considerably stimulate the absorption of such resources 
in Latin America. 
(e) Need for a government guarantee for loans 
This prerequisite also tends to impose serious limitations on the capacity 
' for absorption of international resources in the field of private enterprise. 
On the one hand, there are governments which may prefer to satisfy 
their own needs before those of private entrepreneurs. On the other, 
entrepreneurs frequently feel restrained by the possibility that a State 
guarantee of a loan for which they are applying may entail direct 
intervention in their undertaking, although there might be no other 
reason for this. These factors explain why international public resources 
in Latin America have only rarely been available for private undertak-
ings, and these were generally of substantial size. Credit has been in-
accessible to the small and medium-sized enterprises which carry so 
much weight in industrial development. The next section of this chapter 
reverts to this point. 
III. The access of the Latin American entrepreneur to 
international public resources 
1. INSTRUCTIVE RESULTS OF AN INITIAL EXPERIENCE 
The chief obstacles to the investment of international public resources 
were explained in the foregoing pages, and a general examination made 
of the possibilities of eliminating them. It is now relevant to enlarge 
upon one of these possibilities which is of primary importance, namely 
the possibility of using such resources to encourage the initiative and 
private investment of entrepreneurs established in Latin America. 
Economically and technically, the situation of these entrepreneurs is 
unquestionably inferior to that of their foreign counterparts, and any 
effort to decrease this difference will have marked effects upon economic 
development, and the functioning of the free enterprise system. The 
examination is limited here to the economic aspect, the technical being 
dealt with elsewhere.11 
It is a well-known fact that in Latin America the need for medium 
and long-terms credit for industry can be adequately satisfied only in 
very few cases and that this is one of the factors which retards develop-
ment. The banking system is well prepared for the usual short-term 
loans to supplement a lack of working capital, and such loans are often 
. made with inflationary consequences. The basic organization for loans 
to industry is therefore available, but not the resources at sufficiently 
11 See chapter III. 
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long terms. Banking legislation itself is often opposed to the immobiliza-
tion of an excessive proportion of current deposits in operations of this 
kind. 
In some countries, besides commercial banks, there are special insti-
tutions for furthering industrial development, but they are almost always 
hampered by a shortage of resources. The problem, therefore, consists 
of using the best institutions existing in each country—without prejudice 
to the creation of others if considered advisable—so that through them 
international credit may reach entrepreneurs in Latin America. 
The international credit institutions have not had the opportunity of 
granting loans to these entrepreneurs in Latin America, as their opera-
tions in the field of private initiative have been mainly confined to public 
utility enterprises, mostly of foreign origin. The wish to overcome this 
deficiency has led these institutions to try to meet the requirements of the 
Latin American entrepreneurs. Thus, the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development began to put thi§ idea into practice in Mexico, 
but under circumstances which did not contribute to successful results. 
With a guarantee from the Mexican Government, the Bank decided to 
grant a 10 million-dollar credit to an association of private banks which 
had been formed there on an ad hoc basis for providing medium-sized 
loans to industry. The main circumstances which prevented this plan 
from achieving success were the following: 
(a) The procedure was too complicated for the size of the under-
taking. Each operation had to be approved in Washington, so that it was 
necessary to transmit information which applicants for credit were 
not accustomed to submitting in their routine transactions with the 
banking system. Such approval was in fact the fourth to be required. 
The first was required by the bank originating the operation, the second 
by the banks that took part in it as signatories with joint liability, and 
the third by the Nacional Financiera, an official Mexican institution 
which provided the State guarantee. 
(b) The need for three banking signatures also appears to have been 
an obstacle, although on this point opinions obtained in Mexico are at 
variance. According to some banks, it led to a better selection of loan 
projects, while others maintained that it proved a deterrent to banks which 
had no wish to share their own portfolio operations with others. What-
ever the answer, there would have been no opposition to a requirement 
of one banking signature only. 
(c) In operations of this kind, exchange risks must be faced. The 
central bank took responsibility for half the risk and the remainder was 
incurred by the debtor. Under such circumstances, the investment banks 
that grant medium- and long-term loans in Mexico could offer better 
terms for individual transactions since, although the rate of interest was 
somewhat higher, operations were effected in domestic currency and 
not in dollars. But the credit capacity of these institutions is somewhat 
limited and, if it had been a question of many substantial transactions, 
they would have been unable to compete with capital from foreign 
sources, apart from the international transfer problems which funds of 
domestic origin might have encountered. 
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In addition to these obstacles, there were others resulting from the 
Mexican legislation which could, however, probably be surmounted with-
out undue difficulty. 
The Export-Import Bank carried out an operation of a similar type, 
but for a larger investment, with Italian industrialists. Its satisfactory 
results have led to another similar experiment in the Philippines. ® 
2. POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO T H E PROBLEM 
An examination of the difficulties leading to the failure of the Mexican 
project reveals no intrinsic obstacles to their elimination. If the most 
reliable and respected banks or other institutions are chosen in each 
country, there would be no reason not to provide large sums, propor-
tionate to their capital and reserves. Such sums could be used for 
direct industrial loans in accordance with stipulated conditions and with-
out the requirement for prior approval, except when the loans exceeded 
a certain limit which would be simple to establish. Reports would sub-
sequently have to be submitted on the transactions effected, but without 
the need to present all the information required in the first experiment 
in Mexico. , 
As regards the exchange risk, the solution in the Mexican case seems 
reasonable. But the operation would have to be made more attractive 
to the industrialists by offering a lower interest rate than that on credit 
in the domestic currency. The rate of interest charged by the interna-
tional organizations is relatively low and could be lower than the com-
paratively high rates normally required for such operations in Latin 
America. This could be so despite the guarantee commmission which has 
to be paid to the bank acting as intermediary and the exchange risk 
premium which the Central Bank would have to collect on that half of 
the loan for which it would guarantee the rate of exchange. It is logical 
that the industrialist should assume at least half the exchange risk, since 
the assets acquired with the aid of the loan will also rise in value in the 
event of a currency devaluation. 
It is now appropriate to examine the concrete possibilities for carrying 
out these operations on the broad scale which they could attain in the 
whole of Latin America under an adequately organized system. There are 
three possibilities: to organize the industrial credit system under the 
direction of the International Bank; to do it within the framework of 
the Export-Import Bank, and to create a special Fund. 
Let us glance at the first two solutions so that we may then examine 
separately the question of the special Fund. As regards the International 
Bank it would°be desirable, for the reasons already given, that these 
operations should not require a government guarantee, although the 
Central Bank in each country would have to approve the aggregate sums 
to be lent in order to cover the exchange risk. While it is true that the 
statutes of the International Bank demand such a guarantee, these op-
erations could be conducted by means of an affiliated organization, 
such as the International Finance Corporation, for which the Bank it-
self drew up a project in 1951 at the request of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council. According to this project, the Corporation 
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would be authorized to carry out operations of this nature, although its 
purpose would be somewhat different. The objectives of the Corpora-
tion would be primarily to attract foreign private investment to the 
under-developed countries ánd to promote domestic investment, either 
through loan operations or by underwriting shares which it would later 
se|l, on the domestic or foreign market. The Corporation would have 
at its disposal a capital of only 250 million dollars for the whole world, 
an amount which might prove very inadequate if industrial loans were 
to progress according to reasonable expectations.. The original aims of 
this Corporation are not incompatible with such loans. In fact, they 
are so mutually complementary that if the Corporation were to have 
larger capital resources, a satisfactory solution could be achieved for 
this important problem. 
As regards the Export-Import Bank, the fact that this institution has 
successfully begun to carry out industrial credit transactions of this type 
indicates that it is fully qualified to do so. Moreover, .it has available 
resources which are bigger than those planned for the above-mentioned 
Corporation. The Export-Import Bank is not obliged to obtain its re-
sources by issuing bonds on financial markets. This institution can 
therefore act with a freedom that might perhaps not exist if it were 
obliged to take account of certain doubts or reticences with which opera-
tions unfamiliar to foreign financial centres might be received. 
3. CREATION.OF A SPECIAL F U N D W I T H I N THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
A valid objection might be raised against this suggestion, namely the 
planning of a new body, when two institutions already exist that 
could fill this role. The scope of this report does not include a recom-
mendation as to the most expedient solution. But it is necessary to point 
out that, if breadth is to be given to an industrial credit system, a special 
instrument should be developed, either in combination with the agency 
outlined by the International Bank which, as mentioned earlier, is now 
under consideration by the United Nations, or as a new department of 
the Export-Import Bank. In fact, the operations involved are. different 
from those normally carried out by these two banks and also require 
considerable special experience. In this connexion it would perhaps be 
necessary to establish agencies or branches in the principal countries in 
order to maintain closer contact with the banking system and to gain 
direct knowledge of industrial needs. It is obvious that such an objective 
would require specialized personnel, of whom the majority might be 
drawn from Latin American banks if due importance is to be given to 
direct knowledge of the operational environment. 
All this leads us to present this third alternative, the choice of which 
might also be influenced by other considerations. If the foundations of 
a vigorous economic development policy are laid at the Rio de Janeiro 
Conference, it may be necessary to consider the creation of instruments 
which the inter-American'system át present lacks. In this case the third 
alternative would be worthy of examination along with the others. 
If the proposal should materialize, all the countries would have to 
contribute capital. But only a comparatively small proportion of the credit 
resources would come from Latin America, since the heart of the matter 
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is to attract international resources. It would thus be essential to endow 
such an entity with an adequate amount of special resources, while the 
capital—without prejudice to its use for credit operations—would be 
mainly devoted to guaranteeing eventual losses in applying the resources. 
In present circumstances it would be very difficult to find any solution 
other than the endowment by the United States of a special fund in some 
suitable form for such operations. However, there is one financial source 
that, on account of its special character, might be considered as the most 
suitable. It is calculated that the United States Government receives 
about 100 million dollars annually from the tax imposed on the yield 
of capital invested in Latin America by United States companies. 
This revenue thus accrues from Latin American sources, and—excluding 
the legal aspects involved—the desirability of this revenue remaining 
in Latin America and contributing to the acceleration of its rate of 
growth might be emphasized. Indeed, the United States Treasury 
has itself demonstrated its willingness to consider a reduction in the 
receipts from this tax, as a means of encouraging private investments'of 
United States capital in Latin America. The possibility of abolishing the 
tax altogether has frequently been discussed; but such a proposal has 
been opposed, not so much on account of the reduction—in fact insig-
nificant—in public revenue, as on that of the discriminatory treatment 
which would thereby be introduced into the U.S. tax system. This obstacle 
prevents private United States investment in Latin America from receiv-
ing the maximum stimulus from the Treasury. But in contrast, the op-
portunities of using these funds to stimulate private enterprise in Latin 
America might well be discussed. 
Unfortunately, the Latin American countries could not under present 
circumstances utilize the United States money market to obtain resources 
for a Development Fund of this nature. But if the United States could 
endow the Fund with the revenue accruing from this tax for an appro-
priate period, such funds could serve as the basis for a loan on the 
United States money market, under conditions similar to those for 
Treasury operations. This would provide the Fund, as its operations 
were gradually increased, with much larger resources than through a 
direct contribution of the current tax proceeds. This formula would 
offer the advantage of helping to renew the interest of private savings 
in Latin American development, while a financial market which has 
remained practically closed to Latin America since the world crisis, 
would once more be opened—although only in this special form. 
It is impossible to estimate the exact amount of resources for these 
industrial credit operations which Latin America could absorb each year. 
It will mainly depend on the skill with which the system is organized and 
administered. But, given the substantial potential needs of the Latin 
American countries, it is no exaggeration to consider that at least between 
50 and 100 million dollars could be absorbed annually once the system 
has been organized. 
If the resources considered above should prove to be insufficient, 
the possibility might be considered that the Fund rediscount part of its 
portfolio with the Export-Import Bank in order to create new credit 
resources. Whether the International Bank could assume a similar re-
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sponsibility would depend upon the collective guarantee given by par-
ticipating governments to the Fund's operations; this would enable the 
Bank to comply with the relevant stipulations of its articles of agreement. 
A possible inadequacy of resources would have to be foreseen if 
the Fund extended its operations to agriculture. This should also be 
a matter for special attention, since one of the most serious obstacles 
to agricultural progress in Latin America is the lack of capital. Agri-
culture in general is at a disadvantage as compared with trade, industry 
and other urban occupations. Not only does it experience difficulties 
similar to those faced by industry in obtaining medium and long-term 
loans, but it also encounters problems in securing credit for working 
capital. It is a well-known fact that private banks prefer short-term 
operations of a commercial and industrial nature, because, apart from 
their greater liquidity, they can be concentrated in the cities and are 
less costly to handle than agricultural transactions. Agricultural work-
ing capital generally requires longer terms, while such loans run the 
risk of being immobilized by weather contingencies. This has led to the 
very widespread practice of entrusting such operations to state banks. 
But state banks are often endowed with only a relatively small capital 
and are obliged to resort to rediscounts as a means of obtaining addi-
tional resources, a factor which usually leads to inflationary consequences. 
The fact that State banks are involved has enabled the International 
Bank to carry out operations with them and with other official institu-
tions for the promotion of agriculture. Most loans have been earmarked 
to cover imports, but cases have occurred when the Bank has abandoned 
this practice and has provided credit to State banks to enable them to 
enlarge all their operations, without that restriction. For this purpose 
the Bank uses resources accruing from the repayment or amortization 
of loans covering imports of capital goods. In reality, it is just as if the 
resources accruing from the repayment or amortization of loans were 
received by the International Bank and were then re-loaned to the country. 
But in choosing this method, an elastic criterion has been used that 
enables the problems to be obviated. It is evident that, if the Bank could 
do this in a direct manner, its agricultural operations could be greatly 
enlarged. In that case, the extension to agriculture of the new system 
for industrial credit would not be necessary, particularly if the Export-
Import Bank also entered this field. Under such circumstances, the sug-
gested Inter-American Fund could specialize in industrial credit, which 
would be highly advantageous from every point of view. 
IV. Investments of private foreign capital 
1. BRIEF REVIEW OF THE PRESENT SITUATION 
Investments in Latin America both of private United States capital 
and of private capital from other sources have shown a marked inclina-
tion towards export activities. This traditional characteristic continues 
to prevail Except in special cases, investment in domestic activities has 
not aroused the same degree of interest; it responds to other factors, 
requires knowledge of a local market which is usually limited, and is 
subject to transfer difficulties which are generally escaped by invest-
ments aimed at promoting exports. It is customary to mention as an 
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instructive example the great attraction of Canada's domestic develop-
ment for the entrepreneur in the United States. But Canada constitutes 
a special case which does not allow generalizations. 
Aside from this, the yield obtained by private capital in the United 
States has been high. During the period 1947-50 the average yield of the 
investments in manufacturing companies after payment of taxes was 
14.6 per cent, and in the four years since 1950, while the average has 
fallen to 10.5 per cent, it still remained relatively high. 
It is logical that private foreign capital should attempt to obtain a yield 
at least equal to what it receives at home. There are naturally investments 
in Latin America which give a much higher yield. But if, in such circum-
stances, investments of this type were to become widespread and expand 
substantially, the burden of financial services might become a very serious 
factor in the balance of payments of the Latin American countries. 
All this leads to the conclusion that, even in highly favourable condi-
tions for investments of this type in Latin America, it is not reasonable 
to expect that they will increase sufficiently to contribute substantially to 
an acceleration of the region's rate of development. And even if that 
should occur in the future, the burden of financial servicing would restrict 
the capacity for absorption of capital. However, it should be borne in 
mind that if the yield from private capital were only 10 per cent, two-and-
a-half times more capital could be absorbed in the form of international 
public resources, with the- same financial service, given the current 
relation of interest rates. 
2. OBSTACLES AND POSSIBILITIES OF OVERCOMING THEM 
This is far from implying that the present state of affairs may be con-
sidered satisfactory. There is a general desire to receive more private 
foreign capital, particularly in those frequent cases in which it is accom-
panied by new techniques, in production as well as in the organization of 
the concern and the development of the market. But it cannot be denied 
that there are. real difficulties which sometimes hamper the inflow of this 
capital to several Latin American countries. The chief problems are 
reviewed below. 
(a) Transfer difficulties 
Elsewhere emphasis has been laid upon the need for a far-sighted 
policy of encouraging exports and replacing imports to reduce or elimi-
nate the periodic foreign exchange crises so frequent in Latin American 
countries. Such a policy would relieve the transfer difficulties that occur 
in many cases. 
Inflation is also a major cause of these difficulties. When it is not a 
question of a simple cost inflation, the profits and interest to be trans-
ferred abroad increase and, if the currency has not depreciated externally 
to the same degree as internally, the pressure of these transfers on the 
balance of payments may prove very disturbing. This is what happened 
in those cases—and they were unquestionably important—where the dollar 
quotation long remained steady while domestic prices rose sharply. 
This consequence is often aggravated by the practice of foreign con-
cerns, which work in Latin America with comparatively liberal credit 
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granted by the national banking system, of taking account of the firm's 
responsibilities abroad rather than of the real capital assigned to its local 
operations. In this way the foreign concern is working with substantial 
capital of domestic origin and yet transfers profits abroad as if they were 
the yield of foreign investment. 
Measures which ensure remittances up to a given yield of the invested 
capital and of some proportion of amortization, represent a favourable 
advance on the former situation when remittances of services were sub-
jected to severe restrictions. Only a free exchange market permits trans-
fers without any limitations. But even here the relief so given is often 
curbed by the instability that is generally produced in these cases or by 
the extent to which the external value of the currency exceeds its domes-
tic purchasing power. However that may be, this is a characteristic evil 
of the distortions caused by inflation. On one hand, it causes an exag-
gerated increase in company profits and, on the other, it leads to restrictive 
measures or to adverse situations which—although they may be justified 
by circumstances—are considered contrary to the interests of private 
capital. In fact, satisfactory solutions cannot exist in a state of inflation 
of this type; this provides further proof of the adverse effects which this 
phenomenon sooner or later exerts on economic development. 
(b) Restrictions on certain investments 
Sometimes a selective criterion is established for the investments which 
a country wishes to admit or to which it is prepared to grant special 
exchange treatment. Such a policy represents , favouring investments of 
one type and discouraging others which, in the opinion of the govern-
ments, should be the responsibility of national enterprises. This latter case 
includes, for example, all those activities whose techniques are easily 
accessible and in which the investment of foreign capital and the conse-
quent remittance of profits abroad would be unjustifiable so long as such 
funds could be used elsewhere to the positive advantage of the country. 
The motives for this attitude may be understood, as well as the mis-
givings it arouses in capital-exporting countries. But such discrimination 
always gives grounds for uneasiness, and it may be inquired whether the 
adverse effects on foreign investment caused by discouraging its inflow 
are or are not, in practice, offset by tangible results of this policy. 
The organization of an international credit system for the Latin Amer-
ican entrepreneur might modify the atmosphere in which such restric-
tions have arisen, because he would no longer feel at a disadvantage on 
account of capital shortages as compared with the foreign entrepreneur. 
If to this factor are added means of facilitating his access to modern 
techniques as a way to increasing productivity, the need for a system of 
selective approval of private foreign investments would be deprived of 
most of the economic arguments which at present exist for its justification. 
(c) Resistance to certain types of investment 
• -n 
To omit one other delicate factor, on account of the controversies it 
arouses, would fail to meet the aim of an objective survey of the obstacles 
to private foreign investment. Even in those cases where a tendency 
towards some selective control of investment is evident, there have really 
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been no outstanding instances in Latin America of animosity towards 
foreign capital invested under freely competitive conditions. A hostile 
feeling towards foreign capital has generally arisen when, from the very 
nature of the concession—as in the case of public utilities—or from the 
organization or size of the company itself, a monopoly or, in practice, 
open restriction of competition existed. In contrast to. such cases in the 
public eye, countless others could be cited of commercial and industrial 
companies which—in addition to having earned general recognition of 
their technical and economic efficiency—have never suffered from hostility 
of any kind, although in the course of business they may have encountered 
transfer problems or administrative difficulties with the authorities. 
There is no reason to suppose that the attitude of the Latin American 
public in this respect is any different from that of the public in the United 
States. That a company be an expression of free enterprise is insufficient* 
for the public to be favourably inclined towards it. Free enterprise must 
go hand-in-hand with free and fair, competition, and in this connexion 
public opinion holds a theoretical position which is unassailable. In the 
United States, the pressure of public opinion has won two fundamental 
victories. The first represents legislation protecting the general interests 
of the community coupled with a mechanism for the supervision and 
application of the law. The second is the development of a sense of col-
lective responsibility,, accompanied by the practice of giving publicity to 
the operations of those large corporations which, on account of their 
size or the nature of the market, move in a sphere of limited competition. 
• The assurance that United States companies operating in Latin Amer-
ica are not in practice exempt from such laws might help to clarify the 
unfavourable atmosphere which has been created. Such may be the inter-
pretation placed upon the recent decision of the Department of Justice in 
the United States to enquire into the working methods of a large domestic 
corporation in Central America. In some cases, the application of anti-
monopolistic measures might cause the breaking-up of a complex of 
operations that would be detrimental to the efficient functioning of an 
organization. This does not imply that the problem cannot be satisfac-
torily solved. There are here effective possibilities for international 
co-operation. Intergovernmental agreements could be envisaged aimed 
at ensuring that the business methods of large corporations should 
be subject to adequate standards of control, without prejudice to the free-
dom of enterprise of private companies in their appropriate sphere. Such 
standards, besides guaranteeing the interests of the community, may also 
enable Latin American countries to know the real size of profits and assist 
them to apply reasonable taxation. 
The complexity of economic life makes it impossible to establish a 
single formula to solve the serious and varied problems caused by such 
private companies. But, once a policy of co-operation with common aims 
is established, it will first permit the gradual elimination of disturbing 
elements and, later, facilitate the creation of favourable conditions for 
effective investment in Latin America's economic development. 
It can be understood that in cases of the above nature, the State itself 
might consider the alternative of making the investment, in order to 
avoid the complications which the limited degree or lack of competition 
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involves. It could not be said that by acting thus a Latin American country 
would be improperly interfering with the principle of free enterprise. 
This principle is already violated when free competition ceases to exist 
or finds itself seriously restricted. From this point of view, a government 
might well resort to international loans of a public nature. 
Even if this obstacle to a government's access to international loans 
were to be overcome, others might arise in connexion with the operation 
itself. Credit institutions are naturally obliged to ensure that their re-
sources are advantageously applied to projects with sound economic 
bases; and they must also be convinced that the administration of a 
company is conducted with acceptable efficiency. No question of principle 
is thus involved, but one of practical judgment. 
Possibilities are now appearing which have yet to be exploited. 
Examples exist where, even though private enterprise cannot operate 
satisfactorily, for the afore-mentioned reasons, it can do so very effec-
tively in the realm of management contracts or the loan of services, 
whichever name is preferred. For example, the State can agree with one 
private firm on the building of a given plant and entrust its administration 
to this or another firm for a long enough period to amortize the whole or 
a considerable part of the loan. Such firms may also wish to contribute a 
share of the capital, on either a temporary or. a permanent basis. Various 
possibilities exist, both in this case and in those having special elements 
of risk. At all events, a general characteristic of these contracts might 
be the obligation of private foreign firms to train national personnel, 
both for technical and administrative employment, so thal^ with the 
passage of time, they could assume responsibility- for all operations of 
the concern. 
3. F I N A L CONSIDERATIONS 
In this Report nothing has hitherto been said about the nationalization 
of foreign private companies. In capital-exporting countries, however, 
this is usually mentioned as a factor which acts as a deterrent to the 
foreign investor. Although there have been very few instances of nation-
alization in Latin America, and those with troublesome indemnization 
problems have been even rarer, it is undeniable that their psychological 
repercussions were widespread. While a discussion of this problem and 
of the merits of any legal formulae is outside the scope of this report, 
there can be no doubt that in this and other aspects of the problem of 
foreign investment, a satisfactory and lasting solution can only be reached 
on the basis of a policy of international co-operation for the economic 
development of Latin America. A well conceived policy, complemented 
by indispensable national measures, that besides stimulating the rate of 
economic growth also helps to remedy such adverse factors as those 
indicated above, will give a better understanding of the objectives aimed 
at by the investment of foreign capital. And this will be the best guarantee 
of its successful application. 
Latin America's political instability is also frequently mentioned as a 
source of discouragement to investments of private foreign capital. Out-
side the region importance may doubtless be attached to the psychological 
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repercussions of political changes which occur through irregular methods. 
Latin America is subject not only to the vicissitudes of its internal policies 
but also to the impact of political and economic changes which occur 
within the large industrial centres and which in one way or another are-
usually of considerable magnitude. All this affects Latin America's bal-
ance of payments, its possibilities of development, its capacity to import 
and its ability to service foreign capital. On the other hand it does not 
generally appear that the attitude towards foreign capital, of Latin Amer-
ican governments which hold power as .a result of irregular political 
changes has revealed either more or less understanding than that of gov-
ernments empowered by regular constitutional processes. In any case, the 
favourable attitude of both types of governments appears to depend 
primarily on the creation of the favourable atmosphere, to which reference 




v Chapter III 
INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY A N D T E C H N I C A L 
ASSISTANCE P O L I C Y 
L Technical assistance activities in the sphere of productivity 
1. CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT ON AGRICULTURE 
Technical assistance is a fundamental element of external collaboration 
in an economic development policy. In general terms, it can give the most 
immediate results in the field of increasing productivity by enabling better 
use to be made of the resources currently employed in agriculture, indus-
try and mining. This tends to have a decisive effect on the acceleration of 
economic development. But it should not be forgotten that there are other 
fields in which, although its effects mature slowly, technical assistance has 
a considerable bearing on the problem of productivity. This is particularly 
so with regard to the investigation and inventory of natural resources in 
the Latin American countries, and to research concerning new uses for 
these resources, new production methods and to the serious problem of 
training skilled personnel. 
This chapter will not deal with all these forms of technical assistance 
but only those having a direct bearing on the problem of productivity. 
This in no way implies that the other forms are unimportant, and in fact 
towards the end of this chapter it will be recommended that the study 
considered essential for outlining a policy of productivity in Latin 
America should also be extended to them. 
It is insufficient to take action in isolated cases and then allow the 
knowledge thus obtained to spread slowly throughout the economic 
sphere. If the rate of economic growth is to be accelerated, higher invest-
ment must be accompanied by an intensive training campaign in technical 
procedures which will help in securing the greatest possible benefits from 
the existing capital and the available land. 
The Latin American countries have at their disposal in the technically 
more advanced countries a substantial store of knowledge and skills, 
already perfected, as well as research methtfds for perfecting others 
which may be made more easily adaptable to the particular conditions in 
which they have to be used. The problem consists in how to transfer and 
assimilate such knowledge so as to bring about increases in productivity 
at a more rapid pace than hitherto. 
Private action has played a very effective part in this transference of 
knowledge. But from the point of view of a vigorous economic develop-
ment policy, its contribution is very far from sufficient. Recognition of 
this fact has led governments—Members of the United Nations—to 
organize international technical assistance. This decision—together with 
the decision to organize the investment of international resources—has 
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been of outstanding importance. Of course, the first years have been in the 
nature of an experiment—albeit performing important pioneering func-
tions—as much because of the largely unexplored field in which technical 
assistance has had to be given, as on account of the limited resources, 
available.12 
In any appraisal of technical assistance rendered by the United Nations -
and specialized agencies, one should take account of the limited character 
of their resources; in 1953, for example, they were able to spend only a 
little more than 4.5 million dollars on technical assistance for Latin 
America, in comparison with nearly 17 million spent directly by the Gov-
ernment of the United States, and with somewhat more than 24 million 
to be spent in 1954 (see table 5). Without any reflection on the great 
value of international technical assistance, it can be asserted that in this 
matter of productivity, the action taken by the United States Government 
in Latin America has been of first importance. 
TABLE 5 
Expenditure on technical assistance to Latin America by sources 
(Thousands of dollars) 




United Nations and specialized 
agencies® 













TOTAI/ 12,465.9 23,573.1 23,197.3 30,560.0 
Source: Foreign Operations Administration of the United States, Annual Reports. 
a The United States contribution is included. 
b Based on an estimated allotment corresponding to 26 per cent of the entire 
technical assistance given by the United Nations. 
* Note: In recent years, the expenditure on private technical assistance to Latin 
America incurred by the United States has amounted to almost a million dollars a 
year and has been earmarked almost entirely for agriculture. These funds have 
been supplied, above all, by the Rockefeller Institutions—the Foundation, the 
IB EC Research Institute and the American International Association. 
Of the 24 million dollars which the United States Government expects 
to spend directly on technical assistance in Latin America in 1954 and 
apart from its contributions to programmes established by international 
organizations, about 44 per cent relates to agriculture and natural resour-
" Despite this limitation of resources, technical assistance rendered by the United 
Nations and its specialized agencies has been an important factor in the preparation 
and execution of activities which provide an effective contribution towards the 
economic "development of many countries. In the broader context of technical as-
sistance as an essential element of development policy, reference should also be 
made to the technical assistance at present being rendered by the United Nations 
and the specialized agencies to the Central American countries in their economic 
. integration programme, sponsored by the Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Attention should also be drawn to the important principles established by thie 
United Nations which govern the operations of international technical assistance. 
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ees, and barely 8 per cent to industry, mining and labour. During the 
period 1952-54, however, the most rapid increase in technical assistance 
related to transport and industry (see table 6). 
TABLE 6 
United States Government programme for technical co-operation 
in Latin America 
1952 1953 1954 
(.Percentages of the total expenditure) 
Agriculture and natural resources 43 35 44 
Health and hygiene 28 27 21 
Education 15 11 12 
Transport, communications and power 2 3 4 
Industry, mining and labour 1 10 8 
Public administration 4 8 6 
General and community development 3 1 1 
Costs of the national programme 3 4 4 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE (millions of dollars) 17.9 17.0 24.3 
Source: Foreign Operations Administration of the United States, Annual Reports. 
Note: As these are round figures, their sum total may not be accurate. 
The United States technical assistance in the agricultural sphere in 
Latin America dates back several years, and there has been unani-
mous acknowledgment of the efficacy and significance of this effort in all 
the countries in which it has been applied. This assistance covers a vast 
range of subjects, from genetics to the organization of agricultural credit. 
Technical services are generally provided in collaboration with the gov-
ernments of the various countries, through the medium of combined or-
ganizations whose expenses are covered jointly, in varying proportions, 
by the United States Government and the country concerned. Assistance 
is not limited to short-term visits by experts, but is generally given 
through personnel on long-term appointments, who work both in re-
search and in the dissemination of its results, and in addition help with 
the training and perfecting of the local personnel. 
Besides this official collaboration, the activities of the Rockefeller Foun-
dation deserve special notice, particularly in the field of genetics, in 
which remarkable results have been achieved in several countries. The 
Turrialba Institute of Agricultural Sciences in Costa Rica, a subsidiary 
of the Organization of American States, has also proved of positive 
value both in the training of agricultural experts and in research and 
practical action; however, its limited resources do not allow this Institute 
to extend and intensify its work, its annual budget being less than a mil-
lion dollars for the whole of Latin America. 
Since its establishment the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations has devoted attention to the problem of productivity, 
although its methods of work have not always been similar to those fol-
lowed by the United States'Government. FAO has sent many experts for 
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short periods to solve problems of a special nature. In other fields— 
particularly forestry and animal husbandry—missions of a more perma-
nent nature have been provided. 
Thus, in the realm of agriculture an indisputably successful begin-
ning has been made in the immense task of bringing to and assimilating 
in Latin America the agricultural techniques of the more advanced coun-
tries, especially those of the United States, where a striking degree of 
productivity has been reached. 
2 . INDUSTRY 
The same thing has not happened in the case of industry, so far as 
United States technical assistance is concerned, as is shown by the figures 
for expenditure in table 6. There are several explanations for this dis-
parity. 
In the first place, there is no doubt that technical assistance was 
more urgently needed in agriculture. If export activities are excluded, 
where modern technique has penetrated with less difficulty, Latin Ameri-
can agricultural activity was and still is, generally speaking, in a pre-
carious condition. Secondly, attention may be drawn to the opinion preva-
lent until a short time ago in some circles according to which the problem 
of development was essentially rooted in the technifying of agriculture, 
without its being as yet clearly perceived that industrialization constituted 
the inevitable complement of this. Finally, industry by its very nature 
is in a much better position than agriculture from the point of view of 
access to techniques. The big industrial enterprises of Latin America 
can obtain technical assistance privately, either by contracting experts 
directly, or through the collaboration of foreign companies which pass 
on their technical methods and procedures on a royalty basis. But small 
and medium-scale industrialists are not in the same position, and it is to 
them that priority should be given in allotting this type of assistance. 
These industrialists—who individually may not appear significant— 
have fulfilled a very important function in the industrial development of 
Latin America, and would fulfil it more effectively if they were given 
reasonable access to the sources of international capital and techniques. 
Indeed, the appearance of these industrialists has provided a basis for a 
selective process in Latin America, since from their ranks have often 
emerged the men of enterprise who with the passage of time were to 
build up large-scale industrial undertakings. It is not therefore a matter 
of consolidating antiquated forms of organization, but of assisting growth 
and the attainment of more suitable dimensions, through the co-operation 
of international capital and advanced foreign techniques. 
A short time ago the United States Government began to devote atten-
tion to the fundamental problem of productivity, through the organiza-
tion of technical assistance services for industries of this type. The initial 
results are instructive. This very important undertaking is still in its 
early stages, and the policy to be followed has not yet been defined, pre-
sumably pending a more thorough knowledge óf the needs of the indus-
trial milieu. 
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The United Nations Technical Assistance Administration has attached 
great importance to this problem, and a large proportion of its expendi-
tures concern technical assistance in the industrial field. However, here 
too the limited character of its resources has been a serious obstacle. An-
other way of increasing productivity which is beginning to be tried out in 
Latin America is the improvement in production methods or the intro-
duction of new activities in both urban and rural artisan circles. A con-
siderable increase in the income of these sectors can be achieved at a 
relatively small capital outlay, since it is mainly a matter of introducing 
small equipment or of taking advantage of the rural workers' spare time. 
This is an aspect which appears to offer encouraging prospects, particu-
larly in countries with an indigenous population or those whose farming 
activities are seasonal. 
3. EXPERIENCE IN EUROPEAN INDUSTRY 
It is obvious that, in deciding to inaugurate this assistance to Latin 
American industry, the United States government has found inspiration 
in the experiment undertaken successfully in Europe since the Marshall 
Plan. As is well-known, a serious productivity problem has also arisen 
there the solution of which was indispensable, not only to the domestic 
economic rehabilitation of the coüntries of Western Europe, but also 
to the recovery and subsequent increase of their industrial exports. It 
is worthwhile to call attention to this last point, as it is a very significant 
symptom of the changes which events are bringing about in the foreign 
economic policy of the United States. 
These industrial technical assistance services have been developed grad-
ually in Europe. They began with sporadic experiments and are being J 
transformed into extensive programmes which are being implemented 
in collaboration with national centres of productivity in each of the coun-
tries of Western Europe. 
With this object a European productivity institute has been set up, 
which forms part of the Organisation for European Economic Co-opera-
tion, but is intended to function as an independent body. The institute 
will have a Board of productivity and practical research and a consultative 
council, and will function under a director-general appointed by the 
Organisation. The institute will carry out its aims through the national 
centres mentioned above. These centres, in their turn, are formed by the 
government, private companies and trade unions. The role of the latter 
is very interesting and there is no doubt that—apart f rom what it means 
to the understanding of the problem—labour participation in the increased 
profits generated by greater productivity has been an important motive 
force. In fact, technical assistance is given only to those firms who guaran-
tee to distribute this increment among consumers, workers and the firm 
itself. 
After successive experiments the productivity centres have gradually 
set up their criteria for selecting the industrial enterprises to which the 
service is assigned. First and foremost, they must be industries that pro-
duce essential goods for a growing market; moreover, the possibility 
of achieving concrete and visible results must exist; likewise, the company 
and the workers must show a clear interest in increasing productivity, and 
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the firm's administration must be capable of carrying out the recom-
mended improvements; finally, these improvements must be such as can 
be put into practice with only a small increase in capital, or with no capital 
outlay at all. 
To give direction to the action of the productivity centres, different 
procedures have been followed. One of them has been the constitution 
of productivity groups. Some European groups visited the industries of 
the United States while others from North America inspected the Euro-
pean industries. Visiting groups in Europe itself were also organized. 
These groups, like the centres, were made up of entrepreneurs, workers 
and government representatives, and were followed by exclusively tech-
nical groups. Besides these observation and study groups, other activities 
of special types have been carried on, as, for example, the sending of 
specialists from European industries to North American firms so that 
they might study the best manufacturing processes; likewise, the United * 
States Bureau of Standards has placed its services at the disposal of 
European technicians to carry out practical research and select research 
and testing equipment. European manufacturers can submit their prob-
lems to the productivity centres, and the latter consult Washington on 
any that they cannot solve by themselves. Finally, the centres have been 
supplied with technical and scientific literature as well as with documen-
tary films. 
These visits have enabled very useful parallels to be drawn between 
factories in the United States and in the European countries. Moreover, 
the United States Bureau of Labour Statistics undertook a series of sur-
veys of productivity—which now number 100—in a certain number of 
North American industries, especially in relation to agricultural tractors, 
paper and pulp, manual tools, bricks and tiles, food processing, alumi-
nium goods, beet sugar refining, footwear and some textile goods. Along-
side these surveys others were made in similar industries in European 
countries, so as to compare productivity and establish the differences and 
the factors which cause them, and also arrive at the determination of 
certain standards of industrial productivity whose attainment must be 
attempted.13 
II. Need for a productivity policy 
The United Nations General Assembly and the Economic Social 
Council, as well as ILO and FAO, have been devoting attention to 
methods of increasing world productivity. The Economic and Social 
Council has requested the Secretary-General, after consultation with the 
specialized agencies concerned, to continue studies of problems of raising 
productivity in under-developed countries, in both industry and agricul-
ture. It may be noted that in the Council's resolution416 E (XIV), gov-
ernments of under-developed countries were recommended to consider: 
13 Jointly with the technical programme in industry, technical assistance for 
agriculture has also been developed, but this absorbs barely a quarter of the 
resources. These resources are contributed both by the Government of the United 
States and by the governments of Western Europe. The former makes a contribu-
tion of 135 million dollars and the European governments one of a comparable 
amount. 
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. . the establishment of national productivity centres, adapted to the economic 
and social conditions existing in their countries so as to give special impetus to 
research and the dissemination of information concerning improved practices and 
techniques and to their practical application in the various fields of economic 
activity, keeping in mind the international technical assistance facilities available 
to them;". 
The United Nations Technical Assistance Administration and the special-
ized agencies concerned are responsible for providing such international 
technical assistance facilities at the request of governments. 
Latin America needs a definite productivity policy which can count on 
resources much greater than those which have hitherto been brought into 
play. But for this policy to achieve its objectives efficaciously, a previous 
analysis of the problems of growth and of prevailing trends in each coun-
try will be indispensable. Technical assistance must have a definite orien-
tation and this must arise out of a development programme. So long as 
technical assistance is given in isolated instances and only on a modest 
scale, its close relationship to the overall development policy of a country 
may not be fully apparent; but, when it acquires breadth and produces 
perceptible effects on the rate of increase of productivity, it will have to 
be adapted to the requirements of a development policy. In other words, 
the policy of productivity is only one aspect, though an extremely impor-
tant one, of the policy of development.14 
Indeed, not all the measures that increase productivity ought to stand 
in the same order of priority; what is chosen as a first objective, and the 
various alternatives which might be pursued, are not matters of indif-
ference. A brief incursion into the relations between increases in produc-
tivity and in capital will enable us to deal with the nature of this subject 
which is so important in the drawing up of a development programme. 
1. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIOUS WAYS OF INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY 
It is useful to remember, first and foremost, that an increase in pro-
ductivity can be achieved either by a more intensive exploitation of the 
capital or land immediately available, or by making better use of labour 
resources. It is easily understood that, in countries where there is a com-
parative shortage of capital and a relative abundance of actual or 
potential labour, the technical processes that increase the productivity 
of capital or land generally enjoy a higher priority, as with the same 
capital—without additional investments or with only small investments 
—an increase in the product can be obtained. In Latin America a case 
often in evidence is that of capital equipment which is not used to 
full capacity; one of the usual explanations is the smallness of the 
national market, notwithstanding which new units of production 
are often added without satisfactory use having been made of those 
14 The international agencies rendering technical assistance, being fully aware 
of the above-mentioned need, have insisted that countries co-ordinate their develop-
ment projects with a view to obtaining greater benefit from such assistance. The 
annual programming of the technical assistance of the United Nations and the 
specialized agencies, in pursuance of a recent resolution of the Economic and 
Social Council, is to be formulated on the basis of integrated country requirements. 
A resolution adopted at the Inter-American Conference at Caracas recommends 
that the countries should co-ordinate their requests for technical assistance, which 
provides an incentive for subsequent steps in programming the diverse projects. 
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already in existence; but alongside these cases are to be seen others in 
which the equipment is exploited more intensively than in the advanced 
countries, and a greater product obtained from it but at the cost of 
employing more labour. Power production is a typical case in which a 
greater yield could be obtained with the same capital. The authorities who 
have investigated this problem nearly always agree that there is a con-
siderable amount of waste which could be prevented by better processes 
of combustion or better use of electric power. 
Very frequent too is the case where improvements in the quality and 
durability of the product are possible with the same equipment, either 
by raising the standard of the raw materials used or by improving the 
methods of manufacture. For example, in the survey of conditions in the 
iron and steel industry and its prospects of development, which is being 
carried out by the secretariat of ECLA in several countries, it has been 
verified that defective alloying of the metals used had an adverse influence 
on productivity as well as on the quality and durability of the goods. These 
defects are not generally difficult to correct. 
But the typical case of an increase in productivity with scanty invest-
ments is to be found in agriculture. With the same unit of land, large 
increases in productivity have been successfully achieved by means of 
better methods of cultivating and storing the product. It is clear that such 
ways of increasing productivity with the same—or with slightly aug-
mented—capital, and the same amount of land, should be explored and 
pursued in preference to others which require larger additions to capital. 
Among these methods there are important gradations, all involving a 
saving of labour. But while in some, this economy is achieved without 
increasing the capital, in others it involves a heavy capital burden. An 
example of the first type, confirmed in surveys carried out by the secre-
tariat of ECLA, can be cited. In the course of a careful survey of the 
cotton textile industry in five Latin American countries,15 it was found 
that the labour per kilogramme of cloth could be reduced by from 42 to 
78 per cent, according to the countries, if the work were better organized, 
even without changing the existing antiquated equipment. With the 
installation of more modern equipment, an additional saving of labour 
of from 14 to 33 per cent could be achieved. It can be seen that this addi-
tional economy is less than that which could be effected by making better 
use of the existing equipment. The importance of using this to better ad-
' vantage before investing capital in other new equipment can thus be 
grasped. To what extent this and other interesting conclusions as to pro-
ductivity in the textile industry would prove applicable to other industries, 
is something on which no absolute pronouncement can yet be made. Only 
further research can answer this question, which is of such great impor-
tance for development policy. 
The cáse we have just pointed out is proof of the possibility of freeing 
labour and thus correlatively increasing the yield of the labour still em-
ployed, without any increment of capital. By contrast, there are other 
cases in which the freeing of labour "demands an additional invest-
15 See Productivity of Labour in the Cotton Textile Industry in Five Latin 
American Countries, New York, 1951. (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
195LILG.2.) 0 
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ment. The mechanization of agriculture could be cited as an example: 
when mechanization does not help to increase production—and there are 
cases in which this happens—its effects are not expressed in terms of a 
greater yield per unit of land, but in a reduction of labour per unit of land 
and per unit of product. 
This way of saving labour by investing more capital is also character-
istic of industry. Modern technique, especially in the United States, is 
directed towards a progressive saving of labour by an increase in the 
amount of capital per head. The freeing of labour thus represents a 
capital cost which has not the same significance when capital is plentiful— 
as in the case of the United States—as when it is scarce, as in the case 
of the Latin American countries. 
Nevertheless, the labour liberated also requires fresh capital if it is 
to be productively absorbed in a country's economy. An effort to in-
crease the output of labour would be lacking in economic sense if there 
were no possibility of absorbing it, and still more so if freeing it should 
involve a heavier investment of capital. 
A policy of increasing productivity therefore requires a previous plan-
ning of the various ways of achieving it, and their several combinations. 
There is an obvious gradation with respect to the respective needs for 
additional capital: first, those technical measures which increase produc-
tion without any appreciable necessity for fresh capital; next, those 
which allow labour to be freed without employing fresh capital, but need 
capital in order to absorb that labour, and finally, those which require 
a double investment of fresh capital, both to free labour and to absorb 
it productively in the national economy. For this reason, if technical as-
sistance is to be given on a large scale, as it should be in Latin America, 
a careful analysis of this type, serving to determine the general lines 
not only of a productivity policy but also of the investment programme 
itself, is indispensable. How much progress can be made in this direction, 
is first and foremost a question of availability of capital. There can be no 
doubt that, where there is enough capital, it will be expedient to use 
even the last method for which a double investment is required. The more 
labour is freed by increasing the work yield, and the more capital can be 
employed in absorbing it, the greater will be the average increase in pro-
ductivity per head and consequently in the rate of economic growth. But 
in fact the solution is not easy, since modern techniques do not generally 
offer all these alternative gradations, and processes will often have to be 
chosen which mean incurring heavy capital costs and thus achieving con-
siderable savings of labour in circumstances in which there is already 
labour available which cannot be absorbed because of insufficient capital. 
This increases the complexity of the problem and makes it all the more 
necessary to set up standards for guidance. 
Except in agriculture, where there are considerable possibilities for 
applying techniques to increase the productivity of land without releasing 
manpower, increased productivity in other fields, notably industry, usu-
ally involves a release of manpower. 
Consequently, besides the need for capital, another problem is pre-
sented, namely to determine in what activities such manpower can be 
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absorbed. Those activities should first be considered which produce goods 
or services for which there is a growing demand, as against those for 
which this is not the case or where the opposite occurs. It is obvious that 
in the former the saving of labour can be accompanied by the absorption 
of all or most of it in the same activity. On the other hand, in slow-grow-
ing activities, difficulties often arise in transfer and adaptation which 
may prove serious. 
With respect to this last aspect there is one case of outstanding impor-
' tance. If the transference of labour is carried out within one single indus-
trial community, the difficulties are simply those of readaptation. But if 
the transfer involves the necessity of a geographical displacement, to 
these difficulties is added the provision of a greater amount of social capi-
tal to supply the needs of the increased population in the place to which 
the labour is shifted. 
In connexion with a programme for increasing productivity, it is im-
portant to consider possible forms of action in certain industries where 
high production costs affect the prices of basic consumer goods and, 
therefore, the level of real income of the majority of the population. 
If costs and prices in such industries as textiles, certain food products 
and building materials could be reduced, purchasing power would be 
released among the mass of consumers Avhich would create demand for 
hew products and thus assist in absorbing the displaced labour. 
2. DETERMINATION OF THE TYPES OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE NEEDED 
All this shows that an active productivity policy, which aims at achiev-
ing perceptible results in a relatively short space of time, demands a care-
ful study of the actual state of affairs, not only in its technical aspects, 
but also in its implications from the standpoint of economic development. 
This does not mean that the results of this survey will have to be awaited 
before a wider range can be imparted to the technical assistance which 
is being given at the present time. This assistance" must be continued and 
extended. Nevertheless, if such a survey were carried out, it would assist 
in providing the ample scope required for technical assistance. 
The study of the various activities will be useful in fixing the priority 
and the degree of intensity in which technical assistance should be given. 
This done, the type of assistance which is justified by the circumstances 
will have to be determined. This can only be done after careful analysis 
of the factors determining the low rate of productivity in each activity 
to which intensive technical assistance has been assigned. This analysis 
•demands a review of the répresentative enterprises within each activity, 
as in the afore-mentioned textile report.16 In each establishment a careful 
examination was made of the various successive operations from the time 
the raw material first enters the mill to the moment the finished product 
is dispatched. At the same time, the organization of the mill was 
analysed, and it was thus possible to review the different phases of manu-
facture and compare their productivity with that obtainable under what 
were considered normal conditions. To set up standards of operation 
which corresponded to these conditions was often indispensable, because 
the nature of the equipment and other characteristics of Latin American 
10 See page 49. 
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industry did not allow United States industry to be taken as a standard 
of comparison. Here we find ourselves faced with the aspect of the prob-
lem of productivity in which differences of environment must be carefully 
studied if grave errors are to be avoided. . 
Once the factors which most frequently influence low productivity 
within each industry have thus been determined, it will be possible to 
define the type of technical assistance required. 
In this case the same observation must be made as before, namely, that 
the lack of such an analysis of the industrial enterprises ought not in any 
way to prevent the technical assistance, already given, from being rapidly 
extended, since the very experience thus gleaned will be of noteworthy 
help in establishing the most suitable methods of operation. If, how-
ever, the emphasis has been placed on the need for this analysis, as 
also on the survey to form criteria, it is in order to prevent in time 
the possible consequences of a too empirical approach, whereby purely 
technical considerations, or even circumstantial motives, may prevail 
over the fundamental interests of economic development. 
Again, the knowledge of the factors determining low productivity and 
of the type of technical assistance they call for, will supply the requisite 
data for defining the qualifications of the experts who will have to give it. 
This point is of great practical significance. The form that technical as-
sistance has often assumed has been the sending of some specialists who, 
after a short stay in the country, leave and lose all contact -with the pur-
pose of their visit. Of course, there are many cases which by their very 
nature completely justify this attitude; but in others it is due to the fact 
that the fortuitous and transitory character of the assistance given does 
not permit of the formation or more or less permanent teams of experts 
who are daily accumulating more and more experience. 
(a) In industry . 
In this connexion it is possible that a technical assistance service for 
industry may require—along with experts on short-term contracts in 
special advisory capacities—a body of experts to operate, in accordance 
with the nature, magnitude and frequency of the problems, in the national 
sphere, in groups of countries or . in Latin America as a whole. There 
will thus be an excellent opportunity, first of training Latin American 
personnel while the foreign experts are at hand, and then of using them 
more effectively. 
It is hardly necessary to emphasize the importance of this aspect for 
the success of such a system of assistance in the field of productivity. The 
Latin American technician, once trained, besides having the advantage 
of knowing the environment, will also have to be imbued with a strong 
sense of the mission he is fulfilling, of what his enthusiasm and steadi-
ness of purpose may mean to Latin American development. All this must 
be based on a careful selection of trainees and, in order that this may 
be as broad and effective as possible, it should cover the whole of Latin 
America instead of a few individual countries. This would also facilitate 
the dissemination and application of the experience acquired in one 
country to similar situations in other countries. This is a consideration 
of no little importance in determining the type of approach which may 
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eventually be found most suitable. It is possible that a regional approach 
to technical assistance for productivity in industry would prove to have 
advantages over arrangements made on a purely national level, not only 
on the grounds just described but also because of the continuity of the 
goal pursued and the increased administrative independence within each 
national framework which is required for effective regional collaboration. 
An excellent example of a broader than national approach is the Central 
American Programme of Economic Reciprocity and Integration, which 
receives its direction from ECLA's Committee on Economic Co-operation 
in Central America and is composed of Ministers of Economy and other 
ministers concerned.17 It is clear that the operation of a technical assist-
ance programme on a regional level must involve finding out the best 
methods of working in each country, in close association with the local 
organizations interested in solving the problem of productivity. 
Another aspect which ought to be pointed out is that relating to the 
extension of industrial technical assistance. The problem is of vast pro-
portions in Latin America, and however generously endowed this service 
may be, resources will have to be used in such a way that the re-
sults of the measures recommended are disseminated as rapidly as 
possible. The experience acquired in Europe by European and United 
States experts will likewise be of great value in this connexion, and no 
doubt use is already being made of such experience in the services which 
the United States Government has begun to provide in some Latin Ameri-
can countries. This need to ensure a speedy diffusion of results naturally 
> has financial repercussions. If assistance were limited to those firms which 
were to apply for it spontaneously and were prepared to pay for the whole 
or a considerable part of its cost, the system of assistance could, at the 
end of a few years, cover all its expenses. But if it attempted to extend its 
scope so as to make an intensive contribution to accelerating the pace of 
development, a considerable labour of persuasion and recommendation, 
which would require special resources, would be necessary. It can, how-
ever, be declared with certainty that these resources will signify one of the 
investments which will produce some of the largest returns—if not the 
very highest—in Latin American development. . 
V 
(b) In agriculture 
In the domain of agriculture it is also advisable to make a survey of 
the problem of productivity as a whole. It is true that the effective action 
which is being taken in this sphere has been a valuable source of experi-
ence for understanding the nature of the factors responsible for low 
yields and for seeking the practical way of tackling them. In this connex-
ion it will not be necessary to start from scratch, as is generally the case in 
industry. But it is no less true that from this experience there have not 
been extracted so far any principles of sufficient clearness and precision 
for the mapping-out of trends and objectives for an agricultural produc-
tivity policy. It is indeed striking that an achievement, so praiseworthy in 
numerous cases, should not have been followed up by an over-all analysis 
such as is being advocated. 
17 It may be added that this Committee receives advice from a working party 
composed of representatives of the ECLA secretariat, the United Nations Tech-
nical Assistance Administration and the specialized agencies concerned. 
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Let us look at the aims which such an analysis ought to pursue. First 
and foremost, it would be necessary to carry out a systematic survey 
of the factors accounting for low productivity in agriculture in each 
of the Latin American countries; next an examination would have to 
be made of what has been done in each instance to deal with such 
factors, both through international technical assistance and through 
the action of official, trade union and private organizations; this will 
permit an accurate appraisal of the results of technical assistance, not 
only in their intrinsic significance but in their relation to the real dimen-
sions of every aspect of the problem of productivity. Thus, in this apprai-
sal, it will not suffice to know how much the yield is increased by using 
a particular variety of seed. It will also be necessary to investigate what 
proportion of the production concerned has been improved with this seed, 
and what measures could be taken—and how intensively they could be 
applied—to cover the production in its entirety. Such a comparative analy-
sis would have to be made of every one of the factors which are hamper-
ing productivity. In this way a thorough notion would be obtained of what 
is being done in comparison with what ought to be done, and we would 
be able to approach the formulation of a policy of productivity, or, in 
broader terms, of agricultural improvement, combining national and 
international technical assistance measures. 
Nevertheless, what ought to be done could not be a mere technical 
projection of what is being done. As in the case of industry, here too 
there is an imperative need for guiding principles in accordance with the 
exigencies of economic development. In this we discover one of the urgent 
motives for programming. The difficulties of expanding agricultural pro-
duction are notorious in most Latin American countries, and the most 
elementary degree of foresight suggests that, without neglecting imme-
diate problems, an examination should be made of the possibilities of re-
sponding to the future growth of demand originating in an increase in the 
population and an increment in income, according to admissible hypo-
theses. These projections—worked out over a term of five or ten years, 
so as to keep within reasonable bounds—constitute a valuable and in-
dispensable aid in determining the order of priority of technical assist-
ance measures, as also in formulating a programme of agricultural in-
vestments with suitable guidance and stimulus to private investment. 
Needless to say, this agricultural programme must be strictly related 
to the general economic development programme, since agricultural 
measures must be determined in the context of the growth of the national 
economy as a whole. Of course a productivity policy in agriculture 
cannot avoid dealing with certain basic factors and with the creation of 
incentives which are often non-existent due to antiquated and defective 
agricultural tenure systems, as pointed out in the resolutions and studies 
of the United Nations and FAO. 
It is, therefore, necessary to insist that productivity policy is only 
one aspect of a general development policy; but this does not mean that 
the former cannot be inaugurated nor its scope broadened until the general 
policy has been formulated. These deterrent attitudes are usually very 
harmful in practice. It must be stressed that the knowledge of existing 
realities Which the various countries already possess—if it can be ordered 
and systematized—is often sufficient to map out the principal features 
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of such a policy and to implement it firmly. The development programme 
will subsequently enable the policy to be improved and rectified in some 
aspects, the dimensions of the problem to be more accurately estimated, 
and priorities to be fixed, as well as the most suitable distribution of 
technical assistance and investment resources to be established. 
III. Preliminary tasks which may pave the way for a 
productivity policy 
1. PREPARATION OF BASIC REPORTS 
An attempt has been made to show the need for research into facts, 
possibilities and prospects in order to formulate a productivity policy 
intimately bound up with the development policy. The task is neither 
short nor simple, and demands the exertion of a considerable effort by 
reason of its extensiveness and the patience required for performing it. 
But it is indispensable to tackle it without delay. The collaboration of 
well-informed people in Latin Americanas well as of the foreign experts 
whom it may be desirable to call in, can be relied upon. Contact with 
Latin American economic activities shows that there is a considerable 
quantity of information, comment and opinion, empirical or scientific, to 
be tapped. In order to do so, those people in each country who, by 
virtue of experience or study, are authorities on their respective sub-
jects or spheres of action, should be drawn in to play their proper part 
in this undertaking. Besides the direct advantages inherent in this col-
laboration, acquaintance with such authorities will allow the gradual 
preparation of a well-classified list of individuals who could be borne in 
mind, according to their qualifications, for training courses in their own 
country or abroad, or to form technical assistance groups in both the 
agricultural and industrial spheres. 
When a series of basic reports on the problem of productivity in the 
Latin American countries—or at least in a sufficient number of them to 
be representative of the most general or typical cases that will have to be 
considered—had been drawn up in this way, the same procedure that has 
proved successful in similar cases could be followed. It would be expe-
dient to submit these reports to a select group of Latin American and 
foreign experts for analysis and discussion of their conclusions and 
recommendations in ad hoc committees. Among the experts who have 
worked on industrial productivity in Europe should be chosen those 
whose experience could be assimilated in the Latin American countries, 
together with others who have had experience in these countries, so that 
comparisons could be made which would be very enlightening. 
In this way, governments would have at their disposal all the necessary 
elements for determining the content and orientation of a technical assist-
ance policy designed to improve productivity. The Rio de Janeiro Meet-
ing offers a favourable opportunity to discuss this problem and adopt 
the measures which governments think desirable-. 
It is obvious that a productivity policy, such as has just been sketched 
out, presupposes not only the adaptation of the technical knowledge of 
more advanced countries, but also the assimilation of forms of technical 
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research which enable fresh practical knowledge to be acquired in order 
to increase productivity. But, apart from this type of technological re-
search—which is generally the most urgent—there are two other fields 
in which special effort is required and where important results might be 
obtained. As stated at the beginning, one relates to research into the 
natural resources of Latin America and their exploitation; the other, to 
the possibility of finding certain technical solutions which are better 
adapted to the shortage of capital characteristic of developing countries. 
2. INVESTIGATION AND INVENTORY OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
Until a few years ago it was insistently declared that Latin America 
was one of the regions of the world with least possibilities of industrial-
ization because of the shortage, among other resources, of coal and iron. 
Experience shows this statement to be without foundation, since it is 
evident that the region is one of the least explored as far as its potential 
natural resources are concerned, and few countries have even succeeded 
in taking an inventory of, and appraising the resources already discovered. 
The programming of economic development clearly shows the fields in 
which these investigations are most urgent. For instance, studies of 
demand may show that known hydro-electric resources will satisfy 
demand for only a limited period of time. In that case the investigation 
and appraisal of new hydraulic resources should be undertaken imme-
diately, if difficulties are to be avoided at the end of that limited period. 
Similarly it may be of value to investigate the possibilities of obtaining 
pulp from the tropical jungle, which constitutes about 90 per cent of the 
forest wealth of Latin America and which hitherto has not been the 
object of any systematic research. The economic and technical problems 
relating to its exploitation will bebdiscussed, together with other matters, 
at the Latin American Meeting of Experts on the Pulp and Paper 
Industry which will meet in Buenos Aires in October-November of this 
year under the auspices of the. ECLA secretariat, the United Nations 
Technical Assistance Administration and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. 
It is noteworthy that, within the programme of integration and eco-
nomic reciprocity for Central America, in the planning of which the 
ECLA secretariat, the United Nations Technical Assistance Administra-
tion and other international agencies are actively assisting, one of the 
projects is the creation of an Institute of Industrial Research and Tech-
nology, whose principal aims include methodical and co-ordinated re-
search into the natural resources of Central America required for indus-
trial purposes, the adaptation of the technology of more developed 
countries to local conditions, and a survey of the existing industries,and 
methods of work with a view to obtaining greater productivity. 
Of course, in carrying out research of this type the requirements of 
economic development must also be borne in mind, and it would be very 
desirable to make a preliminary survey of the fields in which such research 
is most needed in Latin America. 
56 
The necessary investigations are costly and require specialized equip-
ment and personnel. It is a virtually virgin territory in so far as interna-
tional co-operation is concerned.18 
3. T R A I N I N G OF PERSONNEL 
From the point of view of time, the problem of productivity may be 
divided into two large groups of subjects. On the one hand, there are 
those which may permit of a relatively speedy solution through technical 
advisory services. On the other are those which can only be solved 
through the progressive raising of the educational level of the popula-
tion and by the technical training not only of specialized supervisors but 
also of skilled and manual workers. Those who have paid attention to this 
aspect of the problem of productivity agree that it is serious and urgent in 
most of the Latin American countries. There are two main difficulties to be 
overcome. First of all, the financial resources set aside for technical 
training are relatively small, and there is a shortage of qualified instruc-
tors ; secondly, there is insufficient correlation between the teaching given 
and the real needs of the economy. 
The Latin American governments have shown, particularly in recent 
years, that they are aware of the responsibility that rests on them to im-
prove general education and to promote technical training. It must, how-
ever, be recognized that requirements far exceed achievements. The 
adaptation of the educational systems to the new requirements imposed 
by economic development, and the promotion and extension of technical 
training for workers, technicians and engineers of various specialities, 
are still at the initial stage in many countries. In others, experiments are 
being made which will undoubtedly prove useful for the rest of the con-
tinent, or partial analysis of the problem is being undertaken. No further 
mention is required of the assistance being tendered in these studies and 
experiments, as well as in fellowship programmes, by the United Nations, 
the specialized agencies and by the United States Government. 
But an examination of the problem as a whole is required, in order to 
determine clearly the magnitude of needs in general and in their various 
partial aspects, with a view to framing and developing a policy which will 
satisfy the requirements of economic development in the most efficient 
way. Such an examination should be based on an estimate of the needs 
for trained personnel in the different branches of agricultural and indus-
trial production, including energy and transport, and in the various levels 
of professional training. Consideration should be given to those fields in 
which complete or partial training must, for the time being, be acquired 
abroad, as well as to other fields in which on-the-job or home training 
for workers is at present available in Latin America but which require 
greater financial or human resources. 
At the same time, teaching systems and methods should be appraised 
with a view to utilizing available resources to the maximum, so that 
technical training may reach the largest possible number of young 
18 Reference may be made, however, to the Economic and Social Council's reso-
lution 345 (xii) and to ECLA's resolution 60 (v) on this subject (See E/2405). The 
limited resources of the international organizations should be borne in mind in 
this connexion. 
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people and adult workers. Naturally, conditions in each country differ 
and demand different solutions. However, a general orientation and 
philosophy of the education required under the economy's new con-
ditions would be a firm foundation for guiding the governments and 
interested sectors, provided it is accompanied by practical alternative 
solutions, adaptable to the different conditions. 
In any event, it appears unnecessary to stress that the general study 
described cannot and should not be considered as a prerequisite for foster-
ing technical training as energetically as possible. Economic development 
is, in many countries, encountering difficulties in practice due to the 
absence of managers, engineers, agricultural and industrial experts and 
skilled workers in different spheres, and these difficulties tend to increase 
daily. In view of this problem, immediate and vigorous action is required, 
and large-scale technical assistance is indispensable both to provide quali-
fied instructors and to improve methods and take maximum advantage 
of existing possibilities and resources. But this should not conceal the fact 
that the problem of technical training must be considered, on the one hand, 
in relation to the probable growth of the economy and to the projections 
of its development, and, on the other, with reference to the general criteria 
which serve as a guide for adapting the educational systems to the require-
ments of development. 
4 . POSSIBILITY OF A NEW ORIENTATION FOR TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTRIES 
WHERE CAPITAL IS SCARCE 
Finally there is a deeper problem which concerns the orientation of 
technological research itself. In a paper submitted by the E C L A secre-
tariat to the Fourth Session of the Commission, held in Mexico in 1951, 
this problem has already been stated.19 
Technological research in the more advanced countries, especially the 
United States, is directed above all towards the discovery of technical 
formulae which, by means of ever greater increases in the amount of 
capital per head, will enable the greatest saving in human effort to be 
achieved. Developing countries—which, unlike the advanced countries, 
have plenty of actual and potential labour and relatively little capital— 
find themselves obliged to adopt the same productivity technique as the 
industrial countries. Of course, in their case technological research ought 
to give priority to the development of equipment which would enable the 
productivity of their capital to be increased, rather than to improving the 
yield of labour.20 
" See ECLA, Theoretical and Practical Problems of Economic Growth (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. 1952.II.G.1.) 
20 There are other cases where a high degree of priority in technological research 
is justified. Among them should be mentioned the building industry, which is of 
particular interest to Latin America. It is a well known fact that the rate of urban-
ization of the la t in An.erican population is among the highest in the world. This 
fact, together with demographic growth, has provoked a severe housing shortage. 
On the other hand, while the building of houses is one of the most capital-absorbing 
activities, it is also one where the techniques in use have progressed least. The 
question of house building has not been given special consideration here. The 
subject is being studied by the United Nations secretariat at Headquarters, at the 
request of the^ Economic and Social Council, and by institutions forming part of 
the Organization of American States. 
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A very serious problem is involved here, which the economist can only 
state, without being in a position to discern its solution. This ought to be 
the subject of preliminary research leading to an investigation of the 
possibilities of obtaining specific results. It is interesting to note that the 
subject has been included in the programme of research on economic 
development which is being conducted at the Centre of International 





TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
I. Essential principles governing trade policy 
1. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PROTECTIONISM 
There are two principles, the frank recognition of which would exert 
a substantial influence on the policy of the Latin American countries 
as regards their trade relations both with industrialized countries and 
with each other. Firstly, in differing degrees according to individual 
countries, industrialization is an inevitable feature of economic develop-
ment. Secondly, a reasonable measure of protection is generally indis-
pensable for industrialization. 
In order to demonstrate the validity of both principles it is unnecessary 
here to underline the details of previous reports by the ECLA secretariat. 
A brief explanation of the basic arguments and some new comments 
will suffice to enlarge arid refine these earlier studies. 
It is already known that the economic development of Latin America 
involves reducing the high proportion of the active population which 
works with low productivity in primary production and in handicraft 
activities. As modern techniques penetrate these activities and raise their 
productivity, proportionately less manpower is generally required to 
accommodate the growth of domestic and foreign demand for primary 
commodities. While the proportion of persons actively occupied in pri-
mary production declines, the proportion of those in other occupations, 
that is, industry, transport, trade and other services must rise.21 Certain 
functional relations exist between these other occupations, however, and 
balanced development cannot take place if, for example, industry should 
grow out of proportion to transport or to other services. 
This process has been characteristic of all developing countries and 
there is no reason to believe that it will be different in Latin American 
growth. In reality, the development of the region is in its initial phase. 
The average of the active population occupied in primary production 
is still around 60 per cent. This represents the conditions existing in 
the United States around 1860 although, during the century which has 
elapsed since that date, the proportion in that country has fallen to 12 
per tent. This does not imply that Latin American countries should in 
time show a similar change, since different factors are in play, but it does 
provide some idea of the distance to be covered. 
21 Certain cases exist in which the increase of productivity in primary production 
does not have these domestic effects on economic development; for example, if 
greater productivity results in a deterioration in the terms of trade or in "an 
increase of profits sent abroad, without stimulating the domestic demand. 
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Latin America's problem, therefore, does not consist of determining 
whether industrialization should or should not take place while techni-
cal advances are made in primary production and other activities of 
limited productivity. Industrialization is essential to absorb labour re-
sources and to contribute to the increase in the aggregate product of 
the community. 
Once this fundamental principle is recognized, the problem arises of 
determining how and to what degree industrialization should be accom-
plished. This is the key to an industrial policy, although only the aspect 
of tariff protection is considered here. 
The major justification for protection lies in the differences of pro-
ductivity between less developed countries and those which have de-
veloped to a greater degree. These differences are explained basically 
by the great disparity in the capital per occupied person and in the tech-
nical skills which they possess.22 
In the abstract the possibility might be conceived whereby a decrease 
in the wage levels of less developed countries could offset these differences 
in productivity. On this supposition a given country could entirely abolish 
its protective tariff, always provided that the decline in salaries would 
compensate industrial establishments for the losses which would ensue. 
But, in addition to being impracticable for social and political reasons, 
such a policy would have serious economic consequences. If a decline 
in domestic wages was followed by a fall in prices, real wages might 
recover their former levels, assuming that adequate adjustments could 
be made. However, this wage decline could in turn affect export activities, 
causing a drop in export prices through the workings of the wage-price 
mechanism. Since this would not be accompanied by a corresponding 
fall in import prices, a deterioration of the terms of trade would result, 
with adverse effects on investment and the rate of development of the 
country. 
Therefore, if the spontaneous development of industry is impracticable 
and uneconomic, protection alone, either through customs tariffs or sub-
sidies, would remain to offset the differences in productivity, since direct 
import restrictions are usually less advisable as a measure of industrial 
policy, unless of a temporary nature. 
Such is the type of protection required by Latin America's industrial 
development. Within the classical school of economic thought, p/otec-
tion is condoned during the initial phase of industrialization until such 
time as industry can be strengthened and has the ability to meet foreign 
competition. It is certainly admissible that in a country in process of 
development a given industry may achieve the same capital density and 
the same productivity as in the large industrial countries. In ¡such a case, 
in view of lower wages, it would cease to be an infant industry requiring 
protection even before reaching the same degree of productivity. But 
this could hardly be the case for all the industries which a developing 
country requires to expand as a means of absorbing the actively employed 
population not required by other sectors. For this purpose it would be 
aa To avoid excessive complications, the diversity of natural resources and other 
such factors have |iot been introduced. 
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necessary to obtain a volume of capital per occupied person similar to 
that of highly developed countries and also the necessary technical skills. 
It is not difficult to show that such a situation is theoretically possible, 
but it could not occur in reality in the foreseeable future, since, while 
productivity grows in under-developed countries, it also increases in the 
industrially advanced countries—and sometimes with greater rapidity. 
As a result, the argument employed to demonstrate the inevitability 
of protection enlarges the scope of classical reasoning. Instead of con-
sidering one isolated industry, the new approach includes industry as a 
whole and establishes the need for protection so long as productivity23 
continues to be lower than that of more advanced countries and to the 
extent that the difference in productivity is not offset by differences in 
wage levels. 
The need for protection in a sound development policy cannot be 
avoided and is in no way detrimental to world trade so long as it is main-
tained within the limits required by development. Within such limits, 
which are discussed at a later stage, protection does not reduce the im-
ports of a developing country but only changes their composition in 
accordance with the structural modifications of the domestic economy. 
Customs tariffs decrease or eliminate some imports for which domestic 
substitutes are found, thus causing an increase in other imports with a 
very elastic demand in relation to the growth of per capita income. 
Thus, if protection does not exceed these limits, it does not affect the 
total volume of imports. This volume is determined by the exports of 
primary products from developing countries (as well as capital invest-
ment and other positive elements in the balance of payments which are 
omitted here to simplify the reasoning). In this connexion, primary pro-
ducing countries, which represent the periphery of the world economy, 
play a very different role from that of the industrial centres. Because this 
distinction is of great importance in the problems of trade policy covered 
by this chapter, more detailed study is justified. 
2. PERIPHERAL COUNTRIES AND THE INDUSTRIAL CENTRES 
If an industrial centre of such world importance as the United States 
increases its purchases of primary products from a peripheral country, 
the latter's imports of industrial goods will rise accordingly, although 
with some delay. The growth of imports is thus an induced phenomenon. 
But if the same peripheral country independently increases its imports 
from the centre, this will not perceptibly raise the purchase of primary 
products by the centre. The periphery thus plays a passive role while the 
centre has the active or dynamic part in world trade. The centre with its 
own rate of growth and its demand for primary products therefore influ-
ences the rate of growth of peripheral countries. But the latter have no 
positive influence upon the rate of growth of the centre, except in a nega-
tive manner, as will be explained later. 
ft 
Since a peripheral country has no dynamic influence on the centre's 
capacity for absorbing primary commodities, its capacity to import 
28 For greater theoretical accuracy: marginal productivity of the industries 
which must be established to absorb the available active population. 
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depends primarily upon its sales to the centre. In other words, while the 
centre can generate purchasing power in the periphery, the latter cannot 
perform the same function in the centre. 
To understand the practical consequences caused^ by these functional 
inequalities, another significant difference is explained. It is a universal 
characteristic of economic development that, as per capita income rises 
above a certain minimum, the demand for primary products grows less 
intensely than that for industrial goods and services. 
This phenomenon has a considerable influence on trade between the 
industrial centres and primary producing countries. Given the same rate 
of growth of per capita income, the demand for industrial imports in the 
periphery tends to grow more rapidly than the demand for primary im-
ports in the industrial centres. If the population of a given country in 
the periphery increases more rapidly than in the industrial centres, the 
disparity in the trend of growth of imports is aggravated. Furthermore, 
if the income of the peripheral country rises more rapidly than that of 
the centres, the disparity becomes more marked.24 
In. consequence, if a peripheral country is not to develop at a slower 
rate than the centres, if it wishes to develop economically and to reduce 
—or at least maintain—the difference in income between them, there 
will be a persistent tendency towards disequilibrium because its in-
dustrial imports will tend to increase more than its primary exports. 
It is not possible for such a country to raise primary exports through 
encouraging its industrial imports. No other solution is available than to 
limit its imports to the level permitted by its capacity for external pay-
ment. But if the restrictions are not applied by selectively .decreasing or 
eliminating some imports in order to increase others, the country is 
obliged by the play of economic forces either to compress its income 
and to slacken the rate of growth or to restrain imports through currency 
devaluation, so as to correct the disequilibrium. 
In any case, the reduction of imports to the level of the payments' 
capacity is inevitable. The fundamental distinction lies in whether restric-
tions are applied spontaneously to the detriment of the rate of growth 
or whether they are part of a deliberate policy favouring that rate. Which-
ever path is chosen, such a country in the periphery is not reducing world 
trade in an arbitrary manner but is only attempting to re-establish equili-
brium. It is trying to maintain imports within the bounds allowed by its 
exports to the industrial centres. 
84 Imports of primary products into the industrial centres do not generally in-
crease in a degree compatible with a satisfactory rate of growth in peripheral 
countries. Income' elasticity of demand for such imports into the centres is ordi-
narily low, and this low elasticity is accentuated by.the restrictive import policy. 
All these factors together explain why imports of primary products in the centres 
tend to grow with much less intensity than the demand for industrial goods in 
peripheral countries. The following striking example is worth mentioning. For 
every one per cent increase in per capital income in the United States, imports 
of primary products tend to rise 0.66 per cent, while the same per capita increase 
in Latin-American income tends to bring forward a demand of 1.58 per cent for 
industrial goods. 
There is thus an impressive disparity in the respective income elasticities of 
demand. There is no other way of correcting this disparity than the promotion of 
industrial production in peripheral countries, inasmuch as they cannot obtain all 
the industrial goods they require in exchange for exports. 
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Nevertheless, such a country, if it exaggerates its restrictive policy for 
imports and reduces the volume below the level necessary to correct the 
imbalance, will adversely affect world trade by reducing it or by limiting 
the increase which would otherwise have taken place. It is true that 
an isolated peripheral country, through its relatively small share in 
world trade, may decrease imports in this arbitrary manner without 
any detriment to its exports. But if several countries combine to follow 
a similar policy, the effects will be progressively greater and will cause 
a growing disequilibrium for the industrial centres until the latter will 
be obliged to enforce restrictive measures similar to those which must 
normally be used by countries in the process of development. 
It is thus found that, while the periphery has no dynamic or positive 
role in stimulating world trade, it could have a serious depressive influ-
ence, reducing it or weakening its rate of growth. This could occur 
through the application of import restrictions which exceed the minimum 
required to correct the tendency to disequilibrium caused by economic 
development, or if export activities were deprived of th¡e productive 
factors required for their normal development. 
3. T w o DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROTECTION 
These facts provide a first conclusion which is very important for inter-
national trade policy. There are two types of protection in developing 
countries. Firstly a type of protection exists which encourages the struc-
tural changes required by economic development without provoking a re-
duction in imports below the volume corresponding to the capacity for 
external payment and without either reducing world trade or weakening 
its rate of growth. Secondly, there is the type of protection which exceeds 
these limits and adversely affects world trade. 
It would be a serious error of judgment to confuse these two types 
of protection, or rather these two stages in a policy of protection. To 
condemn protection in the first case would deprive economic development 
of one of its fundamental instruments. Indeed, protection allows industry 
to absorb part of the surplus active population no longer required by 
primary activities and other occupations because of increased produc-
tivity. The remainder is absorbed by services. This phenomenon must 
be considered in its dynamic sense. It does not normally consist of a 
movement to industry of persons previously occupied in primary pro-
duction, but rather of a shift towards industry and services of a grow-
ing proportion of the annual increase in the active population. In this 
way there is only a gradual decline in the proportion of manpower em-
ployed in primary production in relation to the whole labour force. 
It is evident that, if no encouragement is given to industry, the man-
power which could have shifted to that sector would exert a pressure 
upon wage levels causing them to fall. This is how the possibility of a 
spontaneous process of industrialization may be considered in the ab-
stract, by depressing wage levels, it would have unfavourable effects on 
the terms of trade and w.ould in fact be impracticable. 
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It is thus apparent that industrialization, if kept within proper limits, 
is compatible with the development of primary commodity exports to the 
extent permitted by the increase in the capacity for absorption of the in-
dustrial centres. Other things being equal, the degree to which industriali-
zation is justified will depend upon the rate of growth of exports: the 
lower the proportion of the increase in the active population required 
for the growth of exports, the greater should be the extent of industriali-
zation. 
A rise in the capacity for absorption of primary products in the indus-
trial centres depends upon an increase in their income, upon the income 
elasticity of demand for such products, upon the degree to which the 
centres substitute domestic output for imports, and finally upon the prices 
for primary commodities. A price decline would thus permit the growth 
of peripheral primary commodity exports to be increased. In this way it 
would be possible to absorb in primary production a part of the-active 
population which would otherwise be employed in industry. Nevertheless 
such a policy has relatively narrow limits if related to the periphery of 
world economy as a whole or to those countries—or groups of countries 
—which substantially influence the world trade of a given commodity. 
The world market has a fixed capacity for growth at current price levels 
while every addition of productive factors in export activities causes 
a correspondingly smaller net increase in income due to the fall in prices, 
even when quantum production yields are not diminishing. The time 
will come when this smaller net increase in income will equal that obtained 
by using additional productive factors in industrial activities, although 
the cost of the goods thus obtained would be higher than that of similar 
imported goods. At this point protection is fully justified since it permits 
the use of the available productive factors0in activities with greater 
economic yield. In consequence, a fall in prices to stimulate the growth 
of exports might, up to a point, be economically convenient. This is the 
precise point where industrialization becomes economic and a further 
increase in exports uneconomic. Conversely, before reaching this point 
industrialization would be uneconomic. 
A distinction is thus reached similar to that previously described in 
relation to a policy of protection, but from the angle of the domestic 
economy and not from that of world trade. Both points of view can 
now be combined. For the first type of protection, exports continue to 
rise to the extent permitted by the absorption of the industrial centres, 
while imports are adapted to the capacity for external payments provided 
by exports and other elements in the balance of payments. At the same 
time, industrialization is carried out sufficiently to absorb available pro-
ductive factors which cannot be economicálly used in export activities. 
For the second type of protection, exports increase less than the capacity 
of the industrial centres to absorb them, or they may even decline, accord-
ing to the intensity with which protection deprives them of productive 
factors. As a result, the growth of industry becomes uneconomic, with a 
rise in real income lower than that which might have been achieved if 
the corresponding productive factors had been used in export activities. 
To summarize, in the first case the volume of world trade is not reduced 
in relation to its potential, and the maximum increase in real income of 
the developing country is attained. In the second , case, world trade is 
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unfavourably affected and the available resources are used uneco-
nomically.25 
It has already been noted that this distinction is of great importance 
to international economic policy. Among the specific objectives of the 
United Nations in the economic sphere, two are especially pertinent to 
this report. The first is to encourage the sound progress of international 
trade and the second to contribute to a more intensive growth of less 
developed countries. If, to attain this second aim, it were necessary to 
sacrifice the first, a serious conflict of objectives would arise. But this 
is not the case. The protectionist policy required for the economic develop-
ment of peripheral countries has no reason to injure world trade if such 
a policy remains within the limits imposed by the economic interest of the 
developing countries themselves. The recognition of this compatibility of 
objectives will have far-reaching consequences upon the guidance of 
world trade policy. From a strict development point of view, protection 
is not an exceptional or short-term need; it is a systematic long-term 
necessity. A trade policy with a point of departure which differs from 
this principle will delay economic development or will require continuous 
and laborious adjustments which could have been avoided if this principle 
had been fully recognized. In the long run it will also be detrimental to 
the sound progress of world trade. 
Protection, within the limits mentioned earlier, obviously entails 
changes only in the composition of imports and not in their volume. 
This can, however, cause difficulties in some industrial countries, a factor 
which can hardly be ignored in considering international co-operation. 
These difficulties are inherent in any process of adaptation in the dynamics 
of the economy. While these changes in composition unfavourably affect 
certain imports, they provide a strong stimulus for others. As noted in 
many previous analyses, the proportion of Latin America's imports of 
industrial non-durable consumer goods tends to decline while that of 
imports of raw materials, capital goods and durable consumer goods tends 
to increase. The repercussions of these phenomena differ according to the 
countries of origin. The United States and Germany, late comers to the 
export trade of manufactured goods to Latin America, rank first among 
the countries favourably affected by these structural changes. At the 
other extreme are Great Britain and France, whose exports of manufac-
tured goods for popular consumption or of easy substitution have suffered 
considerably as a result of economic development in the periphery. 
In consequence the policy of protection required by development does 
not affect aggregate imports from industrial centres, but does react 
strongly upon the origin of these imports, creating the need for a re-
adaptation which is generally difficult and takes a long term period to 
complete. These are, however, inevitable transformations and do not 
nullify the validity of a policy of protection. Nevertheless, they suggest 
the advisability of studying with care the specific conditions for the 
application of such a policy. 
/ 
23 Nevertheless it is possible to envisage a situation in which a given country, 
despite these unfavourable effects, would develop with protection domestic activi-
ties which reduce its external economic vulnerability. The advantage of greater 
stability must be weighed against the disadvantages of this type of protection. 
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When, as it is hoped, alternative programmes are available for the 
development of Latin America as a whole, it will be possible to form an 
idea of the changes in the composition of imports which must continue 
to be introduced. This could give adequate and preliminary guidance to 
the process of readapting the foreign trade of the industrial centres. This 
process is just as inevitable as the necessity of growth of the less deve-
loped countries. 
4. CONSEQUENCES OF PROTECTION IN THE INDUSTRIAL CENTRES 
Protection in the industrial centres and its consequences for world 
trade, especially the trade of the countries in process of development, 
should now be considered. It has already been stated that a general char-
acteristic of the centres is for imports to increase at a slower rate than 
income. This tendency may be.either neutralized or accentuated by trade 
policy, In Great Britain during the XlXth century, the elimination of 
customs duties upon imports of primary products encouraged them to 
such an extent that for a number of decades imports increased more 
rapidly than income and their coefficient rose steadily. The influence thus 
exerted by Great Britain, not only directly on the periphery but also 
indirectly on other industrialized countries, was one of the outstanding 
features of economic history in that period. This was the period when 
the Latin American countries received a strong impetus to their external 
development, in response to a world demand which expanded with great 
rapidity. Countries such as the United States, which had commenced to 
develop internally, found themselves favoured by this strong stimulus of 
, world trade; this has slackened to a great degree today when Latin 
America is called upon to follow a similar process. Despite such favour-
able conditions in the international sphere, industrialization in the United 
States systematically resorted to protectionist measures, the theoretical 
rejection of which at that time is clearly evident in the many criticisms 
of the classical school. 
Great Britain at that period is an example of how trade policy may 
alter the tendency of primary imports to increase at a slower rate than 
income. The case of the United States, now transformed into the principal 
economic centre as a result of its prodigious growth, is an example of 
the contrasting phenomenon. The protection of primary production 
strengthened the pressure of this import tendency in the United States 
where the import coefficient is at present almost 3 per cent. In the case 
of the principal ecojiomic centre during the XlXth century a coefficient 
of 35 per cent was registered in 1880. 
The results of this phenomenon cannot be interpreted in the light of the 
previous explanation of peripheral protection. Another distinction of de-
cisive importance must be introduced. The effects of protection on world 
trade are not the same in an industrial centre as in countries in course of 
development. While primary imports to the centre tend to increase less 
than its income, its exports of manufactured goods have a tendency to rise 
more rapidly than the income of peripheral countries. This disparity in 
trends creates contrasting problems. Imports to countries in course of 
development tend to expand more than their exports, while the opposite 
tends to occur in the industrial centres, although to a very different extent 
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(with exceptions which appear on later pages), and to the degree in which 
the composition changes in imports from the periphery affect their in-
dustrial exports. 
Thus, demand by developing countries for imports from industrial 
centres'tends to grow faster than does the demand of industrial countries 
for primary products. 
Under these conditions, there might be other motives for supporting 
measures to protect domestic primary production, although very different 
from those which protection requires in developing countries. Nat-
urally there is no tendency whatsoever towards a negative disequili-
brium in the balance of payments, but rather the exact opposite. Further, 
the active population which technical progress is gradually eliminating 
from primary production, spontaneously moves towards other domestic 
occupations and to the industrial export activities favoured by foreign * 
demand. 
Consequently, protection in under-developed countries — within the 
limits previously established—results in maintaining the close relationship 
between imports and exports, without retarding the rate of growth in 
world trade. But for an industrial centre with such characteristics, pro-
tection reduces imports below the capacity for external payment and un-
favourably affects world trade. 
In other words, given the substantial income elasticity of demand 
for industrial goods in general, the restriction of certain types of imports 
in under-developed countries is offset—within the bounds set by the 
capacity for external payments—by increased imports of other commodi-
ties which cpuld not previously be acquired in the same volume. In con-
trast, restrictions on the import of a given primary commodity into a 
large industrial centre are not necessarily neutralized by greater imports 
of other primary products since the demand was already met by existing 
imports. This will be the case unless, together with import restrictions, 
measures are taken to stimulate imports of other primary products as 
well as of manufactured or semi-finished goods. 
The logical results of such a protectionist policy on the part of a large 
industrial centre is evident. Countries in the process of development are 
compelled to strengthen their own protectionist policies because of a new 
and weakennig factor for their export trade. They must clearly exert 
stronger pressure on imports, both in order to reconcile them with a 
potentially lower capacity for externar payments and to encourage the ~ 
additional use in industry of productive factors which would have been 
absorbed by export activities in more favourable circumstances. . 
II. Practical significance of the principles of world trade 
1. T H E U N I T E D STATES AND TRADE RECIPROCITY 
It is of interest to examine the breadth of the functional differentiation 
which was noted at the end of the previous section. A large industrial 
centre, the United States, has a decisive influence on world trade. Con-
fining the argument to Latin America, it is a well-known fact that its 
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industrial imports depend closely upon exports of primary products. 
But, as already stated, the opposite does not hold true. If Latin America 
independently increases its purchases from the industrial centre, this does 
not imply that the centre will acquire more primary exports from Latin 
America. The volume of these exports is governed by other such impor-
tant factors that fluctuations in Latin American demand are insignificant 
in comparison. Therefore, the only effect of an independent rise in Latin 
American imports, not caused by a previous increase in exports, will be a 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments. 
The position of the United States as the principal dynamic centre of 
the world economy contributes very special emphasis to the concept of 
trade reciprocity. Upon examination, reciprocity is found to be implicit 
in the functional nature of the centre, since, if imports are increased 
simultaneously with exports, compensation is spontaneous and it is un-
necessary to manipulate the tariffs of other countries in order that this 
may take place without any difficulties. It was also a faculty of the British 
centre to provoke the immediate reaction of the periphery when indus-
trial exports from Great Britain were subject to very intense demand. 
T 
Thus the tariff concessions granted by the United States to countries 
in course of development act as a counterpoise, and world purchasing 
power generated by greater United States' imports will tend to transform 
itself directly or indirectly into greater international demand for United 
States' exports. In fact the position of the United States in regard to the 
economic development of Latin America could not be more favourable. 
While Latin American countries maintain their policy of protection within 
the given limits, it will be not their tariffs but their volume of exports 
to the United States26 which will determine their quantum of imports. 
It is true that if Europe strengthens the competitive position of its in-
dustry, a part of the dollars generated by the United States would be 
diverted towards that region; but these dollars would soon be transformed 
into European demand for United States' exports, as indicated by the 
foregoing reasoning and also by experience. This is a well recognized 
fact. 
Clearly, since Latin American tariffs are the instrument for modifying 
the composition of imports, United States' export activities must undergo 
the process of readaptation mentioned elsewhere in this report. In this 
respect also the United States holds a favourable position as compared 
with other industrial countries. It is not only due to the slight incidence 
of its exports in the national income (approximately 5 per cent), but to the 
well-known fact that its exports are those which are attractive to Latin 
American countries, even to an exaggerated extent. This statement does 
not imply that in certain cases the United States may not have a particular 
interest in promoting exports of specific commodities in preference to 
others and that such goods may be precisely those, the domestic output of 
which a Latin American country may desire to stimulate. This is a matter 
for trade negotiations, which would be far easier if agreement were 
reached on the fundamental principles of an economic development policy. 
26 Without considering, of course, other elements in the balance of payments. 
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If the principle is recognized that the volume of Latin American im-
ports is not determined by tariffs but by exports, it would not be difficult 
to find an agreement of interests. Suppose that, as a result of United 
States tariff concessions, a Latin American country should increase its 
exports and therefore be able to raise its imports; but it may also be 
assumed that this country wishes to reduce rather than raise imports of 
certain goods which can be replaced by domestic production through a 
reasonable measure of protection. It is probable that with this object in 
view the protective duties on such goods will be increased. What will 
happen to the other imports ? There will be a tendency towards an overall 
increase, without any need for a reduction of customs duties. Neverthe-
less, it is evident that if the duties on certain goods were to be reduced 
or eliminated, imports of these commodities would increase at the expense 
of others. An increase could therefore take place in imports of luxury 
goods mainly consumed by the higher income brackets or of commodities 
which are not indispensable for popular consumption. The resources 
could have otherwise been advantageously employed in acquiring capital 
goods. Once again the value is apparent of considering all these aspects 
within a development policy which not only attends to present require-
ments, but also to the evident need to introduce future changes in the 
composition of imports. 
To return to protection, the maintenance. of high duties on goods to 
avoid over-encouragement of imports might cause their domestic sub-
stitution to the detriment of productive factors for other uses of greater 
advantage to the country. A good development policy has at its disposal 
internal fiscal means with which to meet such cases, and in this way 
isolates one of the difficulties which often appears in trade negotiations. 
This ability of the United States to obtain spontaneous reciprocity for 
its tariff concessions is a result of the fundamental changes that have 
taken place in, the short lapse of one generation. Interested as it is in a 
vast peripheral development policy, the trade policy of the United States 
should also be modified in accordance with its new international situation. 
But to assume that this merely consists of accommodating a policy to new 
principles would be an artificial over-simplification of a real and very 
complex problem. There is no reason why exporters in general—and 
especially those encountering tariff obstacles elsewhere—should react in a 
manner which does not coincide with their immediate interests. This 
attitude is even more explicable in a country where only a few decades ago 
the efforts of its foreign trade policy had necessarily to be focused upon 
the encouragement of exports. 
2 . POSSIBLE REVISION OF T H E POLICY TOWARDS 
L A T I N AMERICA'S EXPORTS 
Seen from another angle, the tariff concessions granted by the United 
States since the policy of reciprocity began, although of special signifi-
cance in isolated cases, have not had outstanding effects upon overall 
imports of primary products. Nor does it appear probable that they will 
do so in the immediate future. Specific possibilities exist with regard to 
certain minerals, as will be seen directly. But in regard to other com-
modities, technical progress has often permitted productivity to rise 
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above that of other countries and, if costs are higher in the United States, 
it is because of the high wage level there. In any case, there is one con-
sideration which implies that no radical changes may be expected in trade 
policy. Recent technical progress and its immediate prospects axe so great 
that the economy of the United States will have to make a very intensive 
effort to absorb the productive factors that no longer find employment 
in primary production. Thus, there are aspects of the United States' 
economy which are similar to those of a country in course of development 
and simultaneously give other indications of maturity. The complexity 
of the problem therefore increases and its examination needs the same 
comprehension required for Latin American development problems and 
in this particular case for the nature of its trade policy. 
For the same reasons, the recent attitude of the United States Govern-
ment in deciding to propose the lowering of some tariffs must be empha-
sized. Previously the attempt to raise certain duties, which would have 
affected some Latin American countries most unfavourably, was success-
fully opposed. 
The special case of encouraging Latin American mineral exports 
should be considered. It is not surprising that some important strategic 
minerals are being produced in marginal high-cost mines in the United 
States. This contributed, in part, to the substantial rise in copper produc-
tion, since the events in Korea. In 1957, aggregate world capacity will 
probably reach some 1,150,000 tons against 852,000 in 1951. The gravity 
of the situation can be more clearly appreciated when it is recalled that 
the increase in production anticipated for 1957 represents 68 per cent 
of the 1951 imports from Latin-American countries. 
For aluminum an even more intensive programme of expansion had 
been established in the United States. A short while, ago, however, it was 
decided not to continue with the third stage of this programme, which 
consisted in raising output capacity by 240,000 tons through the invest-
ment of 200 million dollars of public funds. This decision was made, 
among other reasons, because the proposed tonnage could be imported 
from Canada. 
A similar situation exists for lead, zinc and other minerals which can 
be bought cheaply in Latin America, although in some cases additional 
investment is required. This situation presents an interesting opportunity 
for agreeing on a policy which would simultaneously supply the United 
States with cheaper minerals and promote the development of Latin 
America's exports. 
Another aspect of this problem is worth mentioning here. Since 1939, 
United States' policy has frequently resulted in the suspension of tariffs 
on minerals, whenever they are in short supply and the prices rise. For 
example, copper duties of 2 cents.a pound were eliminated when the 
domestic price in the United States rose above 24 cents. The same sit-
uation applies to lead and zinc. Undoubtedly this policy tends to regularize 
domestic market prices, but its effects on Latin America are. very un-
favourable. When world market prices fall, duties rise, with a propor-
tionately greater influence on exporting countries. In view of this, meas-
ures should be sought to avoid, or at least reduce, such external reper-
cussions if it is impossible to change this system of flexible duties in 
accordance with considerations of United States' domestic policy. 
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Finally, for both minerals as well as other commodities, additional 
. opportunities are available to assist Latin American exports. The United 
States' tariff system weighs more heavily on the finished product than on 
raw materials, and consequently represents an important obstacle to the 
industrial finishing of raw materials in Latin American producer coun-
tries. This therefore undoubtedly represents another possibility for rais-
ing the value of Latin American exports. 
3. LIBERALIZATION OF INTER-LATIN AMERICAN TRADE 
The centre of gravity in Latin American economic development will 
continue to be industrialization, fundamentally associated with greater 
technical progress in agriculture, that is, on dynamic forces of a domestic 
nature. If, as a result of exceptional events, exports should increase more 
than is at present foreseen, the rate of development would receive a 
greater impulse. 
These factors impose the need for new trends in trade policy, and not 
only in regard to trade between the Latin American countries and 
the industrial centres. Trade policy between individual Latin American 
countries is still influenced by former methods of development in which 
their isolated interests converged upon the complementary needs of the 
industrial centres in the classic exchange of primary products for manu-
factured goods. 
The development of such trade, far from being incompatible with 
industrialization, is a basic means for its attainment. But industrializa-
tion is developing in "water-tight" compartments of national economies, 
and trade in industrial products between Latin American countries is 
very rare. While industrialization merely covered those goods for which 
the national market permitted enterprises of sufficient size to be estab-
lished, this industrial isolation was no cause for serious concern. But 
when, to meet the needs of development, industrialization is extended 
to goods which can only be economically produced by mass production 
methods which exceed the demand of the domestic market, it is impera-
tive to organize reciprocal trade between the Latin American countries. 
Examples which illustrate these facts have recently occurred. A for-
eign company, encouraged by such protective measures, plans to begin 
manufacturing passenger vehicles or tractors in several Latin American 
countries, although not on the most economic scale owing to their limited 
individual consumption. If these vehicles could enter other Latin Amer-
ican countries freely, or with lower duties than imports from outside 
Latin America, production could expand appreciably with all its conse-
quent advantages. 
This liberalization of trade between the Latin American countries 
need not influence either the United States or Europe more than the 
effects of a tariff with which either of these countries might attempt to 
protect its domestic output. Import restrictions on goods from the United 
States and Europe would be the same in each case; in both cases Latin 
America's output must be expanded in view of the urgent requirements 
of economic development. The difference does not lie in the external 
effects but in the domestic consequences. The liberalization of trade 
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permits specialization with its kown advantages; on the other hand, in 
a'system of water-tight compartments, high cost production will often 
result from the inadequacy of the domestic market. 
Clearly this type of liberalization is insufficient to cause a satisfactory 
reciprocal trade movement. A series of additional measures agreed upon 
between the interested countries would be required, so that specialized 
industries could be established in each country and such plans could be 
combined with current trade and its possible encouragement. Under no 
circumstances should exclusive rights be given to some enterprises, but 
only to provide specific initial incentives for the activities thus estab-
lished in each country, leaving a free field for competition at a later date. 
This form of liberalization, confined to Latin American countries, re-
quires the establishment of a special system which has neither the char-
acteristics nor the wide scope of a customs union. On account of its 
breadth and overall nature, the concept of a customs union has at times 
been a powerful obstacle to the attainment of more moderate but prac-
ticable reciprocal advantages. A customs union arouses suspicions which 
are easy to understand. In addition to affecting current interests adversely, 
it means entering a sphere full of unknown quantities among which the 
diversity of monetary and exchange policies between the participating 
countries—to refer to the most important—may lead to unexpected con-
sequences for domestic production. 
The consequences would be entirely different if reciprocity agreements 
were aimed principally at stimulating a reciprocal trade in goods which 
are not at present being produced, which are only being manufactured 
in small quantities or which are alone produced on a large scale in-some 
of the countries and not in others. This could represent a concrete solu-
tion which, instead of raising opposition, would rather favour a healthy 
combination of interests in the countries concerned. 
For such a policy to yield all the anticipated results, it would have to 
be of a multilateral character and include the largest possible number 
of countries. This does not imply that bilateral agreements are not also 
useful. On the contrary; they generally indicate the beginning of a re-
ciprocal trade policy which could later be enlarged with other countries. 
By their very nature, bilateral agreements generally establish units of 
account for carrying out their operations and there is no reason to doubt 
that multilateral compensation formulae could be found. Herein there 
lies a vicious circle. One reason why reciprocal trade between a group 
of countries with potential commercial possibilities does not develop 
to a greater extent is the absence of a multilateral compensation system 
and the fact that no possibility exists for such a system while there 
is no reciprocal trade. The opportunities for concluding small agree-
ments simultaneously and leaving experience to indicate how they should 
be amplified and improved might be envisaged. But for such a proposal 
it is indispensable to create an adequate framework which at present is 
non-existent for trade policy. 
This problem has been of special concern to the Economic Commission 
for Latin America. In accordance with^the recommendations made to 
its secretariat, a preliminary analysis of the possibilities for reciprocal 
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trade in the southern zone of South America27 was presented to the 
Fifth Session at Quitandinha in 1953. At present a further report is 
being prepared, to include the northern zone of South America as well 
as the rest of the region, which will be presented to the Sixth Session 
at Bogotá in 1955. Progress is also being made on a study of inter-Latin 
American maritime transport. Once again a vicious circle occurs. The 
means* of transport are deficient because inadequate trade exists and 
there is a lack of trade owing to transport difficulties. 
It is to be hoped that these reports may lead to construction measures 
that will encourage inter-Latin American trade. If at the forthcoming 
conference at Rio de Janeiro it is possible to reach agreements to facili-
tate the liberalization of trade in the manner suggested here, there ap-
pears to be no doubt that an adequate framework would be available 
shortly for the adoption of specific and concrete measures. 
27 See Study of the Prospects of Inter-Latin American Trade (Southern Zone 




THE EXTERNAL ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF THE 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND THE 
POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING IT 
I. Possibilities of an internal anti-cyclical policy 
1. NATURE OF THE INTERNAL MEASURES 
The reasons for the high degree of economic vulnerability of the 
Latin American countries have been too well explained to require exten-
sive repetition here. It is true that the relative importance of foreign 
trade has declined, since it has increased at a slower rate than income. 
Nevertheless, foreign trade and the other elements in the balance of 
payments continue to exert a strong influence on the economic stability 
of these countries and on their ability to develop. 
Latin America's external vulnerability must be attacked with an ade-
quate combination of domestic and international measures. It is recog-
nized that, with very few exceptions, Latin American countries have 
not known how to take elementary safety precautions in times of plenty 
with which to meet periods of shortage. And there are no international 
measures which can replace individual improvidence with collective fore-
sight. Suitable international action requires an adequate national frame-
work within which to operate. 
A beginning should be made by establishing the domestic measures 
required to decrease external economic vulnerability. These are of two 
kinds and their combination leads to a stronger united force. On the 
one hand are those measures of a structural nature which strengthen 
the basis of the national economy and make it less sensitive to external 
fluctuations and contingencies. On the other, are anti-cyclical measures. 
The former measures are a mainspring of development policy. Indeed, 
the characteristic tendency of the Latin American countries to substitute 
imports by domestic production of goods essential for popular consump-
tion and for the normal growth of their indispensable economic activi-
ties, strengthens the structure of the economy to meet such external 
fluctuations and contingencies. If, once these substitutions are made, a 
substantial share of all imports consists of durable capital and consumer 
goods, imports can be intensively restricted during periods of foreign 
exchange shortage. Such restrictions should begin, of course, with non-
essential consumer goods, followed by durable goods which, however 
useful they may be, can be dispensed with temporarily, particularly if 
previous imports were substantial.28 It would thus be possible to ensure 
continued imports of essential goods during periods of adverse external 
conditions, provided that certain limits are not exceeded. 
28 The purpose here is not to outline a policy, but simply emphasize that this 
possibility exists. 
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But this structural strengthening should be accompanied by the for-
mation of reserves both to facilitate the transition from a period of 
plenty to one of stringency and to moderate the force of the restrictions. 
But if the nature and intensity of Latin America's external fluctuations 
are examined, they indicate the need for reserves which are beyond the 
means of the countries in the region. This occasions very serious diffi-
culties, and the best intentions have frequently encountered such 
obstacles. 
If this matter is viewed exclusively from the angle of stability, the 
desirability of accumulating large gold and foreign exchange reserves 
in times of prosperity is unquestionable. But to adhere too rigidly to 
this point of view would lead to immediate conflict with the requirements 
of a development policy. It would be difficult for such a policy to be 
reconciled with the accumulation of vast monetary reserves when an 
under-developed country has so many unsatisfied needs for capital. In-
vestment could not be effected if such large reserves existed, unless it 
were possible to secure foreign loans, which again are of doubtful value 
during an external boom period. Furthermore, there is another point 
which must be taken into consideration. It is impossible to advise the 
responsible authorities exactly how far they should deliberately abstain 
during the. boom from carrying out important development projects in 
order to build up reserves, the future use of which would not be at all 
certain. 
All these reasons help to explain why—notwithstanding the clear idea 
which has frequently been held of the need for such a policy—a reserve 
policy has been satisfactorily implemented only in exceptional cases. 
2. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION WITH INTERNAL MEASURES 
Hence the desirability of international action to assist in carrying out 
a domestic policy to decrease external vulnerability is fully justified. 
Several proposals can be advanced to accomplish this aim, but instead 
of discussing them in detail, it would be more interesting to indicate 
their central theme. 
It is well to recall first of all that external fluctuations are expressed 
in variations in the prices and volume of exports. Capital investments 
also tend to accentuate the intensity of such fluctuations instead of work-
ing to offset them. 
Various solutions, to be discussed later, have been found to combat 
fluctuations in the prices and volume of the primary products exported 
by Latin America and other exporting countries. This section will be 
limited to domestic measures. 
It is unnecessary to enumerate the disturbing effects of these price 
fluctuations. It is generally accepted that measures should be adopted to 
cushion the internal effects of these movements by absorbing an increas-
ing share of the rise in prices, but without weakening the incentive which 
producers require to expand production. Nevertheless, no sooner is an 
attempt made to translate this principle into reality than the inevitable 
objections occur. A major objection is that the resources thus absorbed 
are devoted to other purposes far removed from the direct and imme-
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díate interests of the producers and that, when the time comes to com-
pensate these producers for the results of a sharp drop in prices, there 
are no resources with which to do so. There is no doubt that if a pro-
cedure could be found to overcome objections of this nature, a solution 
to the problem would be far easier to obtain. 
Before outlining ways in which the problem could be studied, it is 
advisable to explain that this absorption might be achieved either by 
establishing a tax on exports, once prices exceed a certain level, or by 
absorbing a part of the value of exports through loans. There are also 
other general ways of absorbing resources in the market which could 
be used with the same aim when income increases rapidly as a result of 
external factors. But they will not be dealt with here. 
According to the point of view adopted, it is essential that the re-
sources thus obtained should be invested advantageously and that these x 
investments should, moreover, be easily liquidated when so required by 
the balance-of-payments situation or when the decline in internal eco-
nomic activity makes it advisable to follow an expansive policy which 
will have unfavourable effects on that balance. 
This liquidity of investments could only be achieved with the col-
laboration of the international credit institutions. For example, if the 
. funds referred to are invested in the financing of certain development 
projects, it is clear that they will lose their liquidity. This could only 
be recovered if an international credit institution should undertake in 
advance to grant loans on these projects when the country concerned 
needed to liquidate the investment made with those funds. 
For this purpose these projects would have to be presented for the 
prior approval of the credit institution just as if the loan were to be 
granted immediately. Nevertheless, the loan would be approved only in 
principle and its granting would be deferred until such time as the coun-
try concerned needed to recover the resources loaned in'the first instance. 
Meanwhile, the projects would be temporarily financed with these 
resources. Thus it would be a matter of a transitory investment, which 
would achieve the dual objective of applying the increase in international 
funds to economic development and at the same time of preserving their 
liquidity with a view to using them when the occasion arose. 
Clearly these measures would require the introduction of an anti-
cyclical policy by the international credit institutions. There are a series 
of considerations which indicate that this policy should be introduced 
independently of the measure mentioned above. This would have a favour-
able effect upon the economic activity both of the industrial centres and 
the countries in process of development. It is true that from the point 
of view of the International Bank — which is partly dependent on the 
money market for placing its bonds—certain limitations could arise in 
the obligations with interested countries regarding the eventual liquida-
tion of this type of temporary investment, although a favourable mar-
ket is generally available for bonds during slack periods of economic 
activity. But there is no risk in stating that there would be no insur-
mountable obstacles. Similarly, with adequate backing, the Export-Import 
Bank might be in a good position to take part in the operations under 
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consideration. While awaiting the moment to effect longer-term oper-
ations, its resources, provided by the United States Treasury, might 
be applied to short-term credit for reasonable amounts. This appears to 
be very far from being a difficult matter. 
It is evident that the obligation on the part of international financial 
institutions to assure the liquidity of investments, must be combined 
with correlative obligations of the interested countries. These measures 
must have a stabilizing purpose so that access to international resources 
to make investments liquid could only be resorted to when, for example, 
export prices drop below certain limits or when the volume of exports 
declines substantially. In this way, in addition to benefiting the balance 
of payments, the use of these international resources would permit a 
moderation in the effects on export activities of the drop in the prices 
or volume of exports. 
A system of this nature would undoubtedly provide the reserve policy 
v/ith a stimulus which it does not at present enjoy. But, for this policy 
to achieve its maximum efficacy, it would be desirable that, when in-
vestments are made liquid, resources granted by credit institutions be 
added to those which would be conceded if this policy were not in force. 
In the final analysis, it would represent only one of the means of trans-
forming into reality the concept that the size of international investment, 
together with other conditions, should be in proportion to the responsi-
bility and efficacy of a country's development policy and its ability to 
translate this policy into a programme. 
II. Possibilities of an international anti-cyclical policy 
1. T H E REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL PRICES 
It should be clearly understood that however elaborate and prudent 
may be a stabilizing policy such as that outlined above, its efficacy will 
in any case be limited to those price fluctuations which are not of an 
extreme character. But if prices drop to a level which weakens the in-
centive to increase production, with the risk that the normal growth of 
world demand will not be satisfied, the resources accumulated in times 
of plenty will be insufficient to offset the consequences of such a sharp 
decline. It is in these circumstances that the measures of international 
co-operation referred to immediately below must supplement those of a 
domestic nature which have just been analysed. 
But, before examining this possibility, certain preliminary considera-
tions are necessary. This examination does not imply that'the possibility 
or desirability of other types of international measures regarding prices 
should be in any way excluded. In this sense, consideration should pri-
marily be given to the policy of certain countries in accumulating stocks 
for strategic purposes. The experience here has been enlightening and 
it is hoped that future fluctuations in the demand for such stocks will 
not be as sharp as those of the past. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be anticipated that this policy will always exert 
a regulating effect. There will be times when strategic and economic 
conditions will coincide. It may be noted that Dr. Milton Eisenhower's 
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report contains a recommendation to raise United States purchases of 
strategic materials during periods of falling prices. But in the event of 
a rise in prices, it will not be expected that strategic stocks considered 
essential should be liquidated with a view to regulating the market. Fur-
thermore, although the operations of the United States Government on 
world markets have a considerable influence upon them, a regulating 
policy would obviously require the support of other countries if it were 
to achieve real efficiency. The orbit of this policy is thus of a broad in-
ternational nature. 
From the aspect of market stability the ideal would be a regulating 
policy through which an international body would alternately act upon 
the supply of and demand for primary products on world markets, in 
. order to maintain price fluctuations within narrow limits. There are 
obvious complications attached to such a policy, however, desirable as 
it might be for producer countries. Leaving aside the financing of 
purchases, an important objection has frequently been cited. If the price 
level to be stabilized becomes very satisfactory for exporting countries, 
it might encourage exaggerated production and bring with it the need 
for a system of international quotas which is usually difficult to apply, 
especially in the case of some products. 
Without overlooking these difficulties, it is interesting to verify the 
advance achieved in ways of thinking about this subject. For example, 
on the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council, a group of 
five experts was appointed in 1953 by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to recommend price stabilization measures for primary prod-
ucts.29 They drew up a study of the different types of measures that 
might be applied. The experts indicate that they show no confidence that 
multilateral agreements on individual products can be concluded in suffi-
cient numbers, and have a wide enough scope, to satisfy the general 
aspiration in the producer countries of achieving stability in their foreign 
revenue. They analyse the main advantages and drawbacks implicit in 
the creation of international buffer stocks, designed to prevent violent 
short-term price fluctuations. Anti-cyclical loans and measures for auto-
matically compensating the losses suffered by variations in the terms of 
trade are referred to as types of solutions which do not directly attack 
the root of the problem, but which rather tend to compensate by other 
means the undesirable effects provoked by the instability of raw material 
prices. Ideas of such a nature are undoubtedly somewhat slow/to pene-
trate, so it would therefore be advisable at present to select those measures 
which could be applied more easily under present circumstances although 
they might aim at much more modest objectives.30 
2 . T H E FIXING OF M I N I M U M PRICES 
Such could be the concept underlying an agreement between the more 
important exporting and importing countries to establish reserves of the 
principal primary export products when their prices fall below a mini-
29 See Commodity Trade and Economic Developmentj New York, 1953. United 
Nations publication (Sales No. 1954.II.8.1). 
80 In this connexion, it should be noted that the United Nations Economic arid 
Social Council, at its eighteenth session in August 1954, adopted a resolution 
(557 F (XVIII ) )^establishing a Commission on International Commodity Trade. 
(See Annex.) ' . 
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mum level. In fact, the character of the minimum price is the basic 
element in this policy and its determination will not be easy in actual 
practice. But it could be ^defined as the price that is sufficient for most 
producers to cover their costs, to obtain a reasonable profit, and to con-
tinue raising production to respond to the normal growth of demand 
through its cyclical or accidental fluctuations. 
It is obvious that the establishment of a minimum price of this kind 
does not entail the same dangers as the stabilization of prices within 
narrow limits and at a relatively high level. The minimum price deter-
mined by the criterion referred to earlier, could turn out to be high in 
actual practice. A certain flexibility is therefore required/The minimum 
could be pegged for a reasonable period of a year or eighteen months 
and later readjusted according to circumstances. Otherwise this type of 
regulating policy might encounter complications that are analogous to 
the policy of stabilization, and export quotas and restrictions on output 
would have to be established. The object of a minimum price is not to 
oppose basic market trends which necessarily require price adjustments, 
but merely to ensure that transitory market factors do not provoke fluc-
tuations of too violent a nature. 
The question could be raised whether the establishment of minimum 
prices would also imply a need for maximum prices. The accumulation 
of stocks of a product to avoid an excessive decline would lessen the 
importance of the opposite price movement through the gradual sale of 
the buffer stocks. This would undoubtedly be the best way of moderat-
ing the extent of fluctuations. Nevertheless, the possibility of maximum 
prices should not be eliminated.31 
Viewed from another aspect, it cannot be denied that an element of 
risk exists in the establishment of minimum prices, which is greater the 
higher the price is fixed. However, experience shows that a rise in prices 
generally follows a price decline, except in the case of products for which 
world demand tends to weaken persistently, of for which sales tend to 
increase with greater intensity than the growth of demand due either to 
technical improvements or particular conditions for production. But 
these are special cases which must be dealt with individually and it can-
not be said that they are typical of Latin American experience. At all 
events, the losses that might occur if markets do not react sufficiently 
within a reasonable lapse of time, would have to be considered in the 
light of the advantages gained from this policy. Broadly speaking, ex-
cept in the case of certain goods which are subject to their own par-
ticular movements owing to the long period required for their production, 
the fluctuations which concern the Latin American countries are of a 
cyclical nature. 
A regulating policy of this type could contribute substantially to lessen-
ing the cyclical movement in producer countries and have favourable 
effects on the economy of industrial countries. In fact, not only are prices 
81 On the other hand, since the object of a minimum price is to encourage pro-
duction, it is obvious that, as the volume or normal growth of output continues 
to increase, the rise in prices will also be weakened. For example, there is no doubt 
that if it had been possible to avoid the sharp drop in coffee prices in the thirties 
the present exceptional level would never have been reached. 
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prevented from falling below a certain limit, but the creation in producér 
countries of buffer stocks financed with international resources will 
contribute to maintaining the demand for industrial purchases. 
3 . F I N A N C I N G DIFFICULTIES 
When financing these operations, the necessary resources will, in the 
case of isolated commodities, be of relatively moderate proportions. 
But, if the commodities to which this policy would be applied are con-
sidered as a whole, the problem of financing could reach very substan-
tial proportions. It cannot be denied that this is a major problem. If the 
needed volume of resources is large, it is because the threatened con-
traction of exports from the producer countries is also substantial. In 
view of the repercussions of this contraction, the reduction in world in-
come as a result of this phenomenon would be several times greater. 
The problem must therefore be considered from this angle and not 
merely as an expedient to assist producer countries. The fundamental 
aim of such a regulating policy is anti-cyclical and it is evident that an 
international financing system that is not sufficiently flexible to be adapted 
to the requirements of anti-cyclical policy, would offer very serious de-
fects which should be given special attention. 
These considerations would suffice to confirm that the price regulation 
policy appears to be outside the scope of the inter-American system. Ex-
cluding this feature, however, it is obvious that practically all Latin 
America's export products which might be subject to this policy are of 
interest to a large number of producer or consumer countries outside 
the region. Their collaboration would be an indispensable factor for en-
suring the success of this policy. This does not signify that the Rio de 
Janeiro Conference is not a suitable occasion on which to discuss this 
extremely important problem. Price regulation must be an integral part 
of international collaboration within a Latin American development 
policy. And the positive recommendations which may be adopted at 
the Conference could notably contribute to a solution of this problem at 
the broader international level. -
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4 . T H E CASE OF STRATEGIC COMMODITIES 
There are other aspects of price policy which are of interest to Latin 
America. For certain commodities considered of strategic importance, 
obligations have been contracted which restrict normal activities on the 
world market. It is not easy to estimate the extent to which purchases 
made for strategic purposes compensate the producer countries for mar-
ket restrictions. The. possibility of contributing to this compensation by 
other means has been mentioned on various occasions. This is a field in 
which political considerations coincide with those of an economic nature 
in possible concrete solutions. Therefore, this is not the appropriate 
place in which to discuss the problem. 
5. T H E PROBLEM OF SURPLUSES 
The considerations which favour a price regulation policy are of a 
permanent nature and are the result of the manner in which the inter-
national economic system operates. But this is not the sole object of 
concern in the matter. Some Latin American countries face, with un-
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derstandable anxiety, certain events, which, although they appear to be 
of a transitory nature, at present have important international reper-
cussions. The United States, by virtue of its agricultural price parity 
policy, has accumulated surpluses of products with a value amounting 
to the remarkable figure of 6,000 million dollars, of which it is envisaged 
to liquidate 1,000 millions on the world market during the next three 
years. 
A consequence of the price parity policy has been to over-stimulate 
production and to discourage certain types of consumption, such as 
foodstuffs of animal origin, which could easily respond to the stimulus of 
lower prices. The Government of the United States has thus tended 
towards a more flexible price policy to facilitate the reaction of the 
domestic market. Competent experts indicate that a drop of approxi-
mately 10 per cent would be sufficient to cause an adjustment between 
supply and demand, except in the case of wheat where the required de-
crease is estimated at between 20 and 30 per cent. This policy would 
hinder the amassing of new surpluses, but would not solve the problem 
of those already accumulated. However, the decision to liquidate only 
1,000 millions of the 6,000 millions total during the next, three years, 
suggests that consideration is being given to the possibility that, as in the 
past, weather conditions may sharply reduce production and thus permit 
the liquidation of all the accumulated stocks. 
Even though the practice of selling surpluses on the world market is 
a cautious one and a proportion of these surpluses is granted as a sub-
sidy to promote consumption in countries where it is limited, it cannot 
be denied that the resultant greater supply will adversely affect prices. 
It is estimated that disposal of surpluses in the next three years may 
well exceed 1,000 million dollars annually, as was the case in the years 
prior to 1951 when the exports of agricultural products included in the 
foreign aid programmes of the United States constituted a large propor-
tion of its total agricultural exports. One of the fundamental reasons for 
condemning multiple exchange rates and other similar practices has been 
the disturbing effect which external sales, at prices below the domestic 
level, have had on the world market and on international competition. 
Although this does not mean that all multiple rates have this effect, it is 
logical that measures of this nature have been placed within the sphere 
of action of international regulating bodies. The present case appears to 
be of a temporary nature, but there is no doubt that some consultative 
procedure between interested countries could greatly relieve the anxiety 
caused by such occurrences.82 
This system of price parity and its consequences justify a cautious 
attitude to possible international measures with similar principles. This is 
a further reason for giving preference to the consideration of a minimum 
price policy over a stabilizing policy within relatively narrow margins. 
On the other hand, if the prices of certain products were to fall below 
critical levels in the world market, it might be necessary to combine a 
policy of minimum prices with one of disposal of^surpluses. 
.. 32 It should be noted that the Committee on Commodity Problems of the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization has established a Consultative Sub-
Committee on Surplus Disposal. Two Latin American countries are members of 
this Sub-Committee, and many others participated as observers at its first meeting 
which was held in Washington, D.C., in July 1954. 
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6. FLEXIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CREDIT SYSTEM 
There is another aspect of international anti-cyclical action which 
must be underlined in this chapter. At the beginning, the suitability of 
encouraging a policy for the provident accumulation of international ex-
change reserves was noted. This, however, is not sufficient to prevent an 
investment programme from being adversely affected by international 
factors. It is advisable to explore the possibility of giving a broader anti-
cyclical character to the activities of international bodies. Mention has 
already been made elsewhere of the desirability of increasing foreign 
loans when the depressive effect of such factors hinders a country in 
process of development from attaining the volume of domestic saving 
required to carry out a programme. In other words, an element of flexi-
bility would have to be introduced into the credit system, which did not 
formerly exist in the international private banking system. This system 
had substantial advantages but also considerable defects which the new 
institutions have endeavoured to overcome. This is, undoubtedly, another 
field in which valuable service could be rendered to Latin American 
development. 
As regards short-term credits, the International Monetary Fund is 
also in a position to co-operate in the efficient execution of an anti-
cyclical policy. This institution has recently taken measures which notably 
improve the effectiveness of its policy. If it is possible to increase the 
loans and the terms of payment its efficacy would undoubtedly be even 
greater, not only as an element of anti-cyclical policy but also as a 
means of combating those sudden emergencies which have recently arisen 
in Latin America. 
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Chapter VI 
THE ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITES FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CO-OPERATION IN A POLICY OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
This report, by its very nature, concerns the measures of international 
co-operation required by a vigorous Latin American development policy. 
The cardinal points of this policy have already been outlined. They refer 
primarily to the system of international investment and the need to adopt 
measures enabling advantage to be taken of its considerable potential. 
They also relate to the desirability of introducing anti-cyclical measures 
into international economic policy, the efficiency of which is seriously 
endangered without them. It is thought advisable that technical assistance 
should centre around the problem of productivity, without implying neg-
lect of its other aspects. All these objectives must be expressed within 
the framework of a trade policy which permits and encourages the indus-
trialization of countries in the course of development without reducing the 
volume of international trade. 
For this policy of international co-operation to achieve adequate scope, 
it is indispensable for the Latin American countries to adopt a similar 
series of measures without which the desired results of international co-
operation-will be precarious or may be damaged beyond repair. 
This need for harmony and complementarity between the domestic and 
international economic sectors has been an essential premise for the 
discussions in this report. The policy of international co-operation is 
thus no substitute for an internal development policy. It can only be fully 
justified when this policy exists. It is the complement to facilitate its 
execution and to give it greater effect, but not to take its place. 
There are, of course, other forms of external collaboration. The desira-
bility of subsidies might be envisaged, or of certain loans under special 
circumstances designed to assist a country in particular difficulties, re-
gardless of any specific concern for economic development. But such 
measures are not within the scope of this report. 
The ability of the Latin American countries to reap the benefits of a 
system of international co-operation requires, in addition to a clear 
understanding of the problems, a firm collective discipline for solving 
them. Without this determination, the basic objective of development, a 
rapid rise in the standard of living of the masses, will prove difficult if 
at all possible to attain. The masses, together with their political and union 
leaders, must play an integral part in formulating a development policy. 
Without a firm basis of collective understanding and support, it would 
appear impossible to eliminate—or at least weaken—the obstacles hinder-
ing the effectiveness of such a policy. 
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Inflation is perhaps the principal barrier in many countries. Its corro-
sive effects are disturbing and, if it continues unabated, it will be im-
possible to achieve that degree of social cohesion without which economic 
development might be transformed into a merely ideological approach, 
with little practical significance. 
Another serious obstacle is the absence of an adequate fiscal system 
that stimulates the entrepreneur while meeting urgent social demands. 
If this system is indispensable to encourage production, output in turn 
cannot expand steadily unless there is an increasing purchasing power 
among the masses. 
Inadequate utilization of productive land also obstructs development. 
Similarly, inexcusable and out-of-date methods of conducting those pub-
lic utilities indispensable for efficient economic activity are far from 
favouring development. 
Finally, development policy demands a sincere diagnosis of these and 
other evils which hinder Latin American growth and weaken its social 
significance. 
But this should not be. interpreted as implying any association with" 
restrictive formulae based on preventing international co-operation until 
Latin American countries have overcome these evils, prevented their 
recurrence, improved public administration and controlled the factors 
causing political instability. Such an extreme attitude would also be un-
realistic. A country in process of development cannot be expected to show 
signs of the maturity and collective judgment which the more advanced 
countries, after centuries of effort, have still not fully achieved. Here 
again only a high degree of understanding will permit an escape from a 
negative attitude. International co-operation must embody strong and 
constructive incentives if the international flow of investment is to attain 
its maximum power. 
In order to accomplish this, Latin America would be faced with one 
of the most serious responsibilities of its history, namely how to find 
measures to assist its rapid expansion in such a policy of co-operation. 
For it should be stressed that development—except during transitory 
periods—is not generally a spontaneous phenomenon, but rather the result 
of a conviction, a deliberate process, and a persistency of purpose. 
If the course of a country's economy is left to chance and no serious 
effort is made to overcome the obstacles restraining it, the development 
will be uncertain and precarious. Moreover the progress of the interna-
tional system will be weak and fragmentary in relation to a country's 
real capacity for development. 
At the opposite extreme, a country which succeeds in defining its devel-
opment policy in a considered programme of well-concerted measures, 
should receive full and uninterrupted support in the international system. 
Clear and firm guidance of national development policy should give 
ample opportunity for international co-operation. This will be the deci-
sive test in the future. 
Furthermore, the concept of a development policy is still in its infancy, 
and requires the assistance of wide and varied experience. The formulae 
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used by developed countries are insufficient, if not entirely inadequate, 
since the evolution of countries now in process of development is taking 
place under very different historic and institutional conditions. 
It is therefore necessary to draw up a Latin American development 
policy, in which many efforts may be integrated. International credit ágen-
cies, with their increasing knowledge of Latin America's problems, .pro-
vide most valuable assistance. At the sessions of the United Nations 
General Assembly, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America as a regional organ of the latter, 
a growing interest is evident in these problems and in the techniques best 
suited to discover real solutions,' and this interest is also spreading to 
other institutions. , 
A body of practical principles to guide a development policy is thus 
gradually coming into existence. Conferences such as the Rio de Janeiro 
meeting should know how to find in them the instruments of judgment 
which must not be overlooked at any stage of international co-operation. 
Since the leaders of the whole region's economic and financial policy meet 
at this conference, they can specify in agreements and recommendations 
those principles and standards which are progressively being formulated. 
Thus Latin America has at its disposal the facilities for study and 
decision. All that would remain is to accommodate its economic life to 
a continuous and dynamic internal development policy and to appropriate 
measures of international economic co-operation. 
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by the secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America to collaborate in preparing recommendations for the Rio 
de Janeiro Meeting. . • 
The brief period of twenty-five days within which we were obliged 
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subjects to be dealt with at the Meeting. For this reason we limited 
ourselves to formulating our recommendations, without enlarging on 
considerations of a theoretical nature, since these are generally well 
known. Moreover, the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America has prepared a study which constitutes a very complete analysis 
of the principal problems for discussion at the Meeting, and we sub-
stantially share the views expressed therein and consider that they con-
stitute an essential background paper to this Report. 
We have been guided by the criterion'of indicating specific objectives 
that can in practice be attained, taking into account actual conditions in 
, Latin America, the diversity of individual situations, and the need to 
obtain positive results. 
We have not endeavoured to find the ideal formula, but rather to indi-
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Sol Castellanos for the valuable assistance they gave us in their capacity 
as consultants to the Group. 
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Carlos LLERAS RESTREPO 
Rodrigo FACIÓ 
Francisco GARCÍA OLANO 
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The forthcoming conference to be held at Rio de Janeiro is of excep-
tional importance. During the meeting the American system should prove 
itself capable of expanding the range of its agreements, which in the past 
were predominantly political, and of establishing more efficient and fuller 
economic co-operation in order to achieve an equitable balance in reci-
procal obligations and advantages. Iñ this way the scepticism with which 
public opinion in Latin America has often viewed Pan-American con-
ferences may be overcome. 
Public opinion is well aware that in other continents vast development 
plans are under way with the help of the United States and, in some cases, 
of other countries. It is not unaware of the causes influencing the adoption 
of such plans, and their relation to such important factors as the degree 
of a country's development, its culture, population and geographical 
position. Although the importance attached to other continents is ex-
plained by the destruction suffered and by the latent developments there 
and, in many cases, by the exceptionally low level of per capita income, 
public opinion cannot but regret the limited scope of the measures of 
co-operation tried thus far in Latin America. 
Public opinion at the same time sees the emergence of disturbing situa-
tions in Latin America which tend to be intensified, while the exception-
ally favourable economic circumstances existing in former years are 
deteriorating. On the other hand, it sees that in certain regions of the 
world high investment coefficients are obtained through the application 
of systems of economic organization based on a different set of values. 
It is not only a matter of economic values but also of the spiritual values 
upon which our civilization is based. 
The spread of knowledge and the incentives of new inventions that 
make the common man aware of the standards of living of other peoples, 
have given the masses a clear understanding of their own needs, and have 
stimulated more pressing demands than the present rate of growth is 
capable of satisfying. It is not surprising that, combined with political 
instability, this situation had led to ever-increasing social tension which 
is frequently transformed into "a barren and disintegrating struggle to 
share a communal income which hardly increases at air'.1 
Latin America with its 167 million inhabitants, has the highest annual 
rate of population growth in the world, or 20.6 per thousand as compared 
with 10.1 per thousand in Asia, to cite only one example; moreover it is 
probable that before the end of the century Latin America's population 
will exceed 400 millions. This historical projection alone is worthy of 
reflection and, if combined with other basic factors presently influencing 
the development of our economies, the need to increase investment and 
incomes becomes clearly apparent and inevitable. Only then could the 
standard of living of the growing population progressively approach that 
of more advanced countries. Otherwise, a considerable part of this vast 
1 See page 12 above. 
90; 
population would find itself forced along paths fraught with unpredict-
able social and political consequences. 
If the economic inequality between the United States and Latin Amer- . 
ica becomes more pronounced instead of decreasing, greater lack of 
understanding will result and it will be very difficult to maintain a true 
continental system of co-operation and solidarity. 
Attempts to modify this situation are fundamentally the responsibility 
of the Latin American countries. It is a dangerous illusion to believe that 
external assistance can represent the dominant factor in achieving a 
higher standard of living. This must essentially be the task of our own 
peoples. But to accomplish it, Latin America faces many serious ob-
stacles : its present limited income; its low consumption level; social 
pressures that cannot easily be. restrained and tend to be directed into an 
immediate demand for the transfer of a substantial share of income 
towards consumption; the exceptional vulnerability of an economy that 
depends largely upon the prices of a few export commodities; and defi-
ciencies in technical training. An incontestable conclusion can be drawn 
from these facts: without effective international co-operation, the rate of 
development will be very slow and constantly threatened by dangerous 
inflationary pressures and difficult social processes which would consti-
tute a serious risk to the continuance of democratic systems. 
The following are essential aspects of international co-operation that 
our countries need and request: the participation of public international 
capital; agreement regarding action to mitigate the influence of external 
factors upon Latin American economies, principally regarding prices of 
the region's export commodities; a trade policy in accordance with the 
conditions actually prevailing in the continent; and greater technical 
assistance. Adequate organization of such co-operation is of fundamental 
interest to Latin America, but it is also—and this is very cléarly evident— 
in the interests of the United States, as demonstrated in widely accepted 
documents, including Resources for Freedom prepared by the Paley 
Commission, Partners in Progress, by the Nelson Rockefeller Mission, 
and the report of the Capehart Commission. In this connexion the recent 
Report to the President of the United States by Milton S. Eisenhower 
contains the following relevant declarations: 
"As a market for our commercial exports, Latin America is as important to 
us as all of Europe and more important than Asia, Africa and Oceania com-
bined. Our sales to Latin America encompass the entire range of our national 
production. As a source of United States imports, the Latin American republics 
have even greater relative importance, standing well ahead of Europe or the 
other continents. 
. . . Unfortunately, the people of the United States do not seem generally 
to comprehend the full significance to us of stable economic relations with Latin 
America; moreover, some of our actions have caused leaders in those countries 
to adopt the mistaken view that we turn our attention to them only in times 
of crisis". 
Co-operation between the two Americas has encountered obstacles that 
must be removed, including the difficulty in understanding certain reali-
ties arising from our own peculiar historical evolution and our particular 
economic structure. At times there is a tendency to formulate dogmatic 
principles on the basis of mere impressions of other economies-—theories 
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developed from the study of conditions radically different from those in 
our countries. It is thus indispensable to consider with greater care the 
institutional forms and traditions of the countries in each continent, the 
differences of time and space, and human, geographic and economic 
realities. For example, when weighing the influence that private foreign 
investment could have on the development of the Latin American coun-
tries, the role that the State has been forced to assume in these countries 
cannot be overlooked, nor the fact that the State must necessarily create 
the bases upon which such development and the expansion of private 
enterprise can take place. Any policy of co-operation must accept these 
facts. To ignore them would only hinder the attainment of greater har-
mony in plans for hemisphere action. Latin America does not require 
help of a gratuitous character, which could be applied only in exceptional 
and specific cases. Nor need it run the risk that such measures might 
create a feeling of dependence in the minds of its peoples. What is needed 
is a vigorous economic development plan; a definite concept of the goals 
to be achieved and of the means to be used; improved organization; a 
firm continuity of purpose; and the decision to face certain sacrifices 
and restrictions. 
A policy really intended to modify the principles upon which our 
national economies are based would involve weighing the means, estab-
lishing the needs, and fixing the targets to be attained, despite the risks 
and difficulties inherent when results can appear only very gradually. 
It is unquestionable that the programming of economic development 
requires collaboration between the State, the entrepreneur and the 
worker, since its scope transcends the sphere of exclusively public or 
private activity, combining both. It is of fundamental importance that 
workers, especially through their organizations, should participate in 
formulating these programmes and should offer responsible assistance. 
Such collaboration constitutes the only real possibility of attaining a 
higher standard of living for the Latin American people. 
But, we repeat, all this will not suffice. The need also exists for a high 
degree of economic co-operation and, as the decisive factor, a substantial 
inflow of capital in the form of private investment, and loans from 
international credit institutions. 
For all these reasons the meeting of the Ministers of Finance or 
Economy at Rio de Janeiro represents a transcendent and historic oppor-
tunity to understand the concrete possibilities of reaching agreements that 
will promote the economic development required to transform the living 
conditions of our people and decrease the vulnerability of our economies. 
Our peoples will find this meeting the best occasion to discover whether 
it is possible to extend the Good Neighbour Policy to the field of eco-
nomics as well as to politics. 
As stated earlier, Latin America must decide to make certain sacrifices 
and undergo certain restrictions in order to achieve such high objectives. 
This is not easy, but a task of such proportions cannot be successfully 
accomplished by arbitrary means directed merely at solving immediate 
difficulties. Instead a clear and persistent'effort is required and this effort 
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must be made now* Its postponement would constitute an error with 
incalculable repercussions. 
The co-operation of the United States is a basic condition upon which 
not only the success of this effort depends, but also the possibility of 
undertaking it during our times. It may be that the United States economy 
is already heavily burdened with domestic and international problems. 
But even if this situation should prove to be difficult the means to over-
come it must be found. Co-operation alone can create the possibility of an 
Arrierica whose fundamental unity is based on a firm dedication to its 
democratic ways of life. 
The strength of the inter-American system will depend upon the con-
victions arising from the people themselves, who understand and foresee 
its desirability and its ultimate results. And to preserve the values that 
uphold it, this system must show that it has undertaken the enormous 
task of overcoming the profound contradictions and differences in the 
conditions of those who dwell in one part of the continent or the other. 
America will eventually provide an example that mankind can live in 
dignity, freedom and peace. But to achieve these ends continental soli-





HEMISPHERE DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND 
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
The secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America has 
requested us to explore the means of strengthening Latin America's 
economic development within a policy of economic co-operation of the 
Americas in preparation for the forthcoming Meeting of Ministers of 
Finance or Economy at Rio de Janeiro. For this purpose, the secretariat 
placed at our disposal a study which analyses and explains its own sugges-
tions on this subject. We have considered these suggestions with care and 
this report is mainly based upon them, in some respects supplements 
them, and also indicates our opinion of the way in which they could be 
implemented. 
Although many differences are apparent between the countries of Latin 
America with respect to degrees of development and economic structure, 
there exist characteristics common to all or practically all of them that 
fully justify reference to a hemisphere development policy based on in-
ternar action and international co-operation. Such characteristics, suffi-
ciently well known, can be synthesized as follows: 
(a) The accelerated demographic growth and the fact that a large part 
of the active population is employed in primary activities, especially 
agriculture. In general there is an excess of agricultural labour and a very 
low per capita productivity; 
(b) The high proportion of total income that is still represented by the 
value of exports, mainly composed of a very limited number of raw 
materials and foodstuffs whose prices generally vary with greater inten-
sity and frequency than those of manufactured goods; 
(c) The low level of consumption that, in large sectors of the popu-
lation, assumes the characteristics of chronic under-consumption. Conse-
quently, there is an exceptional tendency to increase consumption, and 
with it imports, when an increase in per capita income takes place. This 
occasions—-except in unusual periods—very serious obstacles to an in-
creased rate of investment. 
(d) The relatively small importance of the inflow of foreign capital, 
and the considerable burden that remittances of foreign investments 
impose on foreign exchange availabilities; 
(e) The need for very large basic investments not only to finance in-
dispensable services, but also to permit the development of directly repro-
ductive investments; 
( / ) The considerable deficiencies in general education, and particu-
larly in technical training. 
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These characteristics in themselves indicate the type of measures that 
a development policy should envisage and the role which corresponds to 
international co-operation. Thus, for example, to attain a rate of invest-
ment sufficient to raise income to keep pace with the growth of population 
and to permit a reasonable improvement in the standard of living, domes-
tic investment must be intensified and better oriented. Except during 
exceptional periods, however, these measures would not be sufficient. 
The rate of domestic capital formation can increase substantially only if 
for a sufficient period of time investments are considerably larger than 
normally permitted by limited domestic investable funds. New invest-
ments generate additional income out of which a larger proportion may 
be saved than formerly. The role of foreign capital is therefore-not only 
to permit the execution of a larger number of projects within a given 
period, but also to make it possible to attain a new and higher rate of 
national saving and capital formation within such a period. The impor-
tance of financial co-operation is thus clearly evident. 
The decline in the price of export commodities that causes a deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade obviously exerts a profoundly disturbing effect 
on investment. Consequently, not only does real income decline for as 
long as that deterioration continues, but by affecting the rate of internal 
capital formation, it prolongs its effects on the growth of income into the 
future. Due to the very nature of the problem, international co-operation 
in this field is absolutely indispensable. 
The modifications that may be introduced in the economy to increase 
productivity and cushion the effect of external influences also require the 
combination of internal action with a trade policy that takes into account 
and accepts the need for those modifications. 
Finally, it is evident that without the co-operation of foreign technical 
knowledge it is not only difficult but well-nigh impossible to undertake 
certain activities or the establishment of certain enterprises, as well as to 
give the desired scope to the efforts towards improving the knowledge 
and experience of the national labour force. 
There are therefore four principal fields which should be covered by 
economic development policy and international co-operation: investment, 
the problems related to the external fluctuations, trade policy, and tech-
nical training. Important Steps have already been taken concerning each 
of these points and they have been the object of repeated discussions 
during the conferences held on global and. regional levels. But, as the 
report of the ECLA secretariat has opportunely pointed out, it is neces-
sary to organize more fully, amplify and supplement within the frame-
work of a specific regional development policy the fragmentary solutions 
proposed up to the present. 
The first principle that must be acknowledged as fundamental in the 
policy being recommended is that fiscal and economic actions of the gov-
ernment must be co-ordinated and united with the aim of development 
by eliminating the contradictions that so frequently lessen their efficacy. 
Monetary and fiscal policy, credit systems and government expenditures, 
must take into account that the entire process of economic development 
depends upon increasing productivity and investment, not only on the part 
of the public sector, but also in the private sector. 
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It is equally important that domestic measures should be duly co-ordi-
nated with international co-operation. The former should facilitate finan-
cial co-operation and direct it so as to obtain the maximum effect on 
economic development. That co-operation should be considered as sup-
plemental and not as a substitute for domestic investment, adequately 
stimulated during normal periods. An example may be given to illustrate 
this aspect of the problem. If international funds are diverted towards 
current government expenditures instead of contributing to an invest-
ment programme, or if they are used to expand non-essential imports of 
the private sector, external financial co-operation would be to a great 
extent frustrated. 
In the light of these principles, we recommend the following series of 
domestic measures. 
1. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES 
There is a need for Latin American countries to formulate national 
development programmes. It is only by means of such programmes that 
economic action can be rationalized and given continuity, and that ade-
quate priorities can be assigned in the allocation of available resources. 
Such programmes are equally important with regard to external financial 
co-operation, in that international credit institutions are able to estimate, 
loan requirements over relatively long periods of time and to make com-
mitments in principle, thus giving the interested country a moré solid 
foundation on which to base its economic and fiscal policy. 
The preparation of national programmes should be entrusted to spe-
cialized groups, which in many cases could advantageously utilize foreign 
technical co-operation. These entities should subsequently be permanently 
responsible for studying the modifications suggested by experience and 
for supervising the execution of the plans. Some advancement has been 
made in tasks of this nature in recent years; but, generally speaking, the 
Latin American countries are still far from being able to utilize the tools 
and methods of programming in a satisfactory manner. Above all, pro-
gramming bodies do not exert effective influence on administrative and 
political procedures. • 
Of no less importance is the careful preparation of the plans and 
estimates for specific projects which fulfil the technical requirements of 
international credit institutions. This should be done systematically, even 
in the event that the immediate execution of such plans is not foreseen 
or is not considered possible, and the necessary technical personnel and 
resources should be allocated to them. The existence of projects that 
comply with those requirements naturally conditions the capacity to 
absorb further capital. It must be recognized that on occasions the pro-
curement of external funds to finance development enterprises is ob-
structed by the inability to supply the corresponding technical data and 
financial and economic calculations. Although this is not the principal 
reason why financial co-operation to Latin America has been so reduced, 
it is advisable that it should be clearly pointed out. 
On the other hand, when factors other than capital inflow cause a rapid 
increase in government receipts, the lack of well-prepared plans tends to 
produce a diversion of available funds towards less productive invest-
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ments or towards current expenditures, or else it leads to hasty impro-
vizations that are undesirable from all points of view. Furthermore, the 
implementation of anti-cyclical policy requires that the government be 
prepared to undertake the timely execution of new investments. 
It is of equal importance to emphasize the urgent need for a systematic 
study of the natural resources of each country and the methods employed 
for their conservation and renovation. In many respects, Latin America 
is an unknown continent. There is need to improve and expand geograph-
ical, hydrological, agrological, geological and other services, as well as 
technological research, in all of which international co-operation can and 
should be increased. The systematic and extensive study of natural re-
sources is a prerequisite for good planning. 
2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROGRAMMING 
When mention is made of programming in the Latin American coun-
tries, where private enterprise predominates, the plans of the public sector 
are mainly referred to. But a programme cannot fail to relate public to 
private investment and take into account their inter-dependence. As pre-
viously indicated, fiscal, monetary and tra<de policies should be closely 
related to and co-ordinated with the programme, and they should be 
utilized to obtain its fulfilment. 
All programmes deal essentially with the allocation of resources and 
the establishment of priorities. With regard to public expenditures, first 
of all a general principle may be stated that has no other purpose than to 
offer general guidance. In countries in an early stage of development, 
where the needs for basic investment are considerable, an effort should 
be made to ensure that investments absorb an important part of total 
public expenditure, if possible avoiding an exaggerated increase in cur-
rent expenses that have less influence on increasing productivity. An 
excessive proportion of the latter adversely affects the rate of investment 
not only of the public sector, but of the entire country, as taxes reduce the 
margin of private income available for savings. The problem acquires 
special importance when as a result of transitory events—such as, for 
example, an improvement in the terms of trade—public resources increase 
abnormally. If current government expenditures likewise expand to an 
exaggerated degree, this means that the possibility of increasing the 
future income of the country through a higher investment rate is being 
sacrificed, and also that the way is being paved for serious difficulties once 
the temporary improvement diminishes or disappears. It is then easy to 
drift towards inflationary financing, or an increase in taxation, reducing 
the prospects of private investment. With regard to public consumption, 
the same thing occurs as with total consumption: if the rate of develop-
ment is to be accelerated, a certain degree of sacrifice is inevitable. 
It is exceedingly important that public investment be based on a set of 
priorities .which principally take into consideration the objective of maxi-
mum direct or indirect productivity. It is impossible to evaluate indirect 
productivity in exact terms ; but in practice it is easy to point out when a 
specific investment does not correspond to the criterion indicated. In each 
specific case the projected investment should be examined to see if it 
stimulates the reproductive investments of the private sector, gives access 
98; 
to new resources, or contributes to reduce production and transport costs» 
Naturally, this cannot be an exclusive criterion. There are investments 
that are indispensable for attaining a higher standard of living or for 
human well-being, among which certain public services and the construc-
tion of dwellings occupy a predominant position. But even in these cases 
the amount invested should not be disproportionate with regard to the 
total volume required by the development policy. As we have already 
indicated, any process of accumulation of productive capital necessarily 
imposes a certain limitation on the immediate improvement of the stand-
ard of living. But to compensate for this, a solid and stable foundation 
can thus be built to guarantee gradual, continuous progress. 
3. PUBLIC INVESTMENTS IN INDUSTRY 
In Latin America the government not only has to carry out research on 
the concrete possibilities of industrial development and very often under-
take the direct promotion of certain enterprises, but on occasions it is 
also obliged to invest its own funds in such concerns or guarantee the 
loans necessary to develop them. Nevertheless, it would be advisable to 
take note of certain principles regarding this type of investment. As a 
general rule, they should be made only when private initiative cannot or 
does not wish to develop the industry concerned, when this industry is 
really of fundamental importance for the economic development of the 
country, when the employment of the resources required is not detri-
mental to certain basic investments required for the normal development 
of private investment in other fields, or when'the exceptional importance 
of an industry in private hands makes public operation advisable. In this 
respect, it is desirable to recall the retarding effect oil industrialization in 
many sectors of Latin America that is being exerted for example by the 
lack of electric power installations, to say nothing of means of communi-
cation and transport. It is evident that in such situations these basic 
investments should be given effective priority. 
It is worthwhile to review other aspects of the problem of government 
investment. As from all angles public resources are very limited in com-
parison with needs, and as basic investments of indirect productivity are 
rarely financed privately, it would be advisable to establish or improve 
methods that permit the transfer to private ownership of industrial enter-
prises created by public agencies, thus freeing funds that could be 
re-employed either in basic investments or in the establishment of new 
enterprises. An increasing degree of nationalization in industry does not 
appear to be very advisable considering the present situation of Latin 
America's economy, with the obvious exception of those extraordinary 
circumstances in which a greater public interest intervenes. 
Moreover, it is possible that those enterprises that are not normally 
undertaken by private interests on their own initiative may be promoted 
by making them especially attractive through tax concessions, profit guar-
antees, etc., or by means of obligatory savings, of which there are some 
examples in the region. These methods definitely result in part of private 
savings being forcibly channelled towards a certain type of reproductive 
investment that is considered of fundamental importance for the eco-
nomic integration of the country and, in certain circumstances, present 
unquestionable advantages over the simple taxation procedures. In this 
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way it is possible to fill important gaps in the industrialization process 
without nationalizing the economy to an exaggerated extent but by chan-
nelling a considerable part of the savings in accordance with over-all 
plans. The public sector would at the same time have larger resources for 
basic research for increasing indirect productivity, where backwardness 
seriously, hinders development and affects the standard of living of the 
Latin American peoples. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that nothing that has been stated in this 
report denies the fact that the government must at all times have suffi-
cient power not only to exert a positive influence on the general trends 
of the national economy, but to guide the latter in a way that will im-
pede the increasing concentration of income and wealth. This concentra-
tion is by no means favourable to the future of Latin America, and how 
to avoid this without prejudice to increasing capital formation consti-
tutes one of the problems that has been least studied but is in need of 
most urgent solution in development policy, 
Once again we repeat that a system of priorities is essential to obtain 
the maximum productivity from resources that generally prove to be 
very limited in comparison with the multiplicity and magnitude of the 
needs. 
4. T H E UTILIZATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESOURCES 
Foreign exchange availabilities have a considerable effect on the pos-
sible volume of investments. It is essential to utilize these resources in 
accordance witth development plans, which should take into account— 
together with other factors—the exchange effects of all new investments 
due to the value of the capital goods that have to be purchased abroad 
and to the increased propensity to import resulting from the increase 
in investment and income. 
It is impossible here to examine in detail the systems that can be used to 
achieve the most economic utilization of exchange resources. .We shall 
have to be satisfied with indicating some general guiding principles. 
In the first place, it is clear that when facing a situation of foreign 
exchange shortages, it is necessary to discourage less essential imports. 
As a general rule these should never be unduly increased out of relation 
with the average standard of living of a country that is in the early stages 
of development. But this problem acquires particular significance when, 
as a result of an important improvement in the terms of trade, a con-
siderable increase in the availabilities of foreign exchange takes place 
and a surplus is produced in the balance of payments. Strict rules can-
not be given regarding the policy to be followed in an event of this type. 
Circumstances may indicate the desirability of revaluing the national 
currency or facilitating an expansion of imports to satisfy pent-up de-
mand. The solution will depend on the nature of the payments surplus 
and its causes. However, it should be stated that the new exchange re-
sources should not, as a general rule, be employed to increase consump-
tion to an exaggerated extent that could not be maintained later on and, 
that would utilize resources that are indispensable for the purchase of 
productive equipment. If the demand for capital goods does not promptly 
correspond to increased foreign exchange availabilities, the best move 
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would be to accumulate reserves, at the same time establishing measures 
to ensure that the new resources do not affect domestic prices but rather 
increase savings. It is possible that a delay may take place in the demand 
for productive equipment as a result of the lack of carefully considered 
projects, due to the delivery terms of the manufacturers, or else because 
the domestic capital market does not react rapidly to increased demand. 
It is advisable to reserve surplus foreign exchange as much as possible 
for the time when demand will expand in accordance with development 
plans. 
The point we are referring to is closely connected with anti-cyclical 
policy and international economic co-operation, and we shall return to 
this subject in other chapter of this report. 
5. T H E INCREASE OF DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION 
As an increase in income is principally the result of the rate of invest-
ment, it is essential not only to select carefully the investments themselves, 
endeavouring to obtain maximum productivity, but also to obtain as 
high a rate of investment as possible. To obtain á high rate of capital 
formation in Latin America the contribution of foreign capital is in-
dispensable. The magnitude of that contribution and the means of obtain-
ing it are referred to in another section of this report. But for the time 
being it is necessary to call attention once again to two very important 
facts: (a) that in order that the inflow of external funds may produce 
the indicated effect—that is, the stable increase of the rate of investment 
—it is necessary that they be accompanied by measures to stimulate and 
channel domestic savings towards more productive investments, and (b) 
that it is also possible, although on a limited scale, to increase the rate of 
internal capitalization by means of incentives and restrictions. 
We have already referred to capitalization in the public sector. With 
. regard to the private sector, we shall not discuss here the many ways by 
which investment may be increased and directed, as these have already 
been examined in various international reports. We shall merely indicate 
the importance of tax policy in achieving these ends through influencing 
the level and nature of consumption and stimulating or discouraging 
savings. In general, we can point out by way of example the advisability 
of discouraging Unnecessary consumption and luxury investments, both 
by means of customs duties and domestic taxes. Taxes can also be used 
to encourage better utilization of the land, and that part of individual 
incomes which is re-invested can receive more favourable treatment 
than the part that is consumed. 
Re-investment of private enterprises is of singular importance, since 
it forms a very substantial part of the total savings and is not subject 
to leakage in consumption, as occurs in the case of private savings. A 
specific indication should be made of the desirability of stimulating de-
preciation reserves by means of adequate tax treatment. This problem 
takes on added importance considering that, as a result of monetary 
depreciations and the general rise in prices on the world market, such 
equipment very often appears on the books of the enterprises as having 
a considerably lower value than the actual cost of replacement. Since 
income tax exemptions in respect of depreciation reserves are usually 
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calculated on the basis oí original costs, there is in fact an unjustified 
fiscal burden which constitutes a negative stimulus to investment. 
In general, the re-investment of profits should be encouraged by tax 
reductions or offsets. It also appears advisable for certain government 
enterprises, such as the railways and other public services, to maintain 
a price policy that not only avoids losses and covers costs, but that also 
permits the formation of adequate depreciation reserves whose re-
investment would contribute to the attainment of the rate of investment 
that has been indicated as the target of the development policy. 
The measures adopted to increase the rate of internal capital formation 
must take into account the economic structure of the respective country 
and the sectors in which it seems most possible to obtain that increase. 
We believe that the suggestions given can produce an increase in the 
rate of domestic capital formation and consequently income. Neverthe-
less, it should not be thought that they alone would be sufficient. As has 
already been pointed out, consumption cannot be reduced except in ex-
ceptional cases and for relatively small sectors of the population. The 
co-operation of foreign capital extended for a sufficient period of time 
is an indispensable factor. But it is moreover logical that such co-opera-
tion should be strengthened, as much as possible by means of improved 




INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CO-OPERATION 
The need for an accelerated increase in Latin America's income is the 
natural consequence of certain factors discussed in the previous chapter, 
such as the growth in population and in consumption. Income in turn 
is mainly dependent upon the rate of investment. Accordingly if income 
is to be accelerated, investments must be maintained for some pre-deter-
mined period at a level substantially higher than the present one. Never-
theless, except in unusual circumstances such as the postwar period— 
when countries of the region enjoyed very favourable terms of trade 
and furthermore were utilizing foreign exchange accumulated during 
the war, it is inconceivable that the countries will be able to achieve an 
adequate rate of capital formation from their own domestic resources. 
Since political and social considerations make further reductions in con-
sumption very difficult, foreign capital becomes an indispensable prerequi-
site. Its principal role will be to increase the rate of internal capital 
formation until income rises to á level that will then permit the continua-
tion of development with the country's own resources. For that reason 
continuity in the inflow of that capital is of extraordinary importance. 
Another essential condition is that the financial servicing of foreign 
investments should not represent a disproportionate burden for the na-
tional economy. This condition is even more necessary when it is con-
sidered that Latin American countries, like all such in the initial stages 
of development, must make large investments with a long gestation 
period or which are only indirectly productive. 
There are thus three outstanding requirements for new foreign invest-
ments: adequate amounts received, a continuity in their inflow, and a 
level of servicing repayments that is not excessively burdensome. 
The problem submitted for our consideration is to determine precisely 
what practical measures could attain the above-mentioned objectives. In 
examining this problem we have given due consideration to the suggest-, 
tions contained in the secretariat's report, taking into account the pre-
vailing system of international credit, its special characteristics and the 
deficiencies that it entails. As a result, a series of recommendations are 
presented under the following headings : (1) the foreign investment tar-
get in Latin America; (2) participation of international credit institu-
tions in achieving the investment target; (3) creation of an inter-Ameri-
can Fund for Industrial, Agricultural and Mining Development; (4) 
technical and financial collaboration between foreign private enterprise 
and domestic concerns; (5) internal measures to promote economic de-
velopment and to encourage international co-operation; (6) measures for 
co-operation of the United States Government; (7) periodic revision of 
economic development policy and measures of international co-operation; 
and (8) creation of a Consultative Group on Economic Development. It 
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is desirable to give a brief explanation of the principles underlying these 
recommendations. 
1. T H E FOREIGN INVESTMENT TARGET IN L A T I N AMERICA 
Immense and immediate investments are urgently needed in Latin 
America, from the viewpoint of the requirements to be met and the 
present living standards of its inhabitants. It is easy to state in principle 
those fields in which investments should be made, but conversely it is 
impossible, from available data, to appraise the amounts required and 
the total absorptive capacity for any given period. Considering Latin 
America as a whole, therefore, we do not find any definitive investment 
programme involving a more or less fixed amount of funds over a specific 
period of time. National programmes are being put into effect at different 
rates in different countries, the same being true for specific projects and 
plans. Therefore the problem of financial co-operation within the hemi-
sphere cannot be based upon an over-all contribution to an established 
investment programme. 
A special financial programme such as that put into force by the Mar-
shall Plan, does not appear to be indispensable at present, since the exter-
nal resources that Latin America is capable of absorbing may be obtained 
through existing international credit mechanisms, complemented in the 
manner indicated later in this report. Nevertheless, if investments are to 
be increased and maintained at a relatively high level for an adequate 
period of time, it is essential that the countries of the region and the inter-
national credit agencies should recognize, this need, express their decision 
to satisfy it, take the measures required, and give this policy their con-
tinuous support. 
To what extent should foreign investments be increased ? The ECLA 
secretariat report contains some calculations based on the rate of savings 
necessary to achieve a rate of increase in the gross product similar to that 
obtained during recent years. Taking into account such calculations, the 
amount of foreign investments in different periods, the difficulties still 
limiting the absorption of foreign capital, and other factors, we agree in 
establishing 1,000 million dollars annually as the provisional target for 
foreign investment. This quantity does not seem at all disproportionate 
with Latin America's absorption capacity, since the latter is gradually 
increasing and will improve still further as a result of the knowledge 
gained through recent policies and experiences. Although this amount 
exceeds the average of the past five years, the difference only partly com-
pensates for the deterioration in terms of trade that has already occurred 
in many of our countries. 
Furthermore, if the current demographic growth and other fundamen-
tal changes in Latin America are considered in relation to past periods, 
when substantial foreign investments took place, it seems.likely that the 
established target is barely adequate, and may indeed prove lower than 
the actual requirements. A comparison of this sum with the over-all 
estimate of 2,800 million dollars given by the ECLA setretariat as the 
amount required to maintain the post-war rate of capital formation, con-
firms our opinion. 
In the final analysis, we consider it both necessary and advantageous to 
acknowledge that the minimum level of foreign investment indicated 
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above should be reached and maintained. Establishing this target will 
provide a clear objective for credit policies of international institutions, 
will permit a comparison to be made between the volume of their opera-
tions and the total estimated foreign investment requirements, and will 
facilitate the adoption of whatever measures are necessary to attain such 
a target. Its acceptance will also exert a strong influence on the conduct 
of the countries actually receiving credits as well as on the attitude with 
which development programmes and requests for international credit 
are based and examined. At present, the uncertainties underlying the 
ability to obtain adequate loans seriously limit the formulation of pro-
grammes and specific projects. Only by overcoming these uncertainties 
will there be sufficient inducement to undertake the effort and costs of 
development programming. Moreover, only by such essential steps will -
it be possible for financial a$d monetary policies of the Latin American 
countries to be projected on long-term and stable bases. 
It is evident that the investment target previously indicated represents 
only an annual average. Accordingly it may decline or increase, depend-
ing upon fluctuations in the terms of trade, and upon different aspects 
of the anti-cyclical policy to be discussed in another chapter of this report. 
Out of the total 1,000 million-dollar target, it is assumed that private 
capital. investments will provide between 300 and 350 millions. It is 
obviously impossible to estimate the exact volume of these investments; 
but judging by the data of former years, it seems unlikely that such an 
annual range will be surpassed in a short time. Thus, international credit 
institutions should supply the remaining 650 to 700 million dollars an-
nually. These amounts would likewise have to be increased if, despite 
the stimulating measures recommended, private investments should not 
attain their previously mentioned goals. 
Great stress has been placed on the fact that economic development 
in Latin America should be facilitated by means of private foreign capital 
investments, and it is contended that this is perfectly possible. However, 
experience -has not shown this to be the case, nor is it evident from an 
analysis of present trends. Latin America's situation differs in many ways 
from that of the United. States years ago, and the capital market has 
also changed. The factors that initiated a large and steady inflow of pri-
vate foreign investments in former times no longer exist. On the con-
trary, the world depression beginning in 1929 exerted effects that have 
still not disappeared, and which are major reasons accounting for the 
establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment. Moreover, since private United States investments have given 
priority to the exploitation of certain natural resources, they have been 
distributed very unequally in different areas of Latin America and have 
varied substantially from one period to another, depending upon the 
investment decisions of a few large enterprises. It would be illusory to 
establish an economic development programme with specific targets for 
investment and income based upon the uncertain prospects of a substan-
tial increase in private foreign investment. 
Three aspects of this problem must not be overlooked. Many factors, 
including the rapidity of technical changes and existing high profit levels, 
create new outlets for foreign capital in their own countries. This is par-
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ticularly true of the United States. Due to reasons of geographic prox-
imity, as in the case of Canada, or special circumstances related to colonial 
possessions in other regions, United States capital finds greater incen-
tives in these areas than are generally available in Latin America. Further-
more, if private investments should expand very substantially in relation 
to the region's income, and its payments capacity, the transfer of financial 
services could increase to such an extent that any subsequent reduction 
in the flow of foreign capital would seriously affect the balance of pay-
ments. Over and above this essential point, the high profit rate of direct 
foreign investment immobilizes an excessive amount of national resources 
in remittances, with subsequent and unfavourable repercussions on the 
gross product and domestic capital formation. Finally, since United 
States investments have given preference to activities supplying raw 
materials or fuel to the world market, they have generally not been 
directed toward services or other industries that our countries urgently 
require to satisfy domestic demand. 
In support of our view that loans granted by international institutions 
should play the dominant role in matters of foreign capital investment, 
it is sufficient to reiterate two previously-mentioned facts. First, there is 
a need for large basic investments, upon which the entire process of 
economic development is dependent and which, by their very nature, 
are outside the radius of private initiative. Secondly, there is the prob-
lem that an excessively heavy service burden on private investments, 
especially as carried out at present, could impose on the Latin American 
economy. Various reports of international technical committees have 
recognized the significance of these two facts, and the consequence they 
entail. 
Within the. estimated 650 to 700 million dollars to be supplied by 
international credit institutions are included between 50 and 100 millions 
annually in loans to private firms in Latin America. These could be 
granted by a new organization, whose creation is proposed in this report 
to fill a serious gap in the existing international credit set-up. As a result, 
from 600 to 650 millions would have to be covered by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and by the Export-Import 
Bank. 
This volume of credit would give a strong impetus to basic invest-
ments. Furthermore, it would have the virtue of considerably relieving 
inflationary pressure in countries which, due to lack of adequate resources, 
frequently resort to bank credit expansion for financing their investments. 
2 . CREDIT POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Proper attainment of the investment target would require two types of 
measures; first, those necessary to complete and perfect the system of 
international loans; and second, those required by Latin American 
countries in order to increase their technical and economic capacity to 
absorb foreign capital 
Regarding the first, mention has already been made of the proposed 
Inter-American Fund, which will supply loans to private concerns in 
Latin America. Resources of international credit institutions have reached" 
private entrepreneurs only in exceptional cases, since both the Interna-
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tional Bank and the Export-Import Bank have preferentially granted 
loans to governments and always require government guarantees when 
financing private projects. Here is an evident contradiction: on the one 
hand, the role of the private entrepreneur in economic development is 
highly exalted, and, on the other, conditions are demanded of him which 
often cannot be fulfilled and which tend to limit his initiative and free-
dom. The situation created for the private entrepreneur is therefore in-
ferior to that of the entrepreneur in large foreign countries, who has 
ready access to sources of credit and to international techniques. The 
new Fund would help in correcting these conditions, and would strengthen 
the role which the private entrepreneur must play within Latin America's 
economy. 
Experience also indicates the need to reduce certain existing loan re-
strictions, particularly those limiting the amounts required to cover im-
ports of capital goods, without leaving a certain margin to defray at 
least a part of domestic expenditures. This practice may result in adopt-
ing inflationary means to cover such expenditures, and certainly it does 
not take into account the balances f-payments pressures which are a 
consequence of the new investments and the resulting growth in gross 
product and consumption. From all points of view therefore a change 
of policy is desirable that will permit more complete and flexible financing 
of investment programes, always taking into account the particular con-
ditions within each country requesting a loan. 
With regard to the type of loans, greater emphasis should be given to 
investments in public municipal services, and to the granting of medium-
term agricultural credits, expanding operations of this type where they 
are already being carried out. 
It is also advisable that loans should not be subject to the condition 
that imported capital goods be purchased in a prescribed market. This 
condition may unduly deprive the loan recipient from reaping the advan-
tages of international competition. 
Undoubtedly not all Latin American countries are sufficiently prepared 
so that foreign investments can immediately reach the target we have 
recommended. However, many efforts are now being made for the pro-
gramming and preparation of specific development plans. Such efforts 
would be intensified if greater prospects existed for obtaining the neces-
sary financial resources, and we are therefore of the opinion that the 
fixed target could be attained after a relatively short period of transition. 
3 . CREATION OF AN INTER-AMERICAN F U N D TO STIMULATE PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE IN LATIN AMERICA 
The recommendation concerning the creation of an Inter-American 
Fund to support private enterprise in our countries requires special ex-
planation. • 
First of all, the reasons should be given which have influenced our 
decision to propose a new agency rather than to utilize the services of 
existing ones. In actual practice, existing entities are not adequately 
organized to carry out operations of the type now under consideration. 
Their loans have been utilized for different purposes, and in order to 
perform this new function they would therefore be obliged to create new 
107; 
mechanisms and develop a different type of experience than has been 
accumulated up to the present. Thus it is not a question of deciding 
whether to create a new organization, since this would have to be done 
in any case, but rather whether it should operate in an independent man-
ner. Many practical reasons favour this latter solution, principally the 
degree of specialization and the knowledge of local conditions that would 
8e indispensable for handling this special type of credit to industrial, agri-
cultural or mining concerns. This would be true despite the fact that the 
new agency would generally operate through the banking systems of our 
countries, and through its financing or development institutions. 
Certainly this is not an innovation. Financial co-operation with Europe 
has been carried out on a similar basis, and, if this precedent is followed, 
Latin American countries should play an active part in the new entity 
and share the serious responsibility of its operation. 
No previous experience exists which would permit a calculation of the 
volume of resources required by the Fund. Nevertheless, it does not seem 
unlikely to estimate that, after a given initial period, its loans could easily 
fall between the limits of 50 and 100 million dollars annually. 
A capital of 250 millions is proposed, with half to be contributed by the 
United States and half by the remaining countries of the continent. Fol-
lowing the same system as the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, only 20 per cent of the subscribed capital, that is, the 
amount of 50 million dollars, would be paid immediately. The unpaid 
balance of the capital would merely indicate the limit of responsibility for 
each subscriber with regard to subsequent Fund operations. It is con-
sidered that the cash contributions could be made without difficulty. 
Obviously the amount of paid-in capital alone would not permit the 
development of a loan programme as previously outlined. Other resources 
would be necessary, which we propose should be obtained as follows: (a) 
by a special contribution of 50 million dollars annually to be made by the 
United States to the Fund, under conditions to be indicated later, and 
(b) by having the Fund place, on the market, its own securities or those 
it acquires or to which it gives its guarantee. 
The tax which the United States at present levies on investment returns 
of its nationals in Latin America very nearly equals that of the suggested 
contribution. In the spirit of effective co-operation, it seems appropriate 
to dedicate those resources, or an equivalent amount, towards the eco-
nomic development of the countries from which such returns are forth-
coming. It is certainly not our intention to condition the United States 
contribution upon the continued receipt of these tax resources. Nothing 
would be more desirable than the progressive elimination of multiple 
taxation. But, even if new legislation should reduce or eliminate the in-
dicated income, the annual sum of 50 million dollars contemplated in our 
recommendation is still a very small sacrifice, particularly since the spe-
cial contribution will continue belonging to the United States, which will 
participate in the profits and will be refunded by the entire amount to-
gether with accrued profits in the event that the Fund is liquidated. 
The Fund may place its own securities on the market, with a guarantee 
of not only the paid-in capital and reserves of the organization, but also 
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the amount of unpaid capital. In addition it may, in relation with specific 
operations, arrange for the special guarantee of one or more member 
countries. 
The Fund may also place on the market securities obtained from other 
entities or to which it gives its guarantee. In this way it is hoped to arouse 
the interest of the financial markets in fixed-income obligations of the 
Latin American countries. Revival of portfolio investments, whose virtual 
disappearance has been a basic defect of the international financial system 
since the 1930's, would prove more economical to the debtor countries than 
direct investments. 
If necessary, there is also the possibility of obtaining additional funds 
from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
the Export-Import Bank. These institutions could thus contribute to the 
financing of private enterprise without the difficulties they encounter 
at the present time. 
In order that the Fund can best develop its operations, its character 
should be sufficiently broad to permit the most diverse forms of financing 
that experience may later indicate. In general, if is proposed that the new 
entity operate through banks, finance corporations and development in-
stitutions in the member countries, which in addition to acting as agents, 
will extend their own guarantees. But other forms of operation and dif-
ferent guarantees can be conceived. For example, direct loans to the above-
mentioned corporations might be considered, which in turn would be 
utilized for opening credits to private concerns. The purchase of obliga-
tions issued by the concerns and duly guaranteed, which the Fund could 
sell on the open market, is another interesting possibility. 
The opportunity which the Fund would have of guaranteeing loans or 
securities would also increase the possibility of obtaining external financ-
ing for Latin American concerns. 
It is obvious that the Fund must not assume exchange risks. These 
should be borne in the manner which each country considers most ad-
visable. But there are well-founded reasons of equity for arguing that 
governments should bear part of such risks, since among other reasons 
they earn a profit through the revaluation of their gold and foreign ex-
change reserves when they devalue their currencies. The Central Bank 
could of course charge a premium for assuming the risks indicated. 
The interest rates on loans should be similar to those levied by the 
International Bank and the Export-Import Bank, for operations with 
equal terms. The interest received by these institutions is relatively mod-
erate, being mainly based upon the rate of interest in the United States 
market, and it includes the surcharge for exchange risks, as well as the 
commission for intermediary institutions. 
The Fund is primarily intended to assist industry, but it should also be 
authorized to extend loans to agricultural and mining concerns. This 
may be of considerable importance in cases where it is impossible to resort 
to other sources of international credit. 
In view of the Fund's preferential interest in industry, it is proposed 
to entrust it with specific technical assistance functions, especially so 
that it can promote increased productivity, and facilitate contact between 
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private entrepreneurs and foreign techniques. It is evident that the cost 
of these functions will require special financing, which could at least 
partially be charged to the interested parties. Such technical assistance 
functions should be fully co-ordinated with the United Nations and other 
technical assistance activities. 
The administrative system has been planned along simple lines. Gov-
ernments would subscribe their shares of stock either directly, or prefer-
ably, through their central banks, ,or finance and development corpora-
tions. The shareholders' meeting would elect four members to the Board 
of Directors. The Board would then appoint a fifth, who would act as 
Chairman, and these five members together would direct the Fund in 
accordance with the statutes. Nothing has been established in the project 
regarding the nationality of the four members elected by the stock-
holders. However, in view of the distribution of capital, it is assumed 
that two members should be from the United States, and the other two 
from Latin American countries. With regard to the President, his elec-
tion will be primarily dependent upon personal qualifications, without 
considerations of nationality. 
It is suggested that the headquarters of this institution be situated 
in New York, since the conditions offered by that great financial centre 
would facilitate contact with United States enterprises and make use of 
existing connexions with Latin American businessmen. 
It has been decided to present this recommendation in the form of a 
draft agreement, in case the governments should wish to approve it at the 
Rio de Janeiro Conference. In stich an event, the formulation of statutes 
could be entrusted to a special commission appointed by the Conference, 
to present its report at the first stockholders' meeting, after the necessary 
ratification by participating countries has taken place. 
4 . MEASURES TO STIMULATE PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 
A detailed analysis of this subject will not be presented here, since it 
has been the object of innumerable international studies and recommenda-
tions. The United States, on the one hand, and various Latin American 
countries on the other, have adopted domestic legislation aimed at elimi-
nating some obstacles to the growth of foreign investments in Latin 
America, as previously pointed out. It is to be hoped that such measures 
will be amplified and perfected. 
The development of private foreign investment is closely related to 
general economic development trends in each country. Large basic in-
vestments, for example, greatly stimulate development, since they create 
increasingly favourable technical conditions and larger markets. In other 
words, the problem of private investments cannot be separated from de-
velopment programmes and policies. The progress of a soundly conceived 
programme, and the international credit measures we have recommended 
will undoubtedly be more effective than any other measures in arousing 1 
the interest of foreign investors. 
It is advisable that in development programmes, attention be especially 
drawn to the fields considered most advantageous for foreign investment. 
This does not mean that other activities will be excluded, except when 
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the public interest so warrants. The considerable disadvantages of a re-
strictive policy in this matter must be compared with the advantages of 
an equitable and liberal system. Furthermore, if the proposed Inter-
American Fund provides Latin American business men with greater ac-
cess to international sources of capital and techniques, the case for specific 
restrictions would be considerably weakened or eliminated. 
Moreover certain types of investments are naturally considered more 
desirable and profitable than others, in the same way as Latin American 
countries prefer certain forms of co-operation between domestic and 
foreign capital. The incorporation of new techniques in new fields into 
our countries is more desirable than activities in fields where entrepre-
neurs are already well versed. A new industry represents a more positive 
contribution than that which merely competes with already established 
domestic concerns; and the formation of corporations in which domestic 
capital participates offers many advantages over those which operate en-
tirely with foreign capital. 
We have already recommended that private investment, which at 
present is predominantly equity in type, should assume other forms, pref-
erably the purchase of bonds or Latin American securities in the large 
financing centres. In order to achieve this objective, we place special im-
portance on the activities of the Inter-American Fund whose creation we 
have recommended. It might be added that such a Fund could be an 
excellent form of contact between Latin American entrepreneurs, who 
are interested in associating themselves with foreign capital, and potential 
foreign investors. 
There are other forms of co-operation, relating to techniques and 
foreign capital, that we wish to recommend. One of them is the manage-
ment contract. Because of the nature of a specific industry, or the key 
position it holds, certain countries may prefer to remove it from the 
control of foreign capital. On the other hand, international credit institu-
tions are apt to refrain from granting loans in competition with private 
enterprise. Since private national initiative frequently lacks the technical 
or financial prerequisite for making certain investments, difficulties arise 
that could be eliminated by procedures such as management contracts. 
By means of these contracts, foreign concerns undertake the establish-
ment and management of a local enterprise during a period sufficient to 
train national personnel or to permit the liquidation of loans granted by 
them or by other institutions. Once this period is over, the concern may 
be transferred to private domestic interests, if there are no special reasons 
for maintaining public operation. 
As may be seen, administrative contracts, of which there are already 
important examples, offer great possibilities for technical and financial 
co-operation. It would be convenient if they could receive a stimulus not 
only from the investor and debtor countries, but also from international 
credit institutions. They should not be confused with concession con-
tracts, in which Latin American countries have not always had fortunate 
experiences. In the management contracts, governments own the concern 
and the rights of the managing concern are correspondingly limited. 
There is no need to refer to other well-known forms of co-operation, 
such as the authorization to use certain technical procedures or patents 
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in return for payment of fees or other compensations. But it would be 
useful to stimulate the use of technical assistance contracts between for-
eign enterprises and Latin American countries to aid the establishment 
of activities in which we have limited or no experience. Such assistance, 
covering the installation and initial organization of the plant as well as 
its more advanced and technological operations, could offer great advan-
tages for recruiting technicians by personal contracts. By using this system 
and management contracts, foreign techniques may be incorporated into 
a country with relative ease, contributing moreover to the training of 
Latin American technical personnel. 
Finally, we wish to refer to a measure of a different nature. Without 
in any way denying all that needs to be done by Latin America to elimi-
nate the obstacles that still restrict foreign investment, it must be ac-
knowledged that one factor arousing many misgivings and criticisms is 
the monopolistic nature óf certain foreign activities. The report of the 
EGLA secretariat draws attention to this point. We also believe that 
collaboration between the United States Government and Latin American 
countries, extending the spirit of United States anti-monopolistic legis-
lation to its concerns in Latin America, would greatly facilitate the effi-
cient role which foreign initiative, when exercised in free competition, 
can play in our economic activities. 
5. EXAMINATION AND PERIODIC REVISION OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
AND OF THE MEASURES OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
Our recommendation regarding this point proposes the creation of 
effective means to facilitate the execution and revision of economic de-
velopment policy based on international collaboration. To this effect we 
propose that periodic meetings of Ministers of Finance or Economy be 
held within the inter-American system. Such meetings could, for example, 
be held every two years, to examine the manner in which development 
policy and measures of international co-operation aré being carried out, 
and especially to revise the investment policy and the objectives to be 
attained. 
It is also recommended that the secretariat of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America present a basic report to 
these meetings. 
Convoked as special meetings of the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council, the periodic conferences of Ministers would permit con-
siderable importance to be given to this body, and would exert a decisive 
influence on the orientation of Latin America's economic policy. These 
meetings could alternate with those of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, and the participation of the ECLA secretariat in pre-
paring the basic documents would ensure close co-ordination between 
both organizations. This would be in accordance with the recommenda-
tions that their member governments have already formulated. 
As previously indicated, the conferences of Ministers would periodi-
cally revise the manner in which international co-operation is being car-
ried out, in order to draw up appropriate recommendations or agree-
ments. As a result, it has been considered advisable not to insist at this 
time on more ambitious projects, which may be presented for considera-
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tion on some other occasion. Under the measures proposed, the inter-
national credit system will, for the present, be in a position to carry out 
its task efficiently. If this opinion is not justified by experience, the prob-
lem could again be examined, with a more precise knowledge of the 
obstacles which hinder the attainment of the original objectives. 
Finally, we wish to add a few comments on the suggestion to create a 
Consultative Group on Economic Development. The proposed Group has 
two closely-connected aims. The first is to give advice regarding develop-
ment policy to such governments as may request it. The second is to co-
operate in the solution of specific problems, and to facilitate relations 
between Latin American countries and international credit institutions. 
It is not a matter of creating new institutions. The Group of five inde-
pendent experts will make use of the already existing ECLA secretariat. 
An international secretariat can perform an efficient job by analysing 
development policies and presenting its conclusions. But it understand-
ably must restrict its functions so that it does not formulate opinions or 
recommendations which are incompatible with the objective nature of 
its analytical task or its position in relation to other international entities. 
Thus it is advisable to form a group of experts who can carry out activi-
ties independently, and in a personal capacity, without compromising the 
opinions of those institutions appointing them. 
It is probable that Latin American governments will repeatedly re-
quest the advice of such experts, if the recommendations contained in 
this report are put into practice. In fact, the expansion and continuity 
of international financial co-operation depends to a great extent on the 
firmness and efficiency of the development policy of each Latin American 
country. Nevertheless, experience shows that Latin American govern-
ments do not always share the viewpoint of international credit institu-
tions with regard to measures taken before loans are granted to them. 
It is obvious that, before any specific project is approved, the opinión of 
the credit institutions must necessarily prevail. In regard to the more 
general measures involving development policy, however, the close con-
tact which the group of experts would have with both sides, and its 





MEASURES TO REDUCE THE EXTERNAL ECONOMIC 
VULNERABILITY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
The secretariat report clearly indicates Latin America's marked vulner-
ability to the effects of economic fluctuations originating from abroad. 
Further analytical proof supporting this point need not be stressed. 
Rather there is the necessity of curtailing this serious vulnerability, and 
of moderating the extent to which external stimuli can affect domestic 
economies. 
It has already been observed that the limited number of raw materials 
and foodstuffs which form the bulk of the exports from Latin American 
countries, and the sharp fluctuations in world prices to which these 
products are subject, are characteristic features of our economies and are 
the primary cause of this excessive vulnerability. 
Latin America's dependence on the production of raw materials is 
obvious and in some cases extreme, due to the high proportion they repre-
sent in total exports. This dependence is even greater on account of the 
constant increase in domestic demand, which brings about a rising import 
volume of essential consumer and capital goods. The vulnerability of our 
economic systems is still very dangerous, and its social consequences are 
undoubtedly more serious than ever. 
Prices of raw materials and other basic products undergo variations 
which on the average fluctuate between 27 and 32 per cent, whereas varia-
tions in the prices of manufactured goods do not amount to more than 
4 per cent. If it is borne in mind that a fall in prices generally coincides 
with a slump in market demand, magnified repercussions take place in 
real income and consumption, thereby hampering the planning and execu-
tion of economic development programmes. 
In a number of resolutions by international organizations, attention has 
been drawn to the problem of raw materials, and general principles have 
been formulated to guide the search for satisfactory solutions. Especially 
noteworthy is the resolution (623 (VII ) ) approved by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations in 1952, which provides a detailed presenta-
tion of all aspects of this complex question. 
In general, the resolution aims at maintaining comparatively stable, 
just and remunerative prices for basic products in order that exporting 
nations can attain satisfactory terms of trade. In the definition of just 
prices it is stated that these must stimulate a rise in the standard'of living, 
still very low, in the raw-materials-producing countries. 
It is understandable that in considering such questions, emphasis has 
been given to measures of an international character rather than being 
confined to Latin America. In general we accept this position, since it is 
the inevitable result of world economic realities. However, we cannot 
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ignore the fact that efforts by the Latin American countries themselves 
are just as essential as those required on the international level. Certain 
measures of inter-American co-operation could undoubtedly make a posi-
tive contribution towards preventing sharp reductions in the prices of 
export products, or at least partially offsetting their effects. 
During the 17th and 18th sessions of the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council, which took place in New York (April 1954) and 
Geneva (July-August 1954), a resolution was adopted to create a Com-
mission on International Commodity Trade.2 This Commission is to meet 
early next year, and the following points will appear on its agenda: (a) 
Survey of the situation on international trade in basic products, and (b) 
Review of government proposals relating to the international problems 
that still confront such products. 
This Commission was voted upon in August 1954, when our Group 
was also beginning its tasks. It has been viewed by us with special satis-
faction, and with the hope that positive results will be achieved in the diffi-
cult task entrusted to it. 
1. DOMESTIC MEASURES 
With an appropriate economic development policy, most of our coun-
tries could put their economies on'more solid foundations than now exist, 
to face the consequences of external instability. It is obviously desirable 
to press for the diversification of exports, and to attempt the production 
of new goods for which openings may exist in world markets. These are 
possible up to a point, and may become more possible if due importance 
is given to the study of natural resources. In addition, special efforts 
should be made to improve productivity in the export industries, and to 
reduce costs by the rationalization of production. 
However, even greater possibilities exist, by making structural changes 
through the diversification and broadening of manufacturing or agricul-
tural activities. The creation and expansion of such activities would soon 
enable domestic products to be substituted for goods now being imported. 
During periods of balance-of-payments disequilibria, therefore, domestic 
consumption and production need not fall because of restrictions on im-
ports of raw materials. During normal periods, moreover, greater 
amounts of foreign exchange would be made available for imports of pro-
ductive goods. 
The availability of international credit, discussed in the preceding chap-
ter, could have an important influence upon' the attainment of all these 
objectives. 
2. ANTI-CYCLICAL POLICY 
Apart from the above-mentioned measures, which must form part of 
their development programme, the Latin American countries could fol-
low an anti-cyclical policy to mitigate the consequences of fluctuations 
abroad. This would be done more effectively if the support of interna-
tional credit institutions were received. 
8 See resolution 557 F (XVIII ) of the Economic and Social Council, reproduced 
in the annex below. 
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An anti-cyclical policy would comprise many different kinds of meas-
ures, but their common characteristic would entail the absorption of re-
sources in times of prosperity for use in periods of decline. However, ex-
cept when there is a time-lag in the demand for capital goods, as discussed 
in the first chapter of this Report, it is highly probable that a developing 
country would not typically show a notably favourable balance of pay-
ments. The urgency with which capital goods must be imported, and this 
high propensity to import resulting from previously low levels of con-
sumption, combine to exert sharp pressures on foreign exchange availa-
bilities. The situation is even more serious in so far as labour is not usually 
a limiting factor, given the large amount of disguised unemployment 
characteristic of many agricultural areas. Thus, an anti-cyclical policy 
in Latin American countries must be of a special nature. 
As already pointed out in the first chapter, it is inadvisable to permit 
an exaggerated increase in non-essential consumption, which would ab-
sorb resources otherwise available for capital goods imports, when the 
balance of payments becomes favourable. In general, so long as there is a 
demand for capital equipment, an increase in foreign exchange reserves 
would have to be ensured by measures to prevent the growth of domestic 
means of payment from raising the general prite level and with it the 
level of non-essential imports. Naturally, the exact measures utilized 
would depend on the conditions peculiar to each country. At times it 
is neither possible nor desirable to avoid an increase in consumption and 
imports, when both have previously been kept down to exceptionally low 
levels. Furthermore, in determining the type of measure designed to ab-
sorb part of the new resources, many considerations would have to be 
weighed; the requirements for the expansion and improvement of export 
industries themselves, the degree of concentration or dispersion of the 
export sector, the previous level of profits, etc. 
In practice, such measures could take many forms, including different 
types of tax policies. For example, a duty could be imposed to directly 
regain part of the increased value of exported goods, or an income tax 
system might be adopted. If it proves inexpedient to resort to taxation, 
recourse might be had to public credit operations, by open market opera-
tions or by establishing compulsory subscriptions for exporters or others 
whose incomes reach a prescribed level. It would be possible to devise 
still other means of building up special réserves in the public or the 
private sectors of the economy, such as the sterilization of part of the 
income of certain types of entities or groups of individuals, etc. 
However, all these are temporary in nature. Except when there is a 
risk of intensifying inflationary conditions, Latin American countries 
cannot postpone making the investments necessary for their develop-
ment. The problem which then arises is whether any method exists that 
will enable advantage to be taken of periods of prosperity to acquire 
the capital goods needed for an investment programme, without running 
the risk that a subsequent balance-of-payments deterioration may compel 
drastic restrictions on imports, affecting both the programme and the 
level of consumption. 
Before considering this point, some additional recommendations may 
be made. Under no circumstances should the resources obtained from the 
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foregoing procedures be merged with regular public funds. Otherwise 
they could be used for an undue expansion of current expenditures, 
which would contradict the essence of the policy and vitiate the objectives 
we have been outlining. What is indicated is the, setting-up of special 
development funds, or the reinforcement of institutions already in exist-
ence, for the implementation of clearly defined programmes. The"strength-
ening or setting-up of bodies designed to regulate the market for export 
products may also be appropriate depending upon the special circum-
stances surrounding these markets. 
3. T H E USE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES 
Funds derived from an improvement in the balance of payments should 
be earmarked as soon as possible for development programmes. Such 
resources may be used to finance the proposed projects, after the latter 
have been submitted for approval to the international credit institutions 
in the same way as ordinary loan applications. Once a project is approved, 
the institution concerned would be bound to lend an equivalent amount 
within a certain period of time, conservatively fixed at five years. In 
other words, the country would finance projects out of its own resources, 
but it would have the assurance of financial assistance should a deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade or any other circumstances exert undue balance-
of-payments-pressures. 
There can be no doubt that a plan of this kind, of which only the gen-
eral outlines are sketched here, could supply the Latin American countries 
with a strong incentive to pursue an anti-cyclical policy without prejudice 
to the acceleration of their economic development. 
Such a policy requires a recognition of the importance of anti-cyclical 
measures on the part of international credit institutions. The latter should 
gear the volume of their loans to the need for counteracting the effect, 
upon domestic savings, of international factors which* are beyond the 
control of the country concerned. Stress is laid upon this point of view in 
the conviction that if it is adequately applied, the efficacy of international 
loans will be substantially increased, not only for those countries in an 
early stage of development, but also for others. 
4 . T H E ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY F U N D 
The International Monetary Fund should play a role of the greatest 
importance in an anti-cyclical policy. In order that it may do this more 
effectively, it is recommended that credit quotas of member countries 
be increased. Experience has shown that they are extremely small not 
only from the anti-cyclical point of view but even for dealing successfully 
with other situations frequently encountered in the Latin American 
countries. The insufficiency of these quotas is explained by the rise of 
world price levels, in the volume of international trade and in the amount 
of national currency in circulation. 
5. MEASURES TO REDUCE FLUCTUATIONS IN THE PRICES OF BASIC PRODUCTS 
The measures previously mentioned do not eliminate the serious prob-
lem of price instability of basic products, but they would help to alleviate 
its consequences. In any case, they will have to be used, since no satis-
117; 
factory formulae have yet been discovered to attain completely the desired 
objective. 
However, recourse can be had to measures involving domestic action 
and international co-operation in order to prevent abrupt price declines, 
and some of these measures may prove effective even in the limited sphere 
of the Latin American continent. 
One aspect of the problem is of fundamental importance. This is the 
need to prevent prices of basic products from falling below a critical level, 
beyond which a serious situation would be created for the exporting coun-
tries, and in addition production might be so discouraged that it would 
be impossible later on to satisfy the normal levels of demand. Many ex-
amples of this kind have already been recorded, and the problem is 
especially important in relation to those products such as coffee where 
the crop is long delayed after planting and whose output therefore does 
not respond quickly to changes in demand. The issue must be faced, not 
necessarily of achieving a high degree of stability, but at least of defending 
a minimum price level. In this way the magnitude of the problem and the 
difficulty of solving it are greatly reduced. 
A system for defending minimum prices would necessarily require 
the accumulation of stocks in the producing or consuming countries, 
and also the resources for financing them. Experience has often demon-
strated the feasibility for Latin American countries of setting up funds 
and creating their own domestically financed systems for successfully 
defending minimum prices. This is especially true when their production 
represents an important share of total world supply or if there is con-
certed action on the part of several producers. This presumes of course 
that no attempt is made to fix prices far above the critical level and that 
a comparatively rapid readjustment of demand to supply can be expected. 
If the policy of development loans plays the anti-cyclical role we have 
recommended, recourse to procedures of this kind would be greatly facili-
tated by alleviating their inflationary dangers and their effects on foreign 
exchange reserves. 
Some other forms of co-operation in Latin America could be devised, 
which even if not representing complete solutions, would at least be 
partly efficacious in certain cases. Their nature would depend upon the 
characteristics of any particular crisis, its cause, and its relationship to 
international economic events. What logically emerges from the inter-
American system is that in such an event, the principal consumer and 
producer countries concerned should be prepared to consult each other. 
Such a joint examination could determine the means and the extent of 
defending a critical price level by co-operative effort, or whether it would 
be appropriate to seek solutions involving producers and consumers out-
side the hemisphere.3 This consultative procedure has certain important 
precedents, and could be used not only in situations like the one under 
review, but also for problems of inadequate production or the disposal 
of surpluses.4 
8 Note by the ECLA secretariat: the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council has provided machinery to deal with international commodity arrange-
ments of broader than regional- importance. 
* Note by the ECLA secretariat: see footnote on page 82 regarding the FAO 
Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal. 
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6. DISPOSAL OF SURPLUSES 
In connexion with the disposal of surpluses, a special situation exists 
which, it is to be hoped, may not last too long. Surpluses of agricultural 
and dairy products have accumulated in the United States, and, in spite 
of a declared intention to dispose of only part of them, and with con-
, siderable precautions, are of natural concern to other producer countries.4 
It is therefore appropriate to envisage that the consultative procedure be 
used in this case, so as to clarify the various aspects of the problem and 
to reach agreements which prove to be mutually advisable. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that an honest spirit of international 
co-operation would help to produce the right atmosphere for increased 
consumption of certain Latin American products in the United States 
market and as in the case of coffee it would be necessary to prevent the 
creation of unfavourable impressions, and also to reaffirm in the public 
mind that it is in everybody's interest for the producer in our countries 
—who is also the principal consumer of United States goods—to raise 
his living standards and his purchasing capacity by means of fair and 
reasonable prices. 
4 Note by the ECLA secretariat: see footnote on page 82 regarding the FAO 
Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal. 
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Chapter IV 
TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
1. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND AGRICULTURE 
It should be reiterated that industrialization is an inevitable necessity 
of Latin American economic development. To disregard this fact ob-
scures the real characteristics of economic problems in the region, and 
hinders their solution by the methods of international co-operation. There 
is no need to repeat the reasons which initiated and which continue to 
intensify the trend towards industrialization, whereby our countries are 
seeking to modify their internal economic structures, improve the occu-
pational distribution of the active population, increase productivity and 
make themselves less vulnerable to external influences. Solid and wide-
spread support exists for this trend, and there is a firm conviction that 
a steady improvement in the standard of living of our peoples will not 
be possible without such profound structural changes.The results hitherto 
have brought forth the renewed demand that this'effort be intensified 
and amplified. 
At the same time, however, development policy should concern itself 
with the maintenance of a proper equilibrium between agriculture on 
the one hand and industry and services on the other. It is obvious that 
agriculture and industry are closely interdependent, which means that 
they are not only complementary, but also that a large-scale improvement 
in agriculture will not be possible without industrialization. Otherwise, 
adequate effective demand would not be created to absorb increased agri-
cultural production, nor would employment be available for the rural 
labour displaced by improved productivity. Nevertheless industrializa-
tion cannot be successful without a simultaneous increase in agricultural 
productivity to open additional markets for industrial goods and assure 
the industrial workers of an adequate supply of moderately priced food-
stuffs. It is a mistake, therefore, to think that the two activities are op-
posed to each other; rather their respective development involves dif-
ferent phases of the same process. 
The proportions by which agriculture and industry should be increased 
will vary from one country to another. Industrialization, however, must 
in principle be looked upon as an indispensable instrument for the devel-
opment of agriculture, and the latter as an equally indispensable instru-
ment for successful industrial growth. 
In connexion with the problem of agriculture, there are two points to 
which special attention must be drawn. The first refers to the low educa-
tional and social levels which commonly prevail among the rural popula-
tions in Latin American countries, and which at times are in marked 
contrast with those of the urban workers. This constitutes an important 
obstacle to the improvement of agricultural skills and at the same time 
to the ready absorption of the surplus rural population in industry and 
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services. Persistent and intensive action to rectify this situation is of 
immense importance for the achievement of balanced development. In 
many cases such action would be predicated upon a basic reform of 
land tenancy and of certain aspects of the relationship between land-
owners and rural workers, which presently offer no stimulus to labour 
and discourage investment and the introduction of new techniques. 
In the second place, it should be pointed out that very often a con-
siderable increase in agricultural productivity can be effected by means 
of comparatively modest investments. In view of the shortage of new 
capital, great importance must be attached to this type of action, inti-
mately associated as it is with technical research and extension services. 
While taken for granted that industrialization is an essential pre-
requisite of Latin America's economic development, it must also be recog-
nized that it cannot be achieved without reasonable tariff protection. 
There is no reason to proffer new arguments in favour of this thesis, 
which is vigorously expounded in the report of the ECLA secretariat. 
2. T A R I F F POLICY 
Latin American opinion, which followed with marked anxiety United 
States proposals to raise duties on some of our exports to that market, 
has viewed with satisfaction both the abandonment of these proposals 
and the recent declaration that the Government intends to press for cer-
tain tariff reductions. It is clearly demonstrated in the ECLA secretariat's 
report that the raising of United States customsMuties reduces the volume 
of international trade. In the Latin American countries conversely the 
major effect of protective duties is to modify the composition of their 
imports, so long as export activities are not unduly deprived of the factors 
of production. 
This fundamental difference must not be forgotten, and it must also 
be recognized that every increase in Latin American exports automati-
cally widens the market for United States sales abroad. This type of 
reciprocity is of much greater scope and efficacity than that which could 
arise from reductions in Latin American tariffs, sought as compensation 
for reductions made by the United States and which could cause serious 
damage to the economies of Latin American countries. The principle of 
mutual concessions, manifested in recent bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments, assumes a different aspect in the light of these considerations. 
We do not overlook the fact that in certain cases, and under special 
circumstances, the United States may not be in a position to introduce 
further reductions in some of its tariffs. This fact in itself, however, 
would make the liberal application of other measures of economic co-
operation all the more indispensable. 
3. STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS 
The problem of materials considered of strategic importance requires 
special consideration. As clearly demonstrated during the Second World 
War, the American continents formed a common supply base. Natural 
advantages of geographical proximity and the reduced vulnerability to 
attack from abroad need no explanation. In any event, the reciprocal 
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advantages and responsibilities of the two continents have traditionally 
been accepted in official public declarations. 
However, events have shown that after the war this acceptance did 
not bring with it all the consequences which might have been expected. 
Many projects to promote Latin American production in certain fields 
were given up, or are languishing for want of sufficient resources. 
Other manifestations of United States economic policy, closely re-
lated with .the same subject, are not in harmony with the principles men-
tioned. The flexible tariff system governing the imports of certain min-
eral products involves the raising of duties when market prices fall below 
a stated level. Such actions can have a serious impact on Latin American 
exports, and may increase the disturbing effects initially caused by the 
original decline in prices. It would be desirable to modify this situation. 
Where modifications were difficult, for strategic or other reasons, other 
measures should be taken to offset its unfavourable repercussions on the 
economic systems of our countries. 
The above considerations also require that greater encouragement be 
given to the production of minerals hitherto unexploited in Latin Amer-
ica, or exploited on an inadequate scale. Furthermore, when other coun-
tries of the region can produce these materials economically, the develop-
ment of their marginal production in the United States at high cost 
should be discouraged. 
It may be observed that when a material is classified as strategic, the 
economies of the exporting countries are affected by the restricted mar-
kets and the consequent effects on prices. It is natural that in such cases 
adequate compensation should be granted. 
4 . LIBERALIZATION OF L A T I N AMERICAN TRADING RELATIONS 
A basic factor curtailing the development of certain industries in Latin 
America is the restricted nature of the domestic market in each country. 
Very valuable changes could be made in the present situation by form-
ing a single market free of customs duties for given products in two 
or more countries, especially where geographic circumstances are appro-
priate. A proposal of this kind would have the advantage of complement-
ing the domestic economies of Latin American countries and would in-
crease the degree of specialization possible. 
Despite the fact that preferential agreements continue to flourish in 
other parts of the world, this proposal has conflicted with certain prin-
ciples and practices of trade policy, especially with problems arising from 
the application of the "most favoured nation" clause. It is obvious that 
at present this clause could not be applied—save in exceptional circum-
stances—without reducing the effectiveness of the proposal, and endan-
gering the production that is envisaged. Unfortunately, a general customs 
union can hardly be contemplated in Latin America at the present state 
of its development. 
To overcome existing difficulties, other procedures have occasionally 
been used, such as direct barter agreements. These, however, do not 
offer the same advantages as the total or partial abolition of customs 
duties between different countries of the region. It would be much more 
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effective to acknowledge and apply this basic requirement of our eco-
nomic systems, when considering the reforms that should be introduced 
into the principles governing the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).5 
The tendency to seek the advantages of greater integration has be-
come increasingly evident among different domestic economies through-
out the world. The time has come for this tendency to acquire vigorous 
impetus in Latin America, where the distribution of territory and popu-
lation among so many different nations makes the application of such a 
policy a matter of the greatest urgency. 
0 Note by the ECLxA. secretariat: The ninth session of the Contracting Parties 
to GATT will meet in Geneva,. Switzerland, in October 1954, when they will under-
take a review of the Agreement. 
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Chapter V 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE POLICY IN RELATION TO 
, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The growth of international technical assistance has been an experi-
ment with far-reaching implications. For obvious reasons, we shall limit 
ourselves here to technical assistance relating to economic development, 
which is still in its initial stages. 
Nevertheless, this initial stage is sufficiently advanced to permit of 
several conclusions. Firstly, technical assistance must follow an estab-
lished programme, with clearly defined objectives and priorities for their 
accomplishment. Secondly, although certain objectives are so obvious be-
cause of their urgency and importance that they do not require further 
study, many others must be evaluated and assigned priorities in relation 
to existing development programmes. Thirdly, the formulation of these 
programmes also requires technical assistance, both as regards the pro-
gramme itself and the specific projects of which it is composed. 
Let us look at the first conclusion. In Latin America, as in many other 
regions, there are insufficient economists trained in the problems and 
techniques of programming. It is generally accepted that certain Latin 
American countries have experienced great difficulty in obtaining the 
co-operation of this type of economist. Unfortunately a permanent cadre 
of such experts has yet to be formed. In general, existing consultants • 
act for relatively brief periods and then return to their customary occu-
pations, which are usually far removed from development problems. 
Thus, experience is wasted which, if duly systematized and given'the con-
tinuity it now lacks, could prove invaluable for the Latin American 
countries. 
Furthermore, the effort being made to train such economists is still 
inadequate. To overcome this deficiency, the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Technical Assistance Administration of the. 
United Nations, upon the recommendation of member governments of 
the former, have initiated a training course ir; economic development for 
Latin American economists. This initiative is highly commendable, and 
the enthusiasm and efficiency with which this course has been carried out 
in Santiago has been clearly evident. Nevertheless the effort is still a 
modest one. The training programme should be enlarged, and the rela-
tively small number of Latin American economists benefiting from the 
course, namely some ten to fifteen annually, should be increased. 
It is obvious that a development programme requires, apart from 
economists, other highly specialized experts. This need presents fewer 
difficulties since many first-class specialists may be found within Latin 
America itself. Their knowledge must be used more profitably and they 
should be given the opportunity tp participate more actively in technical 
assistance. However, since such specialists are not generally known out-
124; 
side of their own countries, it would be advisable to prepare detailed and 
classified lists of such qualified personnel, following the system used in 
the United States during the Second World War. 
In addition to experts required for development programming and the 
preparation of specific projects, there is the additional and often urgent 
need for training experts in the fields of agriculture, industry, power 
and transport. National efforts to provide such specialists are often in-
sufficient, and foreign collaboration can therefore prove of singular value. 
In this respect the technical training programme of the United States 
Government, as well as the action taken by international organizations 
and private enterprise, have grown appreciably. The annual number of 
fellowships is estimated at approximately 3,300, distributed in the fol-
lowing manner: 
(a) 1,500 fellowships granted by Latin American countries them-
selves ; 
(b) 727 fellowships by the Technical Co-operation Programme of the 
United States Government; 
(c) 473 fellowships of the Technical Assistance Programme of the 
United Nations and its specialized agencies; . 
\ 
(d) 200 fellowships offered by the Organization of American States 
in various centres that it is establishing with the co-operation of the 
member countries concerned ; 
(e) Approximately 500 fellowships granted by private enterprise, 
mainly petroleum, electric power, agricultural machinery companies, and 
so on. v 
We consider that although these efforts are most praiseworthy, they 
are still far short of satisfying the existing needs. Experience has shown 
that, for each fellowship granted, three or four able candidates must be 
eliminated. As a result, it has been estimated that the desirable number 
of fellowships should reach some 10,000 per year, within a reasonable 
period of time. This figure, together with the investment target, should 
be periodically revised, in order to make adjustments for current needs 
and circumstances. 
One other point should be considered here. To date, fellowships 
granted for study in Latin American countries have been relatively 
limited. Accordingly special attention should be devoted to this problem, 
and adequate assistance given to appropriate Latin American institutions 
so that they may carry out efficient and reciprocal efforts of co-operation. 
1. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PRODUCTIVITY 
It is impracticable, however, to wait for personnel training plans to be 
concluded and put into effect. Immediate solutions must be sought. 
An exceptional opportunity in this field can be provided through the 
co-operation of foreign experts, or of foreign firms and organizations 
with qualified staff and experience. This technical co-operation could be 
effected through multilateral programmes of international agencies, inter-
governmental agreements or direct contracts between interested firms. 
The results of such co-operation, already being given to the Latin Ameri-
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can countries by experts of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, 
the Organization of American States, the Government of the United 
States and private concerns, are already known. 
As explained in the ECLA secretariat report, in order to increase 
the rate of economic growth, a co-ordinated campaign to disseminate 
technical procedures should be permanently carried out through a well-
defined policy of productivity. The execution of such a policy does not 
depend upon the completion of development plans—although proper co-
ordination should exist—but can be put into immediate operation with 
respect to existing activities. 
The execution of a broad policy of productivity must encompass three 
large groups of activities, namely industry, agriculture and services. 
The latter in turn should include not only those comprising the direct 
responsibility of the government, but also those relating to private enter-
prises. The ECLA secretariat report contains a most satisfactory analysis 
of the problems connected with the systematic application of a Latin 
American productivity campaign in these three groups. It is unnecessary 
to repeat the analysis here. It is sufficient to point out that personnel train-
ing programmes, as well as other types of technical assistance which have 
mainly long-term results, should be co-ordinated with productivity cam-
paigns that often provide immediate or short-term results. 
In any event, as indicated by the ECLA secretariat's report, a care-
ful examination of the situation presently existing in Latin America 
should be started, in order to establish priorities and determine the in-
tensity with which technical assistance should be carried out and the type 
of assistance justified by the circumstances. 
2. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN F U N D 
Mention was previously made of the desirability of allowing the Inter-
American Fund for Industrial, Agricultural and Mining Development 
to extend technical assistance on loan projects that it receives. Such as-
sistance would be in addition to the financial activities of the Inter-
American Fund, and could take such forms as co-operating" in the 
preparation of new projects, or of expanding and modernizing existing 
plant and facilities. 
This aspect of the Fund's functions may acquire considerable import-
ance and could be organized directly by means of a special service, or 
through the granting of technical assistance by national entities, inter-
national bodies and specialized private concerns. 
Requests for this type of technical assistance by medium and small 
Latin American enterprises could reach considerable proportions, and 
it would be advisable to examine both the sources and practical uses of 
thê  funds to be provided. The Inter-American Fund itself might provide 
some assistance from its own resources, these outlays being absorbed 
into the cost of the analysis and approval of the financed projects. In 
this way the resources would be returned with the regular amortization, 
following the general practice already used by other development in-
stitutions. 
In addition to the above expenditures for technical assistance, there 
may be others for projects unconnected with the Inter-American Fund's 
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general loan activities. If such expenditures were to exceed certain limits, 
the Fund would not be able to absorb them and would have to seek new 
resources and co-operation from other agencies. 
For these reasons, means should be provided whereby the Inter-
American Fund could obtain the collaboration of international organiza-
tions and of American governments in rendering technical assistance. 
It might also be advisable to establish a special and permanent account, 
administered by the Fund, to which the countries of the hemisphere 
might contribute voluntarily. Such special resources could be granted to 
private entrepreneurs in the form of small loans, for technical assistance 
obtained directly from specialized firms. A system of direct negotiation 
between individual firms financed by the special account would undoubt-
edly yield increased productivity for a large number of private activities. 
To avoid the creation of a new international organization, the opera-
tions of the technical assistance account could be administered through 
the Fund. This would simultaneously ensure a close co-ordination be-
tween technical assistance grants, and credits for industrial or other 
projects. 
3. TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
Elsewhere in this report attention was drawn to the importance of 
organizing services for systematic surveys of physical conditions and 
natural resources in each country. This task is indispensable not only for 
the efficient use of raw materials, fuels and sources of power, but in 
general for all aspects of economic development programming. Cases 
in which the lack of meteorological records, for example, delays the 
accomplishment of irrigation projects or the installation of hydro-electric 
plants, are not exceptional ones. Systematic agrological studies are also 
of fundamental importance for the success of agricultural mechanization 
campaigns. 
This field is one in which technical co-operation could give most fruit-
ful results. The United States Government has considerable experience 
in these matters, while the United Nations Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization has already carried out very interesting work in Latin Amer-
ica, particularly with regard to the study of marine life and forestry. 
These activities could be substantially increased. 
Technological research is intimately related to the study of natural 
resources and could provide a more profitable utilization of Latin Amer-
ica's raw'materials and the methods of transforming them. It has gen-
erally been advisable and economical to adopt systems permitting Latin 
American countries to use results obtained in other countries. Never-
theless there is also a field of research on domestic raw materials that 
justifies the organization of technological institutes, at least in some 
countries or groups of countries. 
At present technical co-operation is given by many different institu-
tions. It is difficult to know the exact range of their activities, and no 
attempt has been made to co-ordinate them with the needs arising from 
general development programmes. For this reason it would be extremely 
valuable to prepare a*complete report on the present organization of tech-
nical assistance for natural resources and productivity. For Latin Amer-
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ican, countries, the report would serve as a basis for determining the 
extent to which technical assistance can be utilized in development plan-
ning and the specific fields in which this assistance, must be supplemented. 
We suggest that the secretariat of the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council of . the Organization of American States, the secretariat 
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, with the collabo-
ration of the other international agencies concerned as well as of. the 
United States Government, should accept the task of preparing such a 
report, leaving to their joint decision the future procedures to be followed. 
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R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 
L FINANCING THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF 
LATIN AMERICA 
International co-operation and internal measures 
1. T H E FOREIGN INVESTMENT TARGET IN L A T I N AMERICA 
Considering* 
That it is necessary to increase foreign investment in Latin American 
countries in order to accelerate their economic development and to per-
mit a progressive improvement in their rate of savings, until a level of 
domestic investment has been attained that will ensure the maintenance 
of a high rate of growth 
That the need for foreign capital to supplement domestic savings might 
be established at 1,000 million dollars annually, of which between 650 
to 700 millions would consist of public resources to be invested by inter-
national credit institutions, provided that private foreign investments are 
not below 300 to 350 million dollars annually; 
That these foreign capital requirements'must be periodically revised 
in the light of experience. 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) To concert international measures aimed at increasing the volume 
of foreign investment in Latin American countries to a minimum of 
1,000 million dollars annually, and for a period of not less than ten 
years; 
(2) To take measures of a domestic nature to raise the technical and 
economic capacity to absorb foreign investments, and to facilitate their 
servicing in such a way that the proposed target of investment may be 
attained in the shortest possible period; 
. (3) To consider that the target thus established is of a provisional 
character, and to revise it in accordance with investment programmes 
drawn up by governments and with periodic analyses of the domestic 
and foreign investment requirements. 
2. PARTICIPATION OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN 
ACHIEVING THE INVESTMENT TARGET 
Considering 
That although the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment and the Export-Import Bank have contributed to the economic 
development of the Latin American countries, their loans are still inade-
quate for the volume indispensable to meet the requirements of these 
countries, particularly in regard to basic investments; 
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That apart from measures adopted by these countries to increase their 
technical and economic capacity to absorb foreign capital, it is of funda-
mental importance that the above-mentioned credit institutions make use 
of every means at their disposal to cover their contribution to the mini-
mum investment target; 
That other special resources, moreover, should be devoted to encour-
aging investment in private enterprises in Latin America and to provid-
ing them with the technical assistance they require; 
That apart from increasing the volume of operations it is indispensable 
to give continuity to these loans for a reasonable period of time, thus 
ensuring one of the essential conditions for establishing and implement-
ing development programmes; 
That the activities of the above-mentioned international credit insti-
tutions should be adequately co-ordinated in analysing such programmes; 
That to facilitate international competition it is inadvisable to estab-
lish restrictions as to the countries where the resources obtained from 
international credit institutions could be spent; and that such restric-
tions are not required by the regulations of such institutions. 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) To indicate to the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment the urgency of using every means within its power to con-
tribute to the attainment of the minimum investment target; 
(2) To endow the Export-Import Bank—-and the proposed Inter-
American Fund for Industrial, Agricultural and Mining Development 
—with sucli necessary resources that the aggregate loans of the three 
international credit institutions can total 650 to 700 million dollars an-
nually, and meet the deficiency in private foreign capital investment until 
the minimum investment target has been attained; 
(3) To introduce modifications in the operating methods of the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-
Import Bank so that, 
(a) In addition to loans required for imports of capital goods, suffi-
cient resources are granted to offset the indirect effects of investment 
upon the balance of payments, with the object of preventing disequilib-
rium ; provided that the interested country demonstrates a need for these 
supplementary loans and states its intention of adopting measures to 
avoid further balance-of-payments disequilibria of domestic origin ; 
(b) Loans are granted to finance municipal investments of acknowl-
edged public benefit and with a sound economic basis; and 
(c) Loans will be granted to agricultural banks and development in-
stitutions which are clearly solvent and well administered, in order that 
they may grant medium- and long-term credit to the producers. These 
loans need not strictly be related to imports of capital goods, but will 
take account of the indirect effects of investment upon the balance of 
payments, under the conditions referred to in point (a) of this recom-
mendation ; 
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(4) To reach an agreement whereby the United States Government 
would devote the proceeds of taxes levied on investments made by its 
nationals in Latin American countries—or an equivalent amount—for 
the granting of loans to private enterprises in these countries and for 
providing technical assistance, without prejudice to resources already 
employed for these purposes; 
(5) To give the greatest possible continuity to the policy of interna-
tional credit institutions, so that, in principle, they may commit them-
selves to lend the total international resources which they agree to par-
ticipate in financing and to confirm the corresponding commitment for 
subsequent approval of individual projects in economic development pro-
grammes. 
3 . CREATION OF AN INTER-AMERICAN F U N D FOR INDUSTRIAL, 
AGRICULTURAL AND M I N I N G DEVELOPMENT 
Considering 
That in addition to measures aimed at encouraging basic investment, 
it is necessary to facilitate the access of Latin America's private enter-
prises to international sources of capital and techniques; 
That existing international credit institutions do not always possess 
the necessary mechanisms for carrying out normal medium-term credit 
operations for private enterprises in Latin American countries ; 
That it is desirable to organize a credit system for such enterprises 
with the collaboration of banks, financial and development institutions; 
The recommendation is made: 
To draw up a joint agreement for the creation of an Inter-American 
Fund for Industrial, Agricultural and Mining Development, along the 
following lines: -
(1) The Fund will be established in the city of New York, for a 
period of thirty years, with a nominal capital of 250 million dollars, of 
which 20 per cent will be paid up immediately and the remaining 80 per 
cent will constitute a guarantee fund, in accordance with point 9 of this 
draft agreement. Half of the capital will be subscribed by the United 
States Government and the other half by the governments of the Latin 
American countries, either directly or through their central banks or 
official development institutions, depending upon the decision of in-
dividual governments. 
The allocation of subscription quotas among the Latin American coun-
tries will be carried out in accordance with the ratios corresponding to 
their share in the International Monetary Fund. Since Argentina is not 
a member of this institution, it has been estimated that its quota might 
be similar to that of Brazil. 
(2) The Inter-American Fund will receive a contribution from the 
United States Government in annual quotas of 50 million dollars for a 
period of fifteen years. 
(3) To obtain additional resources the Inter-American Fund may: 
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(o) Issue securities in the money markets of its member countries, 
following consultation with the governments, or in any other market; 
(b) Receive loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, from the Export-Import Bank, or from any other in-
stitution that it deems suitable, and 
(c) Sell or discount, with or without guarantee, the securities it may 
have acquired. 
(4) The Inter-American Fund may carry out credit operations with 
banks, financing bodies, or development institutions, either public or 
private, which are acknowledged to be responsible and solvent concerns, 
in order to supply them with general resources for operating with indus-
trial, agricultural or mining enterprises, under general conditions to be 
agreed upon; or else to operate with such firms through those banks or 
institutions, which would guarantee the entire amount of the operations 
by the payment of commissions approved by them. 
(5) The Inter-American Fund's credit operations may take the.form 
of: 
(a) Loans; 
(b) Purchases of securities of firms or enterprises; and 
(c) Guarantees on securities of firms or enterprises, or on loans made 
by them. 
The terms of payment applicable to such transactions will be from 
three to twelve years. 
(6) The purpose of the Fund's credit operations shall be to finance 
capital investments, either for imports or capital goods," or for a reason-
able share of the investments made by firms within a given country. 
(7) The Fund may only effect credit operations in dollars, except when 
it issues securities in the currency of its members to cover domestic in-
vestments in accordance with paragraph (6). above. 
In no circumstances may the Inter-American Fund assume ex-
change risks. These will be charged to the debtor, depending upon the 
extent to which they were not shared by a government or central bank, 
by means of an adequate premium to be approved by the Fund. 
(8) The Fund may provide facilities for technical assistance to indus-
trial and mining firms and enterprises in order to improve their technical 
and administrative organization and to increase their efficiency and pro-
ductivity. 
(9) The Fund's profits will be distributed proportionately to the cap-
ital stock in order to constitute a reserve, and to the account representing 
the contribution from the United States, thus increasing its amount. 
Losses will be deducted first from the reserves and secondly from the 
subscribed capital; if these prove to be insufficient, members will be re-
quired to cover the proportion of capital subscribed but unpaid, until 
the losses have been covered. 
(10) The Fund will be administered by a board of five members, of 
which four will be elected on a personal and independent basis by the 
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shareholders and will hold office for a period of four years; the fifth 
member will be elected by the other four members for a period of six 
years and will act as chairman of the Inter-American Fund and of the 
board. 
(11) The Fund will enjoy the same privileges and immunities in this 
continent as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and the International Monetary Fund. 
(12) Member governments agree to appoint a commission of five 
members to prepare the terms of reference of the Inter-American Fund 
and to present them for consideration at its first meeting, less than six 
months after the present agreement has been ratified by shareholders 
representing a minimum of 75 per cent of the paid-up capital. 
4 . TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL COLLABORATION BETWEEN 
FOREIGN PRIVATE AND NATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
Considering 
That, without prejudice to other measures for the promotion of for-
eign capital investment in Latin America, special agreements between 
foreign and domestic enterprises should be encouraged so as to facilitate 
technical, administrative and financial collaboration of the former in 
fields where national effort is still inadequate; 
That such agreements would permit a given Latin American country 
to maintain the ownership of certain concerns, within the hands of the 
government or its nationals, and, simultaneously to obtain the above-
mentioned assistance during the formative and initial development stage ; 
That in this way favourable opportunities are offered to international 
credit institutions for granting their loans and thus adequately comple-
ment the contributions of private foreign capital and of domestic capital; 
That similarly it is desirable to encourage other forms of association 
between foreign private and Latin American enterprises; 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) To promote management contracts in order to obtain the techni-
cal, managerial and financial participation of foreign private enterprise in 
the creation and initial operation of concerns which are considered de-
sirable to keep under domestic ownership, either public or private; 
(2) To suggest to international credit institutions that they collaborate 
in the preparation and financing relating to these management contracts; 
(3) To stimulate the contractual services of foreign concerns whose 
experience can be utilized in the installation and operation of public or 
private national concerns, so as to enable national concerns to share in 
their advanced technological methods. 
5. INTERNAL MEASURES TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AND TO ENCOURAGE INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
Considering 
That the economic development of the Latin American countries de-
pends on international co-operation in technical, economic and financial 
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fields, as well as internal measures adopted by governments to stimulate 
that development and to encourage the most effective utilization of . for-
eign investment; 
That the efficacy of these measures will depend to a considerable degree 
upon the size and scope of the financial co-operation extended to Latin 
American countries and the possibility of reaching the recommended 
investment target; 
That it is indispensable that such measures, without prejudice to other 
objectives, should contribute to an increase in the technical and economic 
capacity to absorb public and private investment and to facilitate the 
transfer of their financial services abroad; 
That with this objective it is necessary to draw up national programmes 
for the better allocation of investments, taking into account the available 
resources, and for the adequate formulation and co-ordination of mone-
tary, fiscal, customs and exchange measures required by a development 
policy; -
That the creation of substantial basic investments, and the adoption 
of such measures, would create a favourable atmosphere for investments 
of private foreign capital in Latin American countries; 
That foreign investments of the size proposed by the above investment 
target can only represent a temporary and supplementary solution within 
a development policy, and that it is essential for such a policy to progres-
sively raise the rate of domestic investment to a level sufficient for main-
taining a high rate of economic growth; 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) To prepare development projects that combine all the technical, 
economic and financial requisites for their consideration by international 
credit institutions, and to co-ordinate such projects within an over-all 
programme. In such programmes it would be desirable to: 
(a) Set aside a substantial share of public funds for basic investments; 
(b) Give priority in public and private investments to those which 
would provide the greatest increase in direct and indirect productivity, 
which would stimulate new investment or which would contribute to a 
reduction of production and transport costs, and 
(c) Establish clearly the fields of investment towards which private 
foreign capital should be guided, in which such capital may provide the 
greatest technical and economic contribution; 
(2) To improve the operating units in the different sectors of public 
administration and economic activity responsible for the preparation of 
individual projects and sectoral development plans; and to create or 
strengthen central programming agencies or organs which give over-all 
direction to the formulation of those plans, integrate them within the 
general economic development programme, periodically evaluate the per-
formance under such programme in terms of planned targets, and assist 
in introducing reforms which experience demonstrates to be desirable; 
(3) To adopt monetary and fiscal measures to curb the inflationary 
process; and to request the collaboration of credit institutions and the 
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International Monetary Fund in avoiding a stabilizing policy which would 
have unfavourable consequences on economic development; 
(4) To undertake fiscal and other measures for discouraging non-
essential consumption and investment in luxury goods, for stimulating 
more profitable utilization of the means of production, particularly arable 
land, for encouraging new investment and for allowing the formation 
of adequate depreciation reserves; 
(5) To adopt customs and exchange measures which would facilitate 
structural changes in the internal economy and in the composition of im-
ports, to open up new fields of investment to private enterprise, to reduce 
the vulnerability of national economies to external fluctuations, and to 
facilitate the transfer of services on foreign capital. 
6. MEASURES FOR CO-OPERATION OF THE* U N I T E D STATES GOVERNMENT 
Considering 
That the United States Government has taken the initiative in intro-
ducing fiscal incentives into its tax legislation in order to stimulate pri-
vate investment abroad; 
Thatthese incentives could be extended to other forms of taxation for 
a better accomplishment of such objectives; 
That in addition to stimulating private enterprise among foreign con-
cerns in Latin America, it is advisable to encourage their free competition 
or, if this should not be possible, to adopt control measures to avoid the 
unfavourable consequences of monopolies; 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) To indicate the importance of the initiative taken by the United 
States Government as regards fiscal incentives to private investment 
abroad; 
(2) To suggest the possibility that such incentives might be extended 
to other taxes, particularly export taxes established by some Latin 
American countries, when these represent alternative forms of taxing 
the profits of export enterprises and may therefore receive the same 
treatment as income taxes; 
(3) To reach agreements for applying to United States concerns oper-
ating in Latin America the same principles of anti-monopolistic legisla-
tion in force in the United States, or otherwise to take adequate control 
measures when necessary; , 
(4) To furnish means for facilitating the collaboration of the United 
States Government in the process of collecting taxes which the Latin 
American countries impose upon those concerns which simultaneously 
operate in their own countries, in the United States, and elsewhere. 
(5) To appoint a special commission to examine the problems con-
nected with points 3 and 4 of this recommendation and to present the 
conclusions to interested governments. 
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7. PERIODIC REVISION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND MEASURES 
OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
Considering 
That the attainment of the foreign investment target, as well as the 
measures of domestic co-operation in development policies of the Latin 
American countries, calls for a periodic examination by the interested 
governments; 
That it is also advisable to examine the internal measures adopted by 
Latin American countries to obtain greater advantages from international 
co-operation; 
That this examination might lead to new agreements or recommenda-
tions; or to a modification of those in existence, and a revision of the 
investment target; * 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) To examine periodically economic development policies and the 
accomplishment of measures for international co-operation during the 
meetings of Ministers of Finance or Economy to be convened by the 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council; 
(2) To invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations to extend 
the collaboration of the secretariat of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America with a view to the presentation by that Commission to 
meetings such of an analytical report on the rate of growth in Latin Amer-
ica and the internal and international factors which influence this develop-
ment, on the investment needs of individual countries, on their develop-
ment programmes and the results being achieved, and, particularly, on 
the scope and effects of the measures of international co-operation in 
the technical, economic and financial fields. 
8 . CREATION OF A CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Considering 
That in preparing internal measures aimed at facilitating the full utili-
zation of international co-operation it might, in certain cases, benefit the 
Latin American countries to receive the prior opinion of an independent 
group of experts; 
That owing to the confidence this group might inspire in the interested 
governments and international credit institutions, the advice of such ex-
perts could also contribute to harmonizing different points of view and 
facilitating negotiations; 
That, in order to discharge their duties to the best of their ability, the 
experts should act in a personal capacity and as entirely independent of 
the institutions appointing them; " . 
The recommendation is made: 
To create a Consultative Group on Economic Development in accord-
ance with the following principles : 
(1) The Group will be composed of five members, of which: 
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(a) Four will be appointed respectively by the United Nations, the 
Organization of American States, the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, and the Export-Import Bank, if such a proce-
dure is agreed upon by these institutions; 
(b) The fifth member will be selected by the four others. 
(2) The experts so appointed will act in a purely personal capacity 
and not as representatives of the institutions which nominated them. They 
will not receive instructions from these institutions nor will their opinions 
bind the institutions in any way whatsoever. 
(3) The members of the Group will remain in office for a period of six 
years and their fees and other expenditures will be covered on a pro rata 
basis by the above-mentioned institutions. 
(4) If this proposal is approved by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America, within the limits of its resources, will place administrative 
services at the disposal of the Group. 
(5) The Group will meet whenever requested by a Latin American 
government or by an international credit institution, and the meeting 
will be summoned by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, in the capacity assigned to it in point 4. 
I I . M E A S U R E S T O D E C R E A S E T H E E X T E R N A L E C O N O M I C 
V U L N E R A B I L I T Y O F T H E L A T I N A M E R I C A N C O U N T R I E S 
9 . INTERNAL MEASURES TO DECREASE THE EFFECTS OF WORLD 
ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS 
Considering . 
That fluctuations in the world economy have adverse effects on Latin 
American stability and economic development; 
That possible international solutions could only reduce the amplitude 
of these movements and that it is therefore necessary to adopt measures 
of an internal nature to reinforce such international action; 
That the main aims of these internal {neasures would be to attenuate 
the effects of variations in prices and in export volume upon productive 
activities, upon the monetary situation and upon the national income; 
That these objectives could be achieved by absorbing international re-
sources in times of prosperity for use in periods of recession, which 
would simultaneously reduce exaggerated variations in public and pri-
vate consumption; 
That it is possible to combine the objectives of stability with those of 
economic development if such a policy of foresight is linked to measures 
of international co-operation; ' 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) To absorb part of Latin America's increase in foreign exchangé 
resources which is periodically caused by favourable external factors, 
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utilizing for this purpose fiscal policies relating to public credit, or other 
measures; 
(2) To direct the resources so obtained towards the financing of eco-
nomic development projects; 
(3) To arrange agreements between interested countries and interna-
tional credit institutions so that the latter, for periods of not more, than 
five years, undertake to loan to the former an amount equivalent to such 
resources utilized in economic development projects when such funds 
are required as a result of a slackening in internal activity or a disequilib-
rium in the balance of payments. To this effect, the projects referred to 
in point (2) should be presented by the interested countries to interna-
tional credit institutions for prior approval; 
(4) To place the resources obtained in accordance with point (1) in a 
special fund or account apart from the general public funds to ensure 
their use for this specific purpose. 
10. ANTI-CYCLICAL POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY F U N D 
Considering 
That the collaboration of international credit institutions is indispens-
able to the anti-cyclical measures adopted by governments to mitigate 
international fluctuations and to lessen their effects upon Latin America's 
economy; -
That stand-by credit arrangements which can be utilized at the discre-
tion of interested countries have been made available by the International 
Monetary Fund; 
That credit quotas of that institution for the Latin American coun-
tries, based on estimates that no longer reflect existing circumstances, 
have in general been insufficient to offset the effects of external fluctua-
tions upon the balance of payments or upon emergency situations of inter-
nal origin; 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) That international credit institutions be provided with the flexi-
bility that is indispensable to obtain greater regularity in implementing the 
economic development programmes of the Latin American countries. In 
the event that external factors prevent the attainment of the volume of 
internal resources required to finance investments, such institutions 
should with prudence increase the volume of lending that had previously 
been approved, without prejudice to the measures referred to in recom-
mendation 1 of Part II or to those they may deem it advisable to adopt 
in order to carry out this proposal; 
(2) That the relevant regulations contained in the articles of agree-
ment of the International Monetary Fund be made use of to enlarge the 
credit quotas of the Latin American countries and to modify them in ac-
cordance with prevailing conditions, thus increasing the efficiency of its 
compensatory policy. 
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11. MEASURES TO REDUCE PRICE FLUCTUATIONS OF PRIMARY PRODUCTS6 
Considering 
That efforts are beiííg made at the international level to obtain greater 
stability in the prices of primary products, and that with this object the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has established 
a Commission on International Commodity Trade; 
That without prejudice to the measures which may be recommended 
by that Commission for maintaining fair and reasonable prices for basic 
products, it is indispensable to prevent such prices from dropping below 
the critical levels at which output would be so affected that it would later 
be unable to meet the normal growth of demand; 
That although such an objective would as a rule necessitate world-wide 
agreements, Latin American countries could in special cases, such as those 
concerning certain strategic products or others in which the hemisphere's 
consumption or production represents a high proportion of the world 
total, contribute to averting a price decline by means of co-operative 
measures; 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) That the Commission on International Commodity Trade study 
measures to prevent prices of basic products from dropping below the 
critical levels referred to previously, including the following: 
(a) Measures to determine such critical levels and their periodic 
readjustment, in order to avoid an accumulation of stock that would 
be excessive in relation to growth trends of world demand; 
(b) The formation of buffer stocks that may be sold at the critical 
price level by the principal producer and consumer countries, and the 
procedure for liquidating such stocks; 
(c) The financial co-operation required to achieve the foregoing ob-
jectives. 
(2) That if prices of basic export products from Latin America 
threaten to drop below the critical level, the governments of the producer 
and consumer countries of the hemisphere should consult together with 
a view to meeting that risk, and, whenever appropriate, to promoting 
more extensive action at the international level. 
12. CONSULTATION PROCEDURE FOR AGRICULTURE SURPLUSES7 
Considering 
That the United States Government has decided to liquidate a propor-
tion of its agricultural surplus without provoking disturbances on the 
world market that would adversely influence other producers ; 
The recommendation is made: 
To follow a procedure of consultation between the interested countries 
which would contribute to greater success in the policy of liquidating 
agricultural surpluses on the world market in an orderly manner. 
6 See annex. 
T See footnote by the ECLA secretariat on page 82 regarding the F A O Con-
sultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal. 
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I I I . T R A D E P O L I C Y A N D E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T 
13 . INDUSTRIAL PROTECTION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
Considering 
That it is desirable to recognize certain essential principles which should 
guide the development policy of the Latin American countries and its 
relation to foreign trade and the policy of international co-operation; 
The recommendation is made: 
To formulate the following declarations: 
(a) Industrialization is an inevitable necessity for economic develop-
ment of the Latin American countries and this process must be progres-
sively amplified to the extent that—as technical advances are made in 
low-productivity activities—it will be increasingly necessary to employ 
in industry and services the potential labour force that export activities 
cannot advantageously absorb. 
(b) In addition to other incentives, industrialization requires tariff 
protection; if this protection is maintained within adequate and reason-
able limits and does not deprive export activities of the factors required 
for their normal development, it does not unfavourably affect the volume 
of world trade. 
(c) The interdependence of economic activities makes it essential that, 
combined with industrial development, special consideration should be 
given to agriculture, as well as the improvement of its techniques and 
working conditions, so as to avoid troublesome maladjustments of an 
economic and social nature. 
14. TRADE POLICY OF THE U N I T E D STATES IN REGARD TO 
L A T I N AMERICA 
Considering -
That a reduction of customs duties on primary products in the United 
States, by causing increased exports from the Latin American countries, 
leads, either directly or indirectly to an expansion of exports from the 
United States; and that in view of this spontaneous reciprocity it is not 
indispensable that Latin American countries should in turn lower tariffs 
which might adversely affect their economic development; 
That tariff protection in Latin America—if maintained within reason-
able limits—only modifies the composition of imports in accordance with 
structural changes in the internal economy, while higher customs duties 
in the large industrial centres unfavourably influence the volume of their 
trade with the less-developed countries; 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) To emphasize the special significance of the proposal publicly 
made by the United States Government to introduce reductions in cus-
toms duties, as also of the recent decision not to raise these tariffs in 
cases that would have adversely affected Latin American exports; 
(2) To underline the importance which the continuance and expan-
sion of this policy has for Latin American countries; 
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(3) To recognize that, notwithstanding these favourable measured, 
well-known obstacles exist in the United States which hinder further 
tariff reductions from reaching a scale sufficient to of fer a powerful 
stimulus for the development of Latin America's economy, and for this 
reason it is of fundamental importance that other vigorous co-operative 
measures be adopted in the international field. 
15. TRADE POLICY GOVERNING STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS 
Considering 
That the economic solidarity of the region is intimately linked with its 
political solidarity and that production and trade in those commodities 
known as strategic raw materials which are produced by Latin American 
countries should be conducted in the light of the basic principle of the 
inter-American system; 
That in considering the hemisphere as a common source of strategic 
raw materials, it is essential to adopt measures to meet the economic con-
sequences of this fact in the Latin American countries, as well as to 
encourage a better utilization of their natural resources; 
That the system of flexible tariffs applied to certain mineral imports 
in the United States causes serious repercussions on the Latin American 
economy; 
The recommendation is made: 
(1) To aVoid the expansion of high-cost marginal production in the 
United States, so as to maintain and enlarge mining activities in Latin 
America, both of strategic and other minerals; 
(2) To adopt measures offsetting the unfavourable consequences to 
Latin America should it be impossible to modify the current system of 
flexible tariffs because of the need to develop certain areas, or because 
of difficulties of another nature; 
(3) To give special consideration among these measures to additional 
imports of mineral products with a view to preventing prices from drop-
ping below the critical level which flexible tariffs endeavour to prevent; 
(4) To encourage production in Latin America from unexploited 
mining resources, or from those at present worked oh a very reduced 
scale in relation to the needs of the continent* through the co-operation 
of either international credit institutions or of private capital. 
16. LIBERALIZATION OF INTER-LATIN AMERICAN TRADE 
Considering 
That the development of certain branches of production in the Latin 
American countries generally requires broader markets than those pro-
vided by the domestic economy; 
That the reduction or elimination of trade restrictions between such 
countries would enable this objective to be achieved, thus facilitating 
greater specialization and supplementing their economies by better utiliza-
tion of resources, increased productivity, reduced costs, and benefits for 
consumers; 
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The recommendation is made: 
(1 j^FoJiberalize trade between the Latin American countries, reduc-
ing or eliminating" tariffs and other commercial barriers between them; 
(2) To extend the-measures initially applied by two or more countries-
to other Latin American^nations, including the granting of adequate 
compensation; 
(3) To take the foregoing p'rinciples~into ̂ account in the regulations 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade^(GATT). 
I V . T E C H N I C A L A S S I S T A N C E 
17. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
TRAINING OF HIGHLY QUALIFIED TECHNICAL PERSONNEL 
Considering 
That the United Nations and specialized agencies and the Organization 
of American States, as well as the Government of the United States of 
America, are engaged in placing at the disposal of under-developed coun-
tries their wealth of technical knowledge and research methods, which 
have been accumulated by the. more advanced countries; 
That among other important aspects, this task is of immeasurable sig-
nificance for the economic development of the Latin American countries; 
That experience has shown the resources devoted to this purpose are 
obviously inadequate and that the present system, which entails annual 
approval of those resources, detracts from the continuity that is indis-
pensable if technical assistance is to provide greater efficiency; 
That the direction and nature of technical assistance closely depends 
upon the objectives pursued by development programmes; 
That experience shows technical assistance to be required in the actual 
drawing up of these programmes, not only for the programme itself but 
also for the preparation of specific projects, and that for this purpose it 
is necessary to train technical personnel who are at present almost non-
existent in the field of programming; 
That among the efforts to this end, the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Technical Assistance Administration of the United 
Nations have begun a training programme for Latin American economists 
in Santiago, Chile, which deals with economic development, but that the 
magnitude of this programme is still limited in relation to practical re-
quirements ; 
That, in addition, more technical personnel for industry, agriculture 
and services must be trained and that although a praiseworthy effort to 
this end is being carried out through fellowship grants, about 3,000 fel-
lowship grants provided annually, for the whole of Latin America satisfies 
only part of the requirements; 
That in the task of training technicians it is advisable to benefit from 
and improve the facilities offered by Latin American countries them-
selves ; 
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The recommendation is made: 
(1) To enlarge substantially the resources devoted to technical assist-
ance for economic development and to give greater continuity to tasks 
that cannot be efficiently accomplished under a system that requires an-
nual approval of resources; 
(2) To form permanent cadres of international technical personnel 
to collaborate with the Latin American countries -in preparing develop-
ment programmes and specific projects; 
(3) To broaden the training programme for economists in the field of 
economic development organized jointly by the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Technical Assistance Administration of the 
United Nations and to extend this programme to other Latin American 
countries, organizing therein short training courses at periodic intervals; 
(4) To increase to 10,000 the number of fellowships that are granted 
each year for training senior technicians for employment in Latin 
America's agriculture industry and services; 
(5) To take advantage of Latin America's own technical experience 
in assistance given by some countries to others, for which purpose a list 
of Latin American experts specialized in different fields should be estab-
lished ; 
(6) To make use of the facilities existing in Latin American countries 
for the training of technicians, and to contribute to their improvement 
as far as possible. ^ 
18. PROGRAMMING OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
Considering 
That technical assistance to Latin American countries is still in an 
initial stage and does not yet therefore follow a definite plan; 
That the objectives of this programme are closely connected with the 
aims of a development policy-and until the latter are clearly defined, ade-
quate guidance cannot be given to technical assistance objectives; 
That while progress is being made in this dual task, it is essential to 
inaugurate a systematic examination of the most important needs of tech-
nical assistance, especially in the field of natural resources and their con-
servation, technological research into their better utilization, and produc-
tivity in agriculture, industry and services; 
That in regard to agricultural productivity the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations is making a valuable contribution, 
while the United States Government is making a most praiseworthy 
effort, in which the institutions of that country are participating efficiently, 
and that such efforts are now being extended to industry; 
That these efforts should be extended and intensified and advantage 
should be taken of the creation of the Inter-American Fund for Indus-
trial, Agriculturál and Mining Development to provide both a wider basis 
and greater continuity to technical assistance in order to increase indus-
trial productivity ; 
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The recommendation is made: 
(1) To entrust to the secretariat of the Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council of the Organization of American States, the secre-
tariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
and. the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, with the 
collaboration of the other international agencies concerned as well as 
of the United States Government, the preparation of a report on tech-
nical assistance requirements which should principally cover the follow-
ing points: 
(a) Technical assistance that has been given in analysing the natural 
resources of the Latin American countries, their conservation and use; 
practical results of that assistance; principal objectives which technical 
assistance should pursue in this field from the viewpoint of economic 
development and the degree and stages in which it is advisable to accom-
plish them; 
( b) Technical assistance to agriculture which would increase produc-
tivity, either directly or indirectly; results obtained and the objectives 
which a programme for agricultural productivity should follow, taking 
into consideration consumption requirements and export possibilities; 
r (c) Factors hindering increased productivity in industry, power and 
transport; criteria and the order of priorities to be followed in granting 
technical assistance, depending upon.the problems involved in developing 
these activities and the objectives established for them; 
(2) To recommend to these secretariats the calling of a Group of 
Experts to discuss the above-mentioned report and to draw up the 
basis for a technical assistance policy with respect to natural resources 
and productivity, presenting a cost estimate of this assistance based upon 
the extent of application that such experts consider advisable to recom-
mend as a means of meeting economic development requirements. The 
report of the group, together with that prepared by the secretariats, will 
be brought to the attention of their respective organizations; 
(3) To extend and intensify the present technical assistance for pro-
ductivity, especially that of the United Nations and of the Government 
of the United States of America. 
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A N N E X 
RESOLUTION 5 5 7 F ( X V I I I ) ADOPTED BY THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COUNCIL AT THE 8 2 9 T H PLENARY MEETING, 5 AUGUST 1 9 5 4 
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY TRADE 
The Economic and Social Council, 
Bearing in mind that Council resolution 512 A (XVII) provided for 
the creation of a permanent advisory Commission on International Com-
modity Trade and postponed its constitution and organization until the 
eighteenth session of the Council, 
Taking note oí the comments from governments contained in docu-
ments-E/2623 and E/2623/Add.l-3, 
y 
Noting that a majority of governments, either in their written com-
ments or in their statements during the debates on. this question in the 
Council, have expressed the view that the Commission should begin its 
work as soon as possible, especially in view of the urgency of problems 
in international commodity trade which was recognized in the debates on 
the world economic situation and economic development, 
Noting furthermore that several governments have expressed the view 
that, before the Commission is established, an opportunity should be 
given to the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade to consider to what extent the problem of instability in primary 
commodities should be dealt with under the auspices of that Agreement, 
Noting that this question will be raised at the forthcoming review of 
the General Agreement, 
Noting also the communication from the Director-General of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization, transmitting the view of the FAO Com-
mittee on Commodity Problems concerning the relationship between its 
work and. that of the Commission, together with the statement of the 
functions and activities of the said Committee in regard to international 
commodity, problems and trade, 
Mindful of the need to provide the Commission with an efficient and 
adequate organization to enable it to accomplish its mission satisfactorily. 
Considering that the Commission will be called upon to study some of 
the problems hitherto entrusted to the Interim Co-ordinating Committee 
for International Commodity Arrangements, 
Decides: 
1. To proceed with the immediate constitution of the Commission on 
International Commodity Trade on'the following basis: 
2. The arrangements for membership shall be as follows: 
(a) The Commission on International Commodity Trade shall be com-
posed of one representative of each of eighteen Members of the United 
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Nations elected by the Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure ade-
quate representation of all geographical regions and of countries' in 
various stages of development which participate to an important extent 
in international commodity trade and/or are closely dependent thereon; 
(b) With the exception of the initial period, the term of office of mem-
bers shall be three years; 
(c) When a representative of a member of the Commission is unable 
to serve for the full term of three years, the vacancy shall be filled by an-
other representative designated by the same Member State; 
(d) Retiring members shall be eligible for re-election; 
(e) The original members of the Commission shall be the eighteen 
States elected by the Council as early as possible at its resumed eighteenth 
session; 
( / ) The term of office of one-third of the Members shall end on 31 
December 1956, one-third on 31 December 1957, and one-third on 31 
December 1958; 
(g) Subsequent elections shall be conducted in accordance with the 
usual procedure for elections to functional commissions of the Council. 
3. In carrying out its work, the Commission shall be guided by the 
following principles: 
(a) Any Member State not represented on the Commission may bring 
to the Commission's attention any problem connected with international 
commodity trade within the Commission's terms of reference which it 
considers to be of special importance; 
(b) Any Member State not represented on the Commission may par-
ticipate in the Commission's debates on problems in which it has a direct 
concern. Similarly, the Commission, subject to prior authorization by 
the Council, may invite States which are not Members of the United 
Nations to take part in its discussions when their presence appears advis-
able for further clarification of the problems under study; 
(c) The Commission shall establish and maintain relations through the 
Secretary-General with other United Nations organs, specialized agen-
cies, international study groups and inter-governmental bodies concerned 
with the problem of primary commodities or with related questions. 
More specifically, in the interpretation of its terms of reference and in the 
organization of its work, the Commission shall consult on a continuing 
basis with various specialized agencies and their subordinate bodies hav-
ing responsibilities in the field of international commodity trade and, in 
particular, with the FAO Committee on Commodity Problems, so as to 
ensure that the most effective use is made of the work already being done 
in that field and to prevent duplication or overlapping with the activities 
of these agencies; 
(rf) Within the above framework, the Commission shall be authorized 
to inform Member and non-Member States of the conclusions of its stud-
ies, to send them its report, and to seek from them the available informa-
tion it requires for its work, all such relations being conducted through 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations; 
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(e) The Commission shall meet as frequently as it considers neces-
sary to discharge its work efficiently. The Commission shall meet only 
when specific items have been proposed for discussion; 
( / ) The Commission shall be authorized to hold private meetings 
when it considers this to be in the best interests of its work; 
(g) The States members of the Commission should appoint represen-
tatives who are qualified experts familiar with the technical and practical 
problems of international commodity trade 
•(h) Neither travel nor subsistence expenses of the representatives of 
members of the Commission shall be paid out of United Nations funds. 
4. Subject to prior authorization by the Council, and in accordance 
with the decisions of the General Assembly, the Commission may hold 
meetings away from headquarters when it considers this to be in the 
best interests of its work. 
5. The Commission shall submit to the Council reports on its activities, 
in which it may include its own recommendations. 
6. The Commission may submit to the Council its views and recom-
mendations on any changes it may consider desirable in its terms of 
reference, organization and rúles of procedure, so as to ensure the most 
practical development of its work. 
7. The Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity 
Arrangements shall, for the present, continue to discharge its functions 
of convening inter-governmental study groups, of making recommenda-
tions to the Secretary-General on the convening of commodity confer-
ences and of co-ordinating the activities of the individual commodity 
study groups and councils. The Commission shall assume all other respon~; 
sibilities hitherto discharged by the Interim Co-ordinating Committee. 
8. The Council, in consultation with the Secretary-General, shall con-
sider the status and functions of the Interim Co-ordinating Committee 
at its twentieth session. 
9. The Council shall consider in the future the status and functions of 
the Commission on International Commodity Trade in the light of any 
important development in its field, including the results of the discus-
sions by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, which shall be taken into account as soon as possible after these 
results are known. 
10. The Secretary-General shall convene the first session of the Com-
mission as early as possible in 1955. The agenda for this session shall 
include the following: 
(a) Survey of the current situation in international commodity trade; ¡ 
(b) Consideration of proposals by governments regarding interna-
tional commodity problems; 
(c) Consideration of terms of reference, rules of procedure and pro-
gramme of work. 
11. The Commission shall submit to the Council at its twentieth ses-
sion the first report on its specific activities concerning international com-
modity trade, and include therein its observations on its terms of refer-
ence, organization, rules of procedure and work programme, taking into * 
account the records of the discussions of the Council on this subject. 
147; 

